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Notes on transliteration and translations 
 
 
If otherwise not indicated, quotations from the Bible are from the New International 
Version; quotations from the Talmud are from the translation of Isidore Epstein. All 
quotations from the responsa are my translation, from the first printed editions of the 
collections. The transliteration of Hebrew follows that of the Encyclopaedia Judaica, with 
the exception that the letters alef and ayin are not indicated. The transliteration of Hebrew 
and Arabic names is not void of some inconsistencies, since where an Anglicized form 
exists, it is generally given precedence. Names of mediaeval authors are given as they 
appear in the Encyclopaedia Judaica. 
 The Mishnah is quoted according to chapter and halakhah (e.g. mGit 1:1); the 
Babylonian Talmud according to folio, side a or b (e.g. bGit 2b). Letter “m” preceding the 
name of the chapter refers to the Mishnah, letter “b” to the Babylonian Talmud. The 
abbreviations of the chapters are that of Strack, H. L. – Stemberger, G.: Introduction to the 








agadah     non-legal portions of the Talmud and the Midrash 
agunah     woman prevented from marriage 
am ha-areÛ    ignorant 
anus, anusim (pl.)   forced convert 
Ashkenaz (n.), Ashkenazic (adj.) Germany, German Jew 
baal teshuva    repentant Jew 
converso, conversos (pl.) Iberian Jews converted to Christianity and their 
descendants 
dayyan     judge of a rabbinical court of law 
eirusin     betrothal 
gaon, geonim (pl.)   head of academy in the post-talmudic period. 
gazbar     treasurer 
ger     proselyte 
get      divorce document 
gezerah    religious persecution, oppressive law 
halakhah (n.), halakhic (adj.)   Jewish law 
ÎaliÛah  ceremony by which the obligation of levirate marriage is 
dissolved 
Îazakah    presumption taken to be true unless proven otherwise 
Îuppah     bridal canopy; nuptials 
ishut     marital status 
karet     punishment at the hands of heaven 
kashrut     Jewish dietary laws 
ketubah     marriage document 
kiddushin    betrothal 
kohen, kohanim (pl.)   descendant of a priestly family 
kosher     fit according to Jewish law 
levir     husband’s brother 
mamzer    offspring of an adulterous or incestuous relationship 
maÛÛah     unleavened bread  
meshummad, meshummadim (pl.) voluntary convert 
mikveh     ritual bath 
min, minim (pl.)   sectarian 
minyan     quorum, ten male adult Jews 
niddah  period unfit for marital life; woman who is in a period 
which is unfit for marital life (like the menstruation and the 
seven following days 
nissuin     nuptials 
Sepharad (n.), Sephardic (adj.)  Iberia, Iberian Jews and their descendants  
setam yeinam    wine of Gentiles 
shemad     forced conversion 
shiddukhin    engagement, match 
yein nesekh    libation wine 
yibbum     levirate marriage 
yiÎud     private meeting of a man and a woman 





Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
I. Historical background 
 
In the Middle Ages a large and prosperous Jewish community lived in the Iberian 
Peninsula1. In the High Middle Ages they formed an integral part of the Iberian society, 
being present in every layer of it. They were not confined to certain occupations, neither 
did they live isolated from their Christian and Muslim neighbours. They took part in the 
intellectual, politic, financial, economic and agricultural life of Iberia.2 They served as 
diplomats, advisors of rulers, courtiers, interpreters, teachers, physicians, merchants, 
shopkeepers, artisans, tax-farmers, soldiers, and farmers. They always formed a subjugated 
group of course, whether under Muslim or Christian dominion. For Muslim Jews (just as 
Christians) belonged to the “people of the Book” and as such formed a protected group 
(ahl al-Æimmah), which through accepting the sovereignty of Islam was granted well-
defined rights, hospitality, and protection. The position of both Jews and Christians 
deteriorated when the Almohads (a Berber dynasty of Morocco that ruled in al-Andalus in 
the 12th century) adopted an intolerant policy towards their non-Muslim subjects, that led 
to massive forced conversions and the emigration of numerous Jews to Christian lands or 
to Muslim East, where they could place themselves under more tolerant Muslim rulers.3 
Although the Almohad persecution was not the first massive forced conversion which the 
Iberian Jewish community had to face, it was a relatively new phenomenon, for previous 
massive forced conversions happened long before, in the Early Middle Ages. In the 
seventh century the Visigoth rulers decreed several times forced conversion or else 
expulsion of their Jewish subjects, but the mere fact that these decrees were repeated again 
and again proves that they had not been carried out thoroughly. The tactic to be adopted 
with regard to the Almohad persecution was determined by Maimonides who in his 
“Iggeret ha-shemad” (Letter about the forced conversion) established that under such 
                                                 
1 I use the name Iberia in an extensive sense, including its dependencies, like the Balearic islands. 
2 The involvement of Jews in public life underwent considerable changes during the centuries, depending on 
time and place. In general it can be said that in the course of the Middle Ages, their position gradually 
deteriorated and their possibilities became more and more limited; their activities were confined to certain 
spheres, while they were denied access to others.    
3 Cf. the emigration of Maimonides to Cairo, where he became the court physician of the Ayyubid ruler al-
Malik al-AfÃal. (Not of Saladin, as it is widely believed. Cf. Vajda: “Ibn Maymun” EI 3:876-878) 
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circumstances one should not choose martyrdom but formally accept Islam. However, one 
should not remain under the dominion of the oppressive ruler, but leave for a land where 
he could practice Jewish religion freely.     
Jews living in the Christian kingdoms of Iberia in the first centuries of the 
Reconquista encountered favourable conditions; Christian rulers encouraged their Jewish 
subjects to settle in the newly conquered territories, since Jews were supposed to be loyal 
to the new leaders (as opposed to the recently conquered Muslims), and as mostly city 
dwellers they could contribute to the economic prosperity of the developing Christian 
kingdoms. They were offered even extensive landed property by the rulers in order to 
further their settling down. Jews were serfs of the king, property of the royal treasury, and 
formed autonomous communities. They were granted the right to exercise their own 
criminal jurisdiction and even inflicting death penalty. With the consolidation of the 
Christian power by the middle of the thirteenth century, the demographic and economic 
map of the fourteenth century Iberia underwent considerable changes. The thirteenth 
century code of law entitled “Las siete partidas” compiled during the reign of Alfonso X 
el Sabio of Castile contained some restrictive dispositions such as the obligation of 
wearing a Jewish badge or the prohibition of holding position of authority over Christians. 
On the other hand, the code of law granted protection to Jewish subjects, and determined 
the way of coexistence between Jews and Christians. In any case, the Code acquired legal 
authority only in the fourteenth century. From the middle of the thirteenth century the 
Church attacked Jews more fiercely; there came the first blood libel case (1250, 
Saragossa), then the Barcelona Disputation (1263), in another couple of years the 
Dominican monk Raymond Martini composed his “Pugio Fidei adversus Mauros et 
Judaeos” (The Dagger of Faith against Moors and Jews) of which accusations were 
repeated in anti-Jewish campaigns for many years. The Black Death was followed by riots 
and massacres in Aragon. At the end of the fourteenth century, the Jews’ right of 
exercising their own criminal jurisdiction was withdrawn by the Castilian Court. In 
Aragon, Jewish courtiers were dismissed and consequently, the influence of Jews in 
political life diminished considerably. Their opportunities of social advancement became 
more and more limited due to the several restrictive measures taken against them. They 
were banished from an ever growing number of professions and occupations, they were 
forced to engage in public religious disputations with Christians, and they were compelled 
to bear the consequences of the sermons directed against them by the militant Dominican 
and Franciscan orders, especially the violent onslaughts of the archdeacon of Ecija, Ferrant 
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Martinez. The growing social tension among Jews and Christians erupted in Seville in the 
summer of 1391, when the kingdom of Castile experienced a period of interregnum. 
Disorder and riots spread to the rest of Castile, to Andalusia, and to Aragon. Jewish 
communities were decimated or destroyed, many of their members killed or forcibly 
baptized; thus originating the social group of converts to Christianity, called “New 
Christians” or “conversos” by Iberian “Old Christians,” that is, Christians of non-Semitic 
origin.  
Many Jews who managed to escape from the rioting mob left Iberia and emigrated 
to North Africa or to other parts of the world where they could practice Judaism openly. 
The part of North Africa called Maghreb4 in the course of the 15th century was in a state of 
total political fragmentation; it was divided between small hostile states ruled by Berber 
dynasties (the Merinides, the Ziyanids, the ÍafÒids), which were in constant war with one 
another. The Jews arriving from Iberia settled along the North African coast, in Honein, 
Oran, Mostaganem, Tenes, Algiers, Bougie, and Tunis; and in inland cities as Tlemcen, 
Constantine, and Medea. They sometimes joined the Jewish communities already existent 
there, but more frequently they formed their own, distinct communities. Even in the course 
of the fifteenth century, Iberian conversos and their descendants did not cease to flee from 
Iberia to the Maghreb, despite the repeatedly renewed prohibitions of the Christian rulers 
to leave their dominium. On the other hand, at that time, the masses of forced converts 
remaining in Iberia formed a numerous and peculiar group in the society remarkably 
different from those individual Jews who accepted Christian faith in the previous centuries 
by choice, for example in the hope of a better carrier. Both Jews and Christians had to face 
a new social reality, the shaping of a well-defined social and religious group whose 
members were neither entirely Christians nor Jews. Even the conversos who wished to 
adopt Christian belief could not assimilate to the majority of the society overnight, let 
alone those who definitely opposed to following Christian religion and did their utmost to 
observe Judaism in secret. According to the Catholic doctrine, the effect of the sacraments, 
therefore that of baptism is irrevocable; a person once baptized remains Christian in any 
case, even if he was baptized against his will. Furthermore, returning to the former faith 
was considered a most serious sin, which had to be prevented. In consequence, the 
conversos had no choice but to live as if they were Christians, mostly because the Papal 
Inquisition which had been active in Iberia before the establishment of the Spanish 
                                                 
4 Maghreb: meaning “West” in Arabic, a denomination referring to the part of Iberia and of Africa ruled by 
Muslims, with the exception of Egypt. 
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National Inquisition (1481) kept an eye on the neophytes, and censured their relapses. The 
Christian society was by no means prepared to the integration of a mass of newly 
converted Jews; for they as New Christians meant competition to the Old Christians, since 
all the opportunities which had been denied them as Jews were opened them as Christians. 
Still, they were not really integrated to the Christian majority; most of the conversos were 
ignorant of the details (or in many cases, the essential doctrines) of Christianity, because 
they were not educated in their new faith. Furthermore, most of them continued to live in 
the same neighbourhood, streets, and houses as prior to their conversion, frequently 
sharing their dwelling place with non-convert Jews. Family ties were not necessarily 
severed because of the (forced) baptism of some members of the family; conversos and 
Jews formed mixed families interlinked by bonds of kinship, personal interest, custom, and 
necessity. Jews and conversos were in many aspects interdependent, since Jewish law did 
not annul certain obligations incumbent upon its followers just because one of the parties 
was converted.5 On the other hand, a converso wishing to observe Judaism in secret could 
not dispense with the assistance of the Jewish community. Such was the situation in which 
the leading rabbis of the Jewish communities had to formulate their opinions concerning 
legal problems that emerged in consequence of the coexistence of Jews and conversos, or 
aroused regarding converts leaving Iberia and returning to Judaism in North Africa.  
 
II. Mumarim, anusim, meshummadim 
 
 In theory, three categories of converts can be distinguished, according to the 
circumstances of their conversion or the measure of their deviation from Jewish law.6 A 
person disregarding one or more religious precept for whatever reason is called in Hebrew 
“mumar” (non-observant; with regard to that specific precept, or with regard Jewish law in 
general) which is a neutral denomination. A person compelled to violate one or more 
commandment by whatever reason (out of fear, ignorance, inevitable necessity, etc.) is 
called “anus” (a forced one). One who disregards a percept or Jewish law in general is 
                                                 
5 For example, a woman wishing to divorce her converso husband was obliged to obtain a bill of divorce 
from him, or else their marriage was not dissolved; a woman under the obligation of levirate marriage was 
required to perform a formal act called ÎaliÛah (taking of the shoe of her deceased husband’s brother) in 
order to be permitted to remarry even if the brother in question happened to be a converso. About these 
obligations see the chapters about divorce and levirate marriage. 
6 About the categorization of converts of different kinds, and transgressing religious precepts under duress, 
see bSanh 74a-b; Netanyahu 1966:6-22; the Iggeret ha-Shemad by Maimonides; and the responsa to be 
discussed in the thesis, especially Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 4, 11.     
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called “meshummad” (renegade or apostate). All the three denominations were used 
referring to conversos, but in the majority of the situations, the last two terms were used. 
For the sake of clarity, if not otherwise indicated, I will always translate “anus” as “forced 
convert,” “meshummad” as “voluntary convert,” and “mumar” as “convert,” without any 
specification.  
 Although in theory the distinction is sufficiently clear among the above mentioned 
terms, in practice it was not self evident if a converso had to be considered as a voluntary 
or a forced one. A person who was violently seized by rioters, and upon whose head the 
baptismal water was poured against his will was evidently a forced convert. But if the same 
person remained in Christian land, subject to their laws, and violated certain precepts in 
order to pretend to be a faithful Christian, could he be considered as someone forced to 
disregard Jewish law? Or could it be supposed that since he did not leave for a land where 
he could practice Judaism openly, he became a voluntary convert after all, notwithstanding 
the fact that his conversion was originally effectuated by obvious compulsion and menace 
of death? It must be stated that the terms referring to the conversos were not used 
consistently by the authors of the responsa, and even less so by the inquirers who 
addressed them with their questions. Not to mention the fact that in the texts the terms 
“anusim” and “meshummadim” were frequently changed to the neutral term “mumarim” 
due to censorship. Since these terms were not used systematically, one cannot tell the 
different groups of conversos merely on the basis of the parlance apart. It seems probable 
that the Hebrew terms chosen for the specification of the conversos, did not necessarily 
reflect the circumstances of their conversion, and were frequently used as synonyms. For 
the same reason insisting on the consequent translation of the terms as forced or voluntary 
converts may be misleading to a certain extent; in any case, I will point out the 
inconsistencies of the usage of these terms in every case I find it necessary.  
 
III. Subject and aim of the research 
 
The main sources of the history of the conversos are those of Christian origin; 
archival documents, files of the Inquisition, polemic literature, and the like. The 
information obtained from these sources is supplemented by data from Hebrew sources; 
such as chronicles, letters, polemic and philosophic literature. The responsa written in 
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Hebrew by leading rabbinic authorities of the time also gained some attention, but they 
were not taken into consideration as extensively and systematically as the other sources. 
 The thesis wishes to present a systematic and detailed elaboration of the halakhic 
(legal) decisions written by five of the most important authors who wrote responsa 
concerning conversos between the years 1391 and 1492, that is, between the year in which 
the massive social group of forced converts originated in Iberia, and the year when the 
expulsion of the Jews from the united kingdoms of the Catholic Monarchs, Queen Isabel of 
Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon took place. The expulsion was an event that 
radically changed the perspectives of the Iberian conversos. The halakhic authorities were 
confronted with an absolutely new situation, in which they had to reformulate their 
position towards the conversos. The thesis aims to present all the responsa written in 
connection with conversos by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran and his 
descendants: Solomon b. Simeon Duran, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran and Simeon b. 
Solomon Duran.  
As the focus of the responsa is the halakhic discussion, the details concerning the 
circumstances of the case that are not of basic importance in terms of the discussion are 
often omitted. Unfortunately, the religion of the converted person is often regarded as 
indifferent in the argumentation, and therefore it is not always explicitly stated. In the 
thesis I have dealt with the responsa that concern Iberian conversos to Christianity 
presumably, whether it was stated expressly in the text or if it could be inferred from the 
context of the responsum. I have also included a few responsa where it was impossible to 
determine if they concerned conversos to Christianity or converts to Islam, but had 
relevance to the subject under discussion. In these cases, the uncertainty concerning the 
adopted religion of the converts is clearly indicated in the analysis of the given responsum.  
  The historical data deductible from the responsa will be presented in its original 
context, that is, in close connection with the halakhic discussion, and not independently of 
it. This method permits to evaluate the historical evidence offered by the responsum in its 
proper dimensions, which in many cases shows the limits of the research based on these 
sources. Consequently, the thesis cannot answer the (in my opinion, erroneous) question 
whether the conversos were Jews or Christians.7 The purpose of the research is to present 
an authentic picture of the conversos containing all the details offered by the sources, but 
the imperfect picture so produced would not contain the products of my imagination. I did 
                                                 
7 Asked more or less literally by Netanyahu 1966:2-3, 22. 
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not make a selection of the sources unlike many other previous studies, thus I do not 
present the interesting parts of a discourse only, and moreover, I do not try to reinforce any 
preconceptions with them (in preconceptions I mean the endeavours of the researches to 
prove the conversos being “real” Christians/Jews) –– I disclose the whole discourses as 
they are. As a result, after reading the thesis, the reader will not have a unified (and 
simplified) view of the conversos, mostly because no such unified view ever existed. The 
thesis is aware of the limits of its subject, and does not want to disclose more than it can, it 
adheres to the evidence offered by the texts, and does not misrepresent them in order to 
reach an appealing but unfounded conclusion. 
 
IV. Sources of the research 
 
The responsa are legal decisions in form of detailed answers given to actual 
questions send by inquirers who might be rabbis themselves, or anyone capable of 
formulating a question and forwarding it to a halakhic authority willing to answer it.8 
Some responsa deal with hypothetical cases that certainly reflect the reality nevertheless; 
otherwise the rabbis would not have found it necessary to expound their opinion in written 
form concerning the issue. The responsa was frequently copied by its author (or the rabbi’s 
students) and thus a copy generally remained in the possession of the rabbi as well. These 
were later collected and edited by the authors themselves or by their students. Furthermore, 
the responsa were copied by those who got access to them during their way to the 
addressees; or by those who were permitted by the owners of the collections to copy them 
for their use. In the course of the repeated transcriptions, the responsa were sometimes 
remarkably shortened; the data regarded as irrelevant to the halakhic discussion like proper 
names, dates, etc. were frequently omitted. Sometimes the copied versions were mere 
digests of the originals containing hardly more than the essence of the question, a brief 
summary of the halakhic argumentation, and the decision. Despite these deficiencies the 
responsa are still a most valuable source of history, since it generally treats specific events 
and therefore is strictly connected with the reality of everyday life. The responsum in most 
cases originates as an answer to the necessity of the moment, and even if it is not void of 
certain tendentiousness characteristic of other sources of history (like chronicles, or 
                                                 
8 About the origins and development of the responsa literature, and the methods of their study, see Freehof 
195 , Soloveitchik 1990, Haas 1996.  
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polemic literature, for example), it certainly offers most realistic information regarding the 
fate of the majority of the conversos. 
 It has to be noted however, that the most valuable information in this respect lies 
not in the direct statements or judgments of the rabbis concerning the attitude of the 
conversos in one or another situation, but in the descriptions of the case and in the final 
decisions themselves. A rabbi might make a remark in the course of the halakhic 
discussion in order to illustrate or support the halakhic argumentation without intending it 
as a statement of absolute value. For example, Simeon b. Solomon Duran when discussing 
whether conversos of priestly origin returning to Judaism enjoy priority in the reading of 
the Torah, remarked that conversos in general used to observe the laws concerning purity 
of marital life (the third or fourth generation of conversos in the last decades of the 15th 
century), although this obviously exaggerating ascertainment is contradicted by previous 
and following authors alike. However, since he discussed a case in which the observance 
of purity of marital life was irrelevant, he presumably permitted himself to make 
exaggerating remarks in order to illustrate that conversos did not differ from Jews to such a 
great extent.  
 
 
V. A critical survey of the history of the research 
 
 H. J. Zimmels: Die Marranen in der Rabbinischen Literatur. Berlin, 1932 
Works dealing with Iberian converts on the basis of responsa literature are scarce. 
The first such compendium was written by H. J. Zimmels. This relatively short work (less 
than 200 pages) presents and analyses some 80 sources from the year 1391 till 1737. As a 
result of the width of the timeframe and the number of the sources treated, the author could 
not discuss the sources profoundly, and could not relate to all of the available texts. 
Zimmels did not detail the halakhic argumentation, but concentrated on the presentation of 
the historical data contained in the responsa. In spite of that, his work is of paramount 
importance until this day, and its approach to the sources is exemplary. As opposed to later 
historians, the argumentation of Zimmels is accurate and reliable; he does not rush into 
conclusions and does not draw far-reaching implications on the basis of superficial reading 
and misinterpretation of the texts. He cannot be accused of trying to prove a presumed 
thesis at any cost, either through intentional or erroneous false presentation of the sources, 
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by deliberately ignoring those that contradict the given thesis and emphasizing those that 
support it, or by quoting passages taken out from their original context.   
Zimmels (1932:21) differentiated five phases with regard to the position taken by 
the majority of the rabbis concerning the converts. From the period of the years 1391-1492 
Zimmels presented nineteen responsa written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet and the members 
of the Duran family, all of them pertaining to the first phase. In his view, this phase was 
characterized by and large by a major adherence to Jewish religion on the part of the 
converts forcibly baptized in 1391 and their descendants, who were in turn deemed by the 
rabbinical authorities as Jews who sinned (by living outwardly as Christians), but still 
remained Jews.9 It does not mean however that their conversion and staying in Iberia did 
not have practical consequences regarding their halakhic status. Some of these are briefly 
mentioned and presented by Zimmels but without going into details.     
 
Simcha Assaf: “Anusei Sefarad u-Portugal be-sifrut ha-teshuvot” [“The forced converts of 
Spain and Portugal in the responsa literature”] Zion 1932, pp. 19-6010 
Simcha Assaf’s essay on the subject of responsa dealing with Iberian converts was 
published in the same year as Zimmels’ work. This essay is not a systematic discussion of 
the subject, but it was not intended as such. The purpose of Assaf was in the first place to 
call attention to the neglected Hebrew sources regarding the history of the conversos. He 
emphasized that beside the already researched inquisitorial documents there existed 
another group of sources that had remained disregarded till then, namely the halakhic 
decisions written by the contemporary rabbinical authorities. In order to demonstrate the 
historical relevance of these sources, Assaf presented a selection of some interesting 
passages. He did not analyze the texts, let alone study them in a systematic way. It is 
highly probable that Assaf was motivated by the awakening enthusiasm of his time with 
regard to the descendants of Iberian converts who, after preserving their Jewish identity 
during four centuries in secret, decided to return to Judaism openly.11 To this end, Assaf 
outlined a heroic and quite romantic picture of crypto-Jews adhering to their ancient faith 
with all efforts possible, and his main concern was to illustrate this heroic struggle with 
proof texts taken from the responsa, from the files of the Inquisition, or from secondary 
literature. Since he did not clearly distinguish the sources he used, it is not always entirely 
                                                 
9 Cf. bSanh 44a 
10 I have used the edition of Assaf’s article published in the collection of his essays (Assaf 19 3).     
11 Assaf begins his article with making reference to the descendants of Portuguese converts returning to 
Judasim. Cf. Assaf 1943:143.  
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clear to what extent the picture formed is based on the responsa themselves, and how much 
it is based on other kind of sources. 
 
Benzion Netanyahu: The Marranos of Spain from the Late XIVth to the Early XVIth 
Century according to Hebrew Sources. New York, 1966 
 The possibly most widely known and controversial work concerning conversos 
(called also marranos in Castilian) was written by Benzion Netanyahu. The scope of this 
work encompasses three kinds of sources: responsa; philosophic and polemic literature; 
and homiletic and exegetic literature. The thesis that Netanyahu wishes to prove on the 
basis of these sources is that “the overwhelming majority of the Marranos at the time of the 
establishment of the Inquisition were not Jews, but detached from Judaism, or rather, to put 
it more clearly, Christians” (Netanyahu 1966:3) and consequently, the purpose of the 
Inquisition was not to confront a Judaizing heresy (as the number of those who adhered to 
Judaism was insignificant in his view) “but to eradicate the Marrano group from the midst 
of the Spanish people” (Netanyahu 1966:4) due to “racial hatred and political 
considerations rather than by religious zeal” (Netanyahu 1966:3). Netanyahu formulated 
his view in an outspoken defiance against the opinion of Y. Baer: “Conversos and Jews 
were one people, bound together by ties of religion, and fate, and messianic hope.”12 
Furthermore, “essentially the Inquisition was right in evaluating the character of the 
conversos,”13 i.e., that they observed Judaism, and continued to live as Jews. But such a 
short introduction cannot treat in details the controversy between Baer and Netanyahu, 
therefore I wish to limit my comments on Netanyahu’s use of the responsa as historical 
sources only. 
  The most problematic aspect of Netanyahu’s method is that he does not relate to 
the halakhic decisions as to integral texts, where even considerations of historical 
relevance appear in the context of a legal argumentation, and not independently of it. 
Moreover, these considerations in general do not constitute the essential part of the 
responsa, but are disclosed passim in the course of the discussion. Often they are not meant 
to be full-fledged statements of universal value, but vague remarks supporting or 
illustrating the halakhic argumentation. It does not mean that they do not reflect historical 
reality at all, but they must be treated with due circumspection, and first and foremost, 
always in close connection with their original context. Netanyahu, however, often presents 
                                                 
12 Quoted by Netanyahu 1966:2-3, from Baer 1959:365.  
13 Quoted by Netanyahu 1966:3, from Baer 1959:464. 
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passages of the responsa without even mentioning the question, or elucidating the specific 
case they relate to. He aims to decide the question of “Jewishness or non-Jewishness of the 
Marranos” (Netanyahu 1966:22) without being aware of the fact that this question as such 
was never addressed to the rabbis, but always in connection with some particular aspects.  
Netanyahu frequently reaches false conclusions due to the superficial interpretation 
of the texts. For example, it should not be automatically supposed that if a consideration is 
not mentioned in a certain responsum, but it is exposed in another, that necessarily 
indicates that the opinion of the rabbi has changed in the meantime. All the more so, if the 
new consideration relates to a social or historical phenomenon, which naturally influences 
the halakhic argumentation but does not constitute the basis of it. A rabbi might mention a 
social phenomenon in order to support his halakhic argumentation without attaching 
cardinal importance to it (as opposed to the historian, who might take out a certain remark 
of this kind from its original context and relate to it as to an unquestionable historical 
evidence). For example, if in a responsum (Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11) 
informers are mentioned while in another text written possibly before14 (Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet: Responsa, no. 4.) they are not mentioned, it does not mean necessarily that they 
have appeared in the meantime (as it is supposed by Netanyahu, 1966:30). It is even more 
misleading if the historian rushes into far-reaching conclusions on the basis of such 
erroneous implications (e.g., when Netanyahu concludes that due to the alleged appearance 
of the informers, the whole converso community became divided in two conflicting 
fractions split by an impervious gap, while they formed a unified group beforehand). There 
are a lot of probable reasons why a text should not mention the informers, and only one of 
them is the possibility that they have not existed yet. Moreover, nothing in the second 
responsum indicates that the lack of homogeneity in the group of the converts was a new 
phenomenon. On the contrary, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet stated already in the first responsum 
that some of the converts adhered to Judaism while others abandoned it. The fact that the 
first responsum does not mention informers does not prove that they did not exist; neither 
does the fact that the second responsum relates to them demonstrate that the group of the 
conversos as a whole underwent such an essential change in the time that lapsed between 
issuing the two responsa, that led to the emergence of a “new […] social panorama” 
(Netanyahu 1966:30).   
                                                 
14 It is supposed that the responsa of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet concerning converts appear in the printed 
editions in the order they were issued. Cf. Netanyahu 1966:23 and the bibliography referred to there.   
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It is even more disappointing when Netanyahu mentions a part of a statement made 
by an authority (the part supporting his hypothesis of course), ignoring the rest of it 
(contradicting his theory).15 
 This is not the appropriate place to offer a detailed critique of Netanyahu’s work. 
Therefore I wish to choose one typical statement of him in order to demonstrate one of his 
usual errors.   
 
While by that time Ribash had already abandoned his unreserved faith 
in the Jewishness of the Marranos and began to limit their validity as 
witnesses before a Jewish court, RashbaÛ still insisted on treating them 
as Jews without any reservation whatsoever…16  
 
As opposed to this ascertainment the following must be observed: 
1) Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet (that is, the Ribash) never discussed the “Jewishness” of the 
converts, but their actual or presumed legal status concerning particular issues (as 
marriage, testifying, writing a divorce document, handling wine, etc.). A person can be 
considered as a Jew from one point of view, while at the same time he can be considered 
as a Gentile from another point of view.   
2) In the surviving responsa written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet there is no indication 
whatsoever that he had had “unreserved faith in the Jewishness of the Marranos” (whatever 
Netanyahu meant by Jewishness). On the contrary, if Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet made general 
statements about the converts’ degree of adherence to Jewish law, he claimed that they 
were presumed to violate the law even if they were not literally forced to, and therefore in 
general they did not qualify as witnesses for example.  
3) If Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet really began “to limit their validity as witnesses before a 
Jewish court” (after abandoning his allegedly unreserved faith in them), that would have 
been an extremely lenient position towards them, since a person has to comply with a 
number of severe requirements so that he may qualify as a witness. For example, it must be 
assumed that he never commits even a minor transgression (the penalty of which is 
lashing), if he is not evidently and literally forced to.17 Whoever is supposed to violate the 
                                                 
15 For example, when Netanyhau (1966:42) states that according to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran the death of a 
convert should not be mourned by his non-convert relatives. Netanyahu fails to mention that this responsum 
differentiates between three types of converts; two of them should be mourned, the third should not. For the 
detailed discussion of the responsum (Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: 2:139) see the chapter about death. 
16 Netanyahu 1966:33 
17 Cf. MT Hilkhot Edut 10:1-2 
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Sabbath when not under threat of death is usually disqualified as a witness.18 It has to be 
noted again, that contrarily to the claim of Netanyahu, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet never held 
that converts as a group would qualify as witnesses; on the contrary. A rabbi taking on a 
more severe position towards converts would not accept them universally as valid 
witnesses, but might hold, for example, that they were to be considered as Jews with regard 
to their marital status solely, since it depended on their descent, and not on their manners 
and customs.    
 
Moisés Orfali Levi: Los conversos españoles en la literatura rabínica. Problemas jurídicos 
y opiniones legales durante los siglos XII-XVI. Salamanca, 1982 
The short tractate written by Moisés Orfali Levi is again more a selection of sources 
than a systematic analysis. Given the limited extension of the work (66 pages), and the five 
centuries it encompasses, it is obvious that the author could not offer a detailed discussion 
of the sources, but a kind of anthology drawing the attention of the students of history to a 
group of less known sources.   
 
Summing up the shared characteristics of these works I wish to point out the 
following: 1) they relate only to a minor part of the sources available, discussing solely a 
very limited number of the responsa written on this subject; 2) they do not present the 
historical data in their halakhic context; 3) they do not analyze the texts in a systematic 
way. 
These deficiencies make complimentary research necessary. My work is intended 
to be a modest contribution in this direction.       
 
 
VI. Life and works of the authors  
 
VI.1. Isaac ben Sheshet Perfet (Ribash)19 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet (1326-1408), known also as the Ribash, from the acronym 
of his Hebrew name, was born in 1326 in Barcelona. His family background is not well 
                                                 
18 Cf. e.g. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 4, 11, 12, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66, 3:312, 
3:40, 3:43, Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 553, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125. 
19 See: Zimmels: “Isaac ben Sheshet Perfet” EJ 9:32-33; Zimmels 1932:24; Zimmels 1971:386-387, 389-391; 
Riera i Sans 1983; Hershman 1943; Netanyahu 1966:22-32; Orfali Levi 1982:25-26; Glick 2006:1051-1052. 
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known, but it is probable that his father was not a scholar (MeÛger 1993:12). His teachers 
were R. Nissim b. Reuben Gerondi, R. PereÛ b. Isaac ha-Kohen, R. Íasdai b. Judah 
Crescas. He acted as a rabbi or as a dayyan (judge of a rabbinical court of law) in 
Barcelona until 1370, although he did not hold an official position. In 1370, he was 
arrested together with other Jewish notables. After several months of imprisonment, he 
moved to Saragossa, and from there to Valencia in 1385. The assault on the Jewish quarter 
of Valencia in 1391 that put an end to the powerful Valencian aljama (community) had 
serious consequences in the life of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet. After the sack of the Jewish 
quarter (that happened on the 9th of July, 1391), practically the whole community was 
converted by force to Christianity. According to Riera i Sans (1983) Isaac ben Sheshet 
Perfet was baptized on the 11th of July, and took the name Jaime of Valencia, as it is 
evidenced by the notarial documents of the Valencian municipality. Although finally he 
left for North Africa, where he reverted to Judaism, in the opinion of Riera i Sans he 
apparently stayed in Valencia outwardly as a Christian at least for one and a half year.20  
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet was appointed dayyan in Algiers by the Muslim authorities. 
The appointment was criticized by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, who regarded it as an 
improper intervention in the internal affairs of the Jewish community. Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet died in Algiers in 1408.  
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet wrote commentaries on several tractates of the Talmud, a 
commentary on the Torah, and composed a number of liturgical poems as well. However, 
his most influential work is his responsa. Almost each one of his responsa treating halakhic 
issues (as opposed to those discussing other matters, as aggadah, philosophy or grammar) 
are referred to by Josef Karo in the Beit Josef.21 The numbering of the responsa does not 
correspond to that of the printed edition, which was established by Samuel ha-Levi,22 since 
Josef Karo used three manuscripts containing different sections of the responsa written by 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, that were organized in different order. (MeÛger 1993:15) 
The responsa were first published in Constantinople, 1546-47, based on the 
manuscript in the possession of Samuel ha-Levi. The second edition appeared in Riva di 
Trento (1559). Subsequent editions appeared in Lemberg (1805), Vilna (1879). A critical 
                                                 
20 Riera i Sans reached this conclusion relying on the statement of Hershman, according to which Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet arrived in North-Africa after the arrival of R. Isaac Bonastruc of Barcelona, who was enlisted 
by the Catalonian authorities among the refugees in November 1392. Cf. Riera i Sans 1983:15 
21 Josef Karo (16th century), the author of the most influential halakhic code called Sulkhan Arukh. Beit Josef 
is his famous commentary on the code of Jewish law entitled Arbaah Turim (Henceforth: Tur) written by 
Jacob b. Asher in the 14th century. 
22 About the identity of Samuel ha-Levi see: MeÛger 1993:14, n. 51 
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edition of his responsa appeared in Jerusalem (1993) in the edition of David MeÛger. The 
so-called Sheelot u-Teshuvot ha-Ribash ha-Íadashot [New Responsa by the Ribash] 
(Munkacs, 1901) were attributed to Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, although apparently the author 
of most of them (Zimmels 1972:33) or all of them (MeÛger 1993:17) was another person. 
He wrote some twelve responsa relating to conversos, dealing with marriage, 
divorce, levirate marriage, wine produced or handled by conversos, inheritance, etc. These 
decisions were written in the decade after the great wave of forced conversion of the year 
1391, that is, in a period when conversos as a massive group of the society were still a new 
phenomenon. His decisions, consequently, laid the foundations for later authorities for 
their discussion of this problem.    
 
IV.2. Simeon ben ÚemaÎ Duran (author of the TashbeÛ)23 
Simeon ben ÚemaÎ Duran was born in Majorca in 1361. He studied in Palma with 
R. Ephraim Vidal and later in Aragon with R. Jonah Desmaestre, whose daughter he 
eventually married. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran had vast halakhic knowledge, and besides, he 
was also skilled in natural sciences such as medicine, mathematics and astronomy. After 
the massive religious persecutions of the year 1391, he left Majorca, and settled in Algiers 
with his family, where he joined the rabbinical court of law led by R. Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet. As it was stated above, his relationship with Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet was not void of 
tension. After the death of the Ribash (1408), Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran became the most 
prominent rabbi of Algiers. He died in 1444. The responsa of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, 
known as the TashbeÛ (from the acronym of the title of his responsa-collection: Teshuvot 
Shimeon ben ÚemaÎ) were first published in Amsterdam, 1738. He wrote some twenty 
responsum regarding conversos. Most of these decisions are quite elaborate and extensive. 
It seems probable that the opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran concerning the conversos 
underwent a gradual change in the course of time; his position towards them became more 
and more severe as he became convinced that the conversos who failed to leave Iberia, 
finally got used to transgress Jewish law and abandoned it almost completely. The process 
of this change can be well observed in his responsa concerning wine made or handled by 
converts. He wrote responsa relating to marriage, divorce and inheritance also. His 
disaccord with Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet is manifest in his decisions regarding conversos as 
                                                 
23 See: I. Epstein 1968; Zimmels 1932:24-26; Zimmels: “Duran, Simeon ben ÚemaÎ” EJ 6:302-306; 
Netanyahu 1966:32-44; Zimmels 1971:387, 391-392; Orfali Levi 1982:26-29; Glick 2006:1369-1371. 
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well; their opinions diverged in several aspects, and the texts are not void of remarks 
alluding to their conflicting views. However, the divergence of their opinion is not 
necessarily due to the fact that they had a conflicting view about the conversos as a group. 
The responsa discusses first and foremost specific cases, and the fact that they differed in 
the judgement of a specific case does not indicate inevitably that their position towards the 
conversos in general would have been contradicting as well.24 
 
VI.3. Solomon ben Simeon Duran (Rashbash)25 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran, known also as the Rashbash, from the acronym of 
Rabbi Solomon b. Simeon, the son of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran was born about the year 
1400 in Algiers. Like his father, Solomon b. Simeon Duran was versed in medicine, 
philosophy, and natural sciences as well as in halakhic knowledge. He joined the 
rabbinical court of law led by his father, whom he succeeded after his death. He wrote 
numerous responsa and an apologetical work entitled MilÎemet MiÛvah in which he refuted 
the accusations against the Talmud made by the convert Joshua Halorki (Gerónimo de 
Santa Fé). The three sons of Solomon b. Simeon Duran, Aaron, ÚemaÎ and Simeon acted 
as judges in Algiers. Solomon b. Simeon Duran died in 1467. His responsa were first 
published in Livorno in 1742. Some eight of his responsa deals partly or entirely with 
conversos, among them the so-called “Maamar ha-anusim” (Treatise about the forced 
converts)26 discussing the formalities of the reintegration of conversos to the Jewish 
community. The rest of his decisions treats problems concerning inheritance, wine, taxes, 
and the observance of dietary laws during Passover.  
 
VI.4. ÚemaÎ ben Solomon Duran (author of Yakhin u-Voaz 1)27 
ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran was the second son of Solomon b. Simeon Duran. The 
details of his life are known mostly from scattered remarks in his responsa. He acted as 
dayyan and rabbi in Algiers in the course of the 15th century. Similarly to his father and 
grandfather, besides his halakhic knowledge he was also versed in medicine and 
                                                 
24 For the divergent views of the two authorities on the same issues see their responsa concerning wine 
(Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63), cheese (TashbeÛ 2:201, 3:83) and inheritance (TashbeÛ 1:58-62 
and Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 46-52).  
25 See: Zimmels: “Duran, Solomon ben Simeon” EJ 6:306-307; Zimmels 1932:26-27; Netanyahu 1966:44-
50; Zimmels 1971:388, 392-394; Orfali Levi 1982:29-32; Glick 2006:1070-71. 
26 Solomon b. Simeon Duran himself referred to this responsum thus (cf. Solomon b. Simeon Duran: 
Responsa, no. 393). Cf. also ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75, 1:107. 
27 See: Zimmels 1932:27-28, Netanyahu 1966:51-54; Zimmels 1971:388; Zimmels: “Duran, ÚemaÎ ben 
Solomon” EJ 5:17; Orfali Levi 1982:32-33; Glick 2006:440. 
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philosophy. Although he lived in Algiers, it is attested that he stayed for some time in 
Majorca for a medical cure, returning from there in 1468. Due to his visit to Majorca he 
had the opportunity to become acquainted with the life of the converso community of the 
island. At that time the Jewish community has already ceased to exist, since after a blood 
libel in 1432, the majority of the community was forcibly converted and the rest fled to 
North Africa (the Jewish community was ultimately destroyed in 1435). His responsa was 
collected in the first part of Yakhin u-Voaz. The second part of the book contains responsa 
written by his brother, Simon b. Solomon Duran. Three of the responsa dealing with 
conversos written by ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran survived. Two of them treats conversos 
leaving Christian land and returning to Judaism in Malaga (which was under Muslim 
control at that time) and in Algiers. The third one discusses the validity of a divorce 
document written by a converso. This responsum was written during his sojourn in 
Majorca, as it is evidenced by the first lines of the answer: “I am staying at the island of 
Majorca having a serious illness…”28 This indicates that though the Majorcan Jewish 
community ceased to exist in 1435, a rabbi visiting the island circa 1468 was still 
addressed halakhic questions (in this case, related to converts). Yakhin u-Voaz was first 
published in Livorno, 1782. 
 
VI.5. Simeon ben Solomon Duran (author of Yakhin u-Voaz 2)29 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran was born in Algiers in 1438, and succeeded his brother, 
ÚemaÎ b. Solomon as a rabbi there after the latter’s death. Details of his life are very little 
known. He fled Algiers when the Spanish army conquered port cities of the North African 
shore in 1509-1510.30 That is the last known event of his life; there are no other data after 
that, we do not even know when he died. 
His responsa were published together with his brother’s, in the second part of 
Yakhin u-Voaz, which was first published in Livorno, 1782. Three of his responsa treating 
                                                 
28 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125 
29 See: Zimmels 1932:28; Netanyahu 1966:54-68; Zimmels 1971:388; Zimmels: “Duran, Simeon ben 
Solomon” EJ 5:17; Orfali Levi 1982:33-34; Glick 2006:440. 
30 Oran, Tripoli, Algiers, Tunis, Bougie and Tlemcen were conquered by Pedro of Navarre in 1509-1510. 
Bougie remained under Christian rule until 1555. Cf. Marçais: “Bidjāya” EI 1:1204b. Tunis was occupied by 
the forces of Carlos V in 1535, and remained under a limited Christian dominion (kind of quasi-protectorate) 
until the first half of the 16th century. Cf. Sebag: “Tūnis” EI 10:629b. In 1510 the Christian troops succeeded 
to occupy the islets off the north-west coast of Algiers Bay, but could not conquer the city, which sought help 
from the Turkish corsair, ÝArūğ, who occupied the city itself, but was unable to expel the Christians from the 
islets, who tried to conquer the city without success in 1516 and 1519. Carlos V attempted to capture the city 
in 1541 but due to a violent storm half of his landing fleet was lost, and he was forced to abandon the siege. 
Cf. Le Tourneau: “al-Djazair” EI 2:519b. 
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conversos survived. The three of them discusses halakhic problems connected with 
conversos who left Christian land and returned to Judaism in Muslim territory. 
 
VII. Manuscripts of the responsa studied 
 
The following list includes manuscripts containing responsa written by Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, Solomon b. Simeon Duran, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon 
Duran, and Simeon b. Solomon Duran. The descriptions of the manuscripts (date, script, 
number of folios / pages) follows that of the online catalogue of the Jewish National and 
University Library (JNUL), if otherwise not indicated.  
The JNUL catalogue however offers only selected details about a manuscript, thus I 
had to read through whole collections, and to identify the responsa concerning conversos 
one by one. In the course of my work I identified a vast number of responsa addressing 
other topics, not related to my research matter. 
In the following, I enumerate the manuscripts I consulted, indicating the responsa I 
identified; first I give the page number, and than the number of the responsum in the 
printed editions. I put the identified responsa in square brackets, and I mark the ones about 
conversos (and I even indicate if there are not any). I remark if the texts of the responsa 
concerning conversos present significant differences from the texts that can be found in the 
first printed editions. Every remark, addition and complement I made to the online 
catalogue is put in square brackets.  
 
 
List of the manuscripts consulted: 
 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
 
1)  
New York – Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1410 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 43419 
Description: Maaravic script, 16th cent., 56 folios 
Contents: responsa by various authors among them Solomon b. Abraham Adret (Rashba), 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet (Ribash), Maimonides, etc. 
  
[1a-3b: Ribash no. 335; 4a: Rashba no. 1:538; 4b: Rashba no. 1:181, 1:308; 5b: Rashba no. 
1:314; 6a-7a: Ribash no. 93; 7b: Ribash no. 115; 7b-8a: Ribash no. 134; 8a-9b: Ribash no. 
16; 9b-10b: Ribash no. 17; 10b-12a: Ribash no. 18; 12a-b: Ribash no. 126; 12b-13a: 
Ribash no. 137; 13a-b: Ribash no. 164; 13b-15a: Ribash no. 165; 15a-b: Ribash no. 166; 
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15b-16b: Ribash no. 167; 16b-17b: Ribash no. 98; 17b-18a: Ribash no. 99; 18b-19b: 
Ribash no.100; 20a-31a: Ribash no. 127; 31a-32a: Ribash no. 314; 32a-34a: Ribash no. 
173; 34a-36a: Ribash no. 178; 36a-37b: Ribash no. 186; 37b-38a: Ribash no. 8; 38a-b: 
Ribash no. 10; 38b-39b: Ribash no. 2; 39b-40a: Ribash no. 1; 40a-41a: Ribash no. 29; 41a: 
Ribash no. 40; 41a-b: Ribash no. 84; 41b-43a: Ribash no. 94; 43a-b: Ribash no. 95; 43b-
44b: Ribash no. 106; 44b-48a: Ribash no. 107; 48a-b: Ribash no. 150; 49a-50b: Ribash no. 
161] 
 
[Responsa related to conversos written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: 38b-39b: no. 2; 39b-40a: 
no. 1] 
 
[There are no significant differences from the first printed edition.] 
 
2) 
St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 406 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 65346 
Description: Mizrahic script, 16th cent., 12 folios. A greater part of the same collection can 
be found in St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116.  
Contents: responsa written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
 
[The ms contains Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 7, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22-26, 34, 
35, 37, 38, 20, 290-292] 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
3) 
St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 64128 
Description: Mizrahic script, 16th century, 106 folios. A smaller part of the same collection 
can be found in St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. A 406. The folios are 
disordered. 
Contents: responsa written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
 
[1a: no. 264; 1a-b: no. 27; 31b: nos. 274, 233; 2a-b: no. 226; 2b: no. 225; 3a-b: no. 245; 3b: 
nos. 246, 212; 4a: no. 200; 4a-b: no. 201; 4b: no. 202; 4b-5b: no. 203; 5b: no. 204; 6a: no. 
416; 6a-b: no. 417; 6b: nos. 419, 421; 6b-7a: no. 424; 7a-b: no. 425; 8a-b: no. 268; 8b-9a: 
no. 270; 9b-10b: letter of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet concerning the issue discussed in no. 270 
(the text is probably not included in the printed collection); 10b-11a: no. 177; 11b-12b: no. 
102; 12b: no. 103; 12b-14b: no. 104; 14b-15a: no. 105; 15a-15b: no. 106; 15b-16b: no. 
107; 17a: no. 110; 17b: no. 119; 18a: no. 217; 18a-b: no. 218; 18b: no. 21; 18b-19b: no. 
220; 19b-20b: no. 221; 20b-21a: no. 222; 21b-22b: first part of no. 228; 23a-b: no. 108; 
23b: no. 109; 24a-b: no. 161; 25a: second part of no. 228; 25a-b: no. 287; 25b: 288; 26a-b: 
middle part of no. 271; 27a-b: no. 193; 28a: middle part of no. 306; 28a: no. 307; 28a: no. 
308; 28b: middle part of 306; 29a-b: no. 227; 29b-30a: no. 247; 30a-31b: no. 248; 31b-32a: 
no. 253; 32a-33a: no. 254; 33a-33b: no. 255; 33b: no. 256; 34a: no. 257; 34a-b: no. 258; 
34b: no. 259; 34b-35a: no. 260; 35a: no. 262; 35b: nos. 241, 242; 35b-36a: no. 243; 36a: 
no. 244; 36a-b: part of no. 251; 37a: part of no. 280; 37a: no. 281; 37a-b: 282; 38a: nos. 
283, 284; 38b: no. 285; 38b-39a: no. 286; 39a-40a: no. 322; 40a-b: no. 323; 40b-41a: no. 
15; 41a-b: no. 28; 41b-42a: no. 29; 42a-b: no. 40; 42b: no. 36; 42b-43b: no. 41; 43b: no. 
42; 44a-b: the responsa on these pages are probably not included in the printed collection; 
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45a: part of no. 295; 45a-b: no. 296; 45b-46b: no. 297; 46b: nos.  298, 299; 46b-47a: no. 
300; 47a-48a: no. 301; 48a-b: no. 302; 48b-49a: no. 303; 49a-50b: no. 304; 50b-54b: part 
of no. 305; 55a-56a: part of no. 308; 56a-56b: no. 309; 56b-57b: no. 310; 57b-58b: no. 
311; 58b: no. 312; 59a: no. 317; 59a-59b: part of no. 318; 60a-60b: part of no. 305; 61a-
61b: part of no. 210; 61b: beginning of no. 211; 62a-62b: middle part of no. 231; 63a-67b: 
part of no. 207; 67b-68b: part of no. 20; 69a: no. 1; 69a-b: no. 2; 69b-70a: no. 3; 70a-b: no. 
4 (the middle part of the responsum is missing); 70b: no. 5 (end missing); 71a-b: no. 207 
(beginning and end missing); 72a-b: no. 5; 72b: no. 6 (end missing); 73a: no. 9; 73a-b: no. 
10; 73b: no. 11 (end missing); 74a-74b: no. 344; 74b-78a: no. 345; 78a-b: no. 346; 78b-
79a: no. 348; 79a-80a: no. 349; 80a-81a: no. 350; 81a: no. 351; 81a-b: no. 352; 81b-82b: 
no. 353; 82b-83a: no. 354; 83a-b: no. 355 (end missing); 84a: no. 33 (beginning missing); 
84a-84b: no. 43; 84b: no.46 (only the beginning); 85a: no. 90 (only the end); 85a-86a: no. 
91; 86a-87a: no. 93; 87b-88a: no. 98; 88a-88b: no. 99 (on the margin); 88a-90a: no. 123; 
90a-90b: no. 158; 90b: no. 470 (end missing); 91a: nos. 171 (only the beginning), 172; 
91a-b: no. 173 (end missing); 92a: (drawing); 92b: no. 177; 93b: no. 81; 94a: no. 184 (only 
the end); 94a-b: no. 185; 95a: no. 113 (beginning missing); 95a-b: no. 116; 95b-96a: no. 
117; 96a-b: no.118; 96b: nos. 114, 115; 97a: no. 147 (beginning missing); 97a-98a: no. 
159; 98b: blank; 99a-b: no. 175 (beginning missing); 100a: nos. 186 (beginning missing), 
111; 100a-100b: no. 112; 100b: no. 113; 101b-103b: no. 475; 103b-104a: no. 176; 104b-
105a: no. 177; 105a: no. 141; 105b: nos. 142, 143; 105a-b: no. 146; 105b: no. 147 (end 
missing)] 
 
[Responsa related to conversos: no. 1 (69a); no. 2 (69a-b); no. 4 (the middle part of the 
responsum is missing) (70a-b); no. 5 (70b, 72a-b); no. 6 (the end of the responsum is 
missing) (72b); no. 11 (the end of the responsum is missing) (73b); no. 43 (84a-b); no. 46 
(the end of the responsum is missing) (84b)] 
 
[There are no significant differences from the first printed edition.] 
 
4)  
Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 263 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 45718 
Description: Sephardic script, 15th cent., 55a-117b 
Contents: responsa by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
 
[responsa related to conversos: no. 49 (55a-b); no. 50 (55b-56a); no. 51 (56a-b); no. 52 
(56b-57b); no. 61 (64a-66a)]  
 
[There are no significant differences from the first printed edition.] 
 
5) 
Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek Leiden Cod. Or. 4788 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 17382 
Description: Italkian script, 16-17th cent., 91 folios 
Contents: responsa mostly by Moses Halawa and some written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet. 
 






London, British Library Or. 6358 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: 12414 
Description: Sephardic script, 15th cent., 2 folios 
Contents: Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, responsum no. 372 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
  
7) 
Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 19429 
Description: Sephardic script, 15th cent., 81b-257b 
Contents: responsa by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
 
[responsa related to conversos: 94a-b: no. 1; 94b-95a: no. 2; 95b-96b: no. 4; 96b-97b: no. 
5; 97b-99b: no. 6; 102b-104a: no. 11; 104a-b: no. 12; 105b-108b: no. 14; 129a-130b: no. 
43; 133a-134a: no. 46; 134a-b: no. 47; 134b-135a: no. 48; 135a-b: no. 49; 135b-136a: no. 
50; 136a: no. 51; 136a-137a: no. 52; 141a-143a: no. 61] 
 
[There are no significant differences from the first printed edition.] 
  
8) 
New York, M. Lehmann FR 14 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 72703 
Description: Sephardic script, 15th cent., 8 folios 
Contents: responsa by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet (nos. 127-128, 132-135 and fragments of 
others)  
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
9) 
Paris, Collection Jacques Mosseri V, 202-203 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 26202  
Description: Genizah fragment, 2 sheets 
Contents: responsa of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, nos. 362, 370 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
10) 
Wien, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek Rainer coll. H 9531 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 1477 
Description: Genizah fragment, 15 folios, some pages are very faded and barely legible  
Contents: responsa written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet  
 
[The ms does not contain responsa concerning conversos.] 
 
11) 
Holon, Yehuda Nahum 259/47 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 42077 
                                                 
31 The online catalogue of the Jewish National and University Library of Israel gives the number of the ms 
erroneously (H 90 instead of H 95). 
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Description: folios 126-127 
Contents: responsa of Isaac b. Sheset Perfet 
 
[It contains nos. 379, 380.] 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
12) 
St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 453/6 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 65396, F 46187 
Description: Genizah fragment, 1 folio 
Contents: fragment of a responsum by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
13)  
Budapest, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, MS Kaufmann A 504 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 14989 
Description: Italkian script, 16th century, pp. 169-171 
Contents: Responsa by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, nos. 59, 334 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
14) 
New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1379 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 43371 
Description: Sephardic script, 16th century, 18 folios  
Contents: responsa by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
15) 
Holon, Yehuda Nahum 262 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 42080 
Description: Sephardic script, 15th cent., 13 folios 
Contents: responsa by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
  
[It contains nos. 390-391, 418, 497, 508-517. The pages of the ms are disordered.]    
 
[The ms does not contain responsa related to conversos.]  
 
16) 
St. Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy B 130 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 53065 
Description: Sephardic script, 16th cent., 198 folios  
Contents: Responsa by various authors (Solomon b. Abraham Adret, Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet, Simeon ben ÚemaÎ Duran, Solomon b. Simeon Duran, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran, 




[Fol. 109b contains an abbreviated responsum, the original of which might be Ribash no. 
43. 





Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran (TashbeÛ) 
 
1)  
London, Montefiore Library 101  
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 4615 
Description: Sephardic script, 15-16th century, 128 folios 
Contents: responsa written by various authors, among them Solomon b. Abraham Adret, 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran and Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran. 
 
[The ms contains the following responsa written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: 78b-80b: 
TashbeÛ 1:21; 83a-83b: TashbeÛ 1:141; 84b-85b: TashbeÛ 3:292; 85b-86a: TashbeÛ 2:254; 
86a-86b: TashbeÛ 2:255; 86b-87a: TashbeÛ 2:256; 87a-87b: TashbeÛ 2:257; 87b-88a: 
TashbeÛ 2:258; 88a: TashbeÛ 2:259; 88a-89a: TashbeÛ 2:260; 89a-89b: TashbeÛ 2:261; 
89b-90a: TashbeÛ 2:262; 90a-91a: TashbeÛ 2:263; 108b: TashbeÛ 1:45; 109a: TashbeÛ 
1:46; 110b-111a: TashbeÛ 1:32; 111b-112a: TashbeÛ 1:67; 112a-112b: TashbeÛ 1:72; 
112b-113a: TashbeÛ 1:15; 116a-122b: TashbeÛ 1:2] 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
2) 
Escorial, Biblioteca de San Lorenzo del Escorial G-IV-732 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 10075 
Description: Sephardic script, 146 folios, according to the colophon (143a) copied in 1447, 
Algiers 
Contents: collection of responsa (Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran and Solomon b. Simeon Duran), 
legal documents, etc.  
 
[The ms contains the following responsa written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: 36b-37b: 
TashbeÛ 3:21; 37b-38a: TashbeÛ 3:146; 38a-38b: TashbeÛ 3:142; 59b-60a: TashbeÛ 2:239; 
60a: TashbeÛ 2:267; 60b: TashbeÛ 2:268, 2:269; 70-72a: TashbeÛ 1:154; 72a: TashbeÛ 
1:132] 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
3) 
St. Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy B 130 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 53065 
                                                 
32 The catalogue of the National Library of Israel gives the number of the ms erroneously (Escorial G-VI-7); 
although the number written in the ms itself is: G-IV-7.   
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Description: Sephardic script, 16th cent., 198 folios  
Contents: Responsa by various authors (Solomon b. Abraham Adret, Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, Solomon b. Simeon Duran, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran, 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran, R. Joseph ibn Zimron) most of them abbreviated. 
TashbeÛ: 1a-102b, index to the responsa of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: 166a-169b 
 
[It contains the following responsa related to conversos: 32b-33b: TashbeÛ 1:58; 33b: 
TashbeÛ 1:59; 33b-34a: TashbeÛ 1:60; 34a-b: TashbeÛ 1:61; 34b-35a: TashbeÛ 1:62; 35a-
36b: TashbeÛ 1:63; 38a- 40b: TashbeÛ 1:66] 
 
[The text of the ms is significantly shorter than that of the first printed edition, omitting 
passages and details not regarded as essential, like toponyms; the introduction of 
responsum no. 1:58 written in rhymed prose; part of the introduction of responsum no. 
1:63 containing some modest remarks of the author concerning his own capacity of 
answering the question, etc. The halakhic argumentation is abbreviated considerably as 
well.]    
 
4)  
London, Montefiore Library 103/2 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 4617 
Description: Sephardic script, 16th cent., 203a-213b  
Contents: collection of responsa by various authors, among them Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran. 
(TashbeÛ nos. 1:154, 1:132-133) 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
5)  
Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 401/2 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 28033 
Description: Italkian script, 16th cent., 49b-121b 
Contents: collection of responsa by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
 
[The ms contains the following responsa written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: fols. 49a-
50b: TashbeÛ 1:23; 50b: TashbeÛ 1:24; 50b-53a: TashbeÛ 1:25; 53a-54b: TashbeÛ 1:26; 
54b-55b: TashbeÛ 1:27; 55b-56b: TashbeÛ 1:29; 56b-57a: TashbeÛ 1:30; 58b: TashbeÛ 
1:31; 58b-60a: TashbeÛ 1:32; 60a-63a: TashbeÛ 1:33; 63a-63b: TashbeÛ 1:34; 63b: 
TashbeÛ 1:35; 63b-64a: TashbeÛ 1:36; 64a-64b: TashbeÛ 1:37; 64b: TashbeÛ 1:38; 64b-
65a: TashbeÛ 1:39; 65a: TashbeÛ 1:40; 65a-65b: TashbeÛ 1:41; 65b: TashbeÛ 1:42; 65b-
66a: TashbeÛ 1:43; 66a-66b: TashbeÛ 1:44; 66b: TashbeÛ 1:45; 66b-67a: TashbeÛ 1:46; 
67a: TashbeÛ 1:47; 67a: TashbeÛ 1:48; 67a-70a: TashbeÛ 1:49; 70a-72a: TashbeÛ 1:50; 
72a-75a: TashbeÛ 1:51; 75b-76b: TashbeÛ 1:53; 76b-77b: TashbeÛ 1:54; 78a-78b: TashbeÛ 
1:55; 78b-79b: TashbeÛ 1:57; 79b-81b: TashbeÛ 1:58; 81b-82a: TashbeÛ 1:59; 82a-82b: 
TashbeÛ 1:60; 82b-84a: TashbeÛ 1:61; 84a-85a: TashbeÛ 1:62; 85a-88b: TashbeÛ 1:63; 
88b-91a: TashbeÛ 1:64; 91a-91b: TashbeÛ 1:65; 92a-98b: TashbeÛ 1:66; 98b-102a: 
TashbeÛ 1:67; 102a-102b: TashbeÛ 1:68; 102b-104a: TashbeÛ 1:69; 104a: TashbeÛ 1:70; 
104a-104b: TashbeÛ 1:71; 104b-109b: TashbeÛ 1:85; 109b-110a: TashbeÛ 1:86; 110a-
110b: TashbeÛ 1:87; 110b-111a: TashbeÛ 1:88; 111a-112a: TashbeÛ 1:89; 112a-113a: 
TashbeÛ 1:90; 113a: TashbeÛ 1:91; 113a-113a: TashbeÛ 1:92; 113b-119b: TashbeÛ 1:93; 




[Responsa related to conversos: 78b-81b: TashbeÛ 1:58; 81b-82a: TashbeÛ 1:59; 82a-82b: 
TashbeÛ 1:60; 82b-84a: TashbeÛ 1:61; 84a-85a: TashbeÛ 1:62; 85a-88b: TashbeÛ 1:63; 
92a-98b: TashbeÛ 1:66] 
 
[There are no significant differences from the first printed edition.] 
 
6)  
London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 4691 
Description: Sephardic script, 15th cent., 316 folios  
Contents: Collection of responsa by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran  
 
[The ms contains the following responsa related to conversos: 46a-47a: TashbeÛ 1:58; 47a-
b: TashbeÛ 1:59; 47b: TashbeÛ 1:60; 47b-48b: TashbeÛ 1:61; 48b-49a: TashbeÛ 1:62; 49a-
50b: TashbeÛ 1:63; 52a-55b: TashbeÛ 1:66; 158a: TashbeÛ 2:60; 179b: TashbeÛ 2:139; 
190b: TashbeÛ 2:201; 192a-192b: TashbeÛ 2:215; 193b: TashbeÛ 2:225; 208a: TashbeÛ 
2:278; 232b: TashbeÛ 3:40; 233a: TashbeÛ 3:43; 234a-235b: TashbeÛ 3:47; 243b-244a: 
TashbeÛ 3:83; 278b: TashbeÛ 3:227; 299a: TashbeÛ 3:312; 302b: TashbeÛ 3:323] 
 
[There are no significant differences from the first printed edition.] 
 
7)  
Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 456/2 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 47791   
Description: Sephardic script, 15th cent., 9a-11a 
Contents: TashbeÛ 3:58 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
8) 
Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms Guenzburg 1596 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 48948 
Description: Sephardic and Maaravic script, 15th cent., 130 folios33  
Collection of responsa by various authors. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran and Solomon b. 
Simeon Duran: 11a-105b 
 
[The ms contains the following responsa written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: 
11a: TashbeÛ 2:101; 11a-13b: barely legible; 14a: TashbeÛ 2:233; 15a: TashbeÛ 3:318, 
3:319; 15b: TashbeÛ 3:162; 16a-b: TashbeÛ 3:204; 16b: TashbeÛ 3:206, 3:268; 17a-17b: 
TashbeÛ 3:163; 17b: TashbeÛ 3:182, 3:183; 18a: TashbeÛ 3:239, 3:238; 18b: TashbeÛ 
3:192, 3:258; 19a: TashbeÛ 3:259, 3:261; 3:256; 19b: TashbeÛ 3:245; 20a: TashbeÛ 3:243; 
20a-b: TashbeÛ 3:244; 20b: TashbeÛ 3:269; 21a: TashbeÛ 3:122; 21b: TashbeÛ 3:74; 21b-
22a: TashbeÛ 3:75; 22a: TashbeÛ 3:76, 3:77; 22b-23a: TashbeÛ 3:78; 23a-24b: TashbeÛ 
3:80; 24b-25a: TashbeÛ 3:141; 25a-25b: TashbeÛ 3:174; 25b: TashbeÛ 3:175; 25b-26a: 
TashbeÛ 3:177; 26a-26b: TashbeÛ 3:168; 26b-27a: TashbeÛ 3:190; 27a-b: TashbeÛ 3:312; 
27b: TashbeÛ 3:309; 28a-b: TashbeÛ 2:236; 28b: TashbeÛ 2:237; 29a-b: TashbeÛ 2:248; 
                                                 
33 According to the online catalogue of the Jewish National and University Library the ms consists of 128 
folios. This is erroneous however, since the pagination is inaccurate; after fol. 17a the pagination returns to 
15a. 
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30a: TashbeÛ 2:244; 30a-b: TashbeÛ 2:240; 30b: TashbeÛ 2:241; 30b: TashbeÛ 2:242; 31a-
32a: TashbeÛ 2:234; 32a: TashbeÛ 2:235; 40a-41a: TashbeÛ 3:124; 41a-42a: TashbeÛ 
3:240; 42a-42b: TashbeÛ 3:148; 42b-43a: TashbeÛ 3:156; 43a-44a: TashbeÛ 3:263; 44a-b: 
TashbeÛ 3:246; 44b: TashbeÛ 3:207; 45a: TashbeÛ 3:205; 45a-b: TashbeÛ 3:208; 46a: 
TashbeÛ 3:213, 3:278; 46b: TashbeÛ 3:284; 47a-49b: TashbeÛ 3:285; 49b-51a: TashbeÛ 
3:286; 51a: TashbeÛ 3:288; 52a-53b: TashbeÛ 3:297; 54a-b: TashbeÛ 3:298; 54b: TashbeÛ 
3:273; 55a-56b: TashbeÛ 3:37; 57a: TashbeÛ 3:38; 57a-57b: TashbeÛ 3:40; 57b: TashbeÛ 
3:41; 57b-58b: TashbeÛ 3:43; 59a: TashbeÛ 3:54, 55; 59b-60a: TashbeÛ 3:56; 60a: TashbeÛ 
3:91; 60a-b: TashbeÛ 3:79; 61a-b: TashbeÛ 3:45; 62a-63a: TashbeÛ 3:46; 63a-67a: TashbeÛ 
3:47; 71a-72b: TashbeÛ 3:10; 72b-73b: TashbeÛ 3:11; 73b-74b: TashbeÛ 3:287; 74b-75a: 
TashbeÛ 3:289; 75a-b: TashbeÛ 3:290; 75b-76b: TashbeÛ 3:291; 76b-77a: TashbeÛ 3:292; 
77a-b: TashbeÛ 3:293; 77b-78a: TashbeÛ 3:294; 78a-b: TashbeÛ 3:296; 78b: TashbeÛ 
3:295; 78b: TashbeÛ 3:271; 78b: TashbeÛ 3:272, 3:160; 79a-b: TashbeÛ 3:218; 79b: 
TashbeÛ 3:219; 79b-81a: TashbeÛ 3:221; 81a: TashbeÛ 3:223; 81a-82a: TashbeÛ 3:224; 
82a: TashbeÛ 3:225; 82a-b: TashbeÛ 3:229; 82b-83b: TashbeÛ 3:230; 83b: TashbeÛ 3:231; 
83b-84a: TashbeÛ 2:232; 84a: TashbeÛ 3:233; 84a-86b: TashbeÛ 3:250; 86b: TashbeÛ 
3:276; 87a: TashbeÛ 3:304; 87b-88b: TashbeÛ 3:86; 89a: TashbeÛ 3:121; 89b: TashbeÛ 3: 
129, 3:143; 90a-b: TashbeÛ 3:133; 90b: TashbeÛ 3:149; 91a: TashbeÛ 3:99; 91b-92a: 
TashbeÛ 3:106; 92a: TashbeÛ 3:119; 92b: TashbeÛ 3:140, 3:308; 93a-b: TashbeÛ 3:158; 
93b-94a: TashbeÛ 3:42; 94b: TashbeÛ 3:89, 3:107; 95a-96a: TashbeÛ 3:210; 96a-b: 
TashbeÛ 3:211; 96b-97a: TashbeÛ 3:212; 97a: TashbeÛ 3:96, 3:97, 3:176; 97b-98a: 
TashbeÛ 3:320; 98a-99a: TashbeÛ 3:323; 99a-100b: TashbeÛ 3:324; 100b-101b: TashbeÛ 
3:325; 101b-102b: TashbeÛ 3:326; 103a: TashbeÛ 3:310, 3:62; 104a: TashbeÛ 3:81; 104a-b: 
TashbeÛ 3:94; 105a: TashbeÛ 2:245; 105a-b: TashbeÛ 2:266; 105b: TashbeÛ 2:243, 2:242]   
 
[Responsa related to conversos written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran:  
27a-b: TashbeÛ 3:312; 57a-57b: TashbeÛ 3:40; 57b-58b: TashbeÛ 3:43; 63a-67a: TashbeÛ 
3:47]34 
 
[There are no significant differences from the first printed edition.] 
 
9)  
Cambridge, University Library Add. 498/4 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 16791 
Description: Sephardic script, 15th cent., 18a-30b  
Contents: TashbeÛ: nos. 1: 2-4, 6-9, 14, 21, 24, 32, 42, 44-46, 56, 67, 175; 2:254-263; 3:15, 
16, 18-20, 92; 141; 292-293.35  
 




Jerusalem, Benayahu NA 111 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 43661  
Description: Maaravic script, 15-16th cent., 8 folios  
Contents: TashbeÛ nos. 2:6-17 
                                                 
34 These are the correct page numbers. According to the errouneous pagination of the ms the page numbers 
are: 25a-b: TashbeÛ 3:312; 55a-55b: TashbeÛ 3:40; 55b-56b: TashbeÛ 3:43; 61a-65a: TashbeÛ 3:47 About the 
erroneous pagination of the manuscript see the previous note.  









New York, Columbia University X 893.15 D 932 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 23479 
Description: Maaravic script, 15th cent., 14 folios  
Contents: TashbeÛ nos. 1:102-1:120. The numbering corresponds to that of the printed 
edition. 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
12) 
Paris, Collection Jacques Mosseri VII, 416 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 26211 
Description: from the Cairo Genizah, 1 folio  
Contents: TashbeÛ nos. 1:172-1:173  
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
13) 
Ramat Gan, Bar Ilan University 1014 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 22998 
Description: Mizrahic script, 17-18th cent., 354 folios  
Contents: Collection of responsa by various authors. TashbeÛ: 166a-175b.  
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
14)  
Jerusalem, The Jewish National and University Library, Ms. Heb. 8°3946 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: B 543 
Description: Sephardic script, 16th cent. (ca. 1530), 268 folios  
Contents: collection of responsa written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran. It contains TashbeÛ 
1:123-154. 
 
[The ms does not contain responsum related to conversos.] 
 
 
 Solomon b. Simeon Duran (Rashbash) 
  
1) 
New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; New York, Jewish Theological 
Seminary Ms. 7196 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 39536 
Description: Italkian script, 17th century, 248 leaves36 
Contents: Responsa by Solomon b. Simeon Duran 
                                                 
36 In the online catalogue of the National Library of Israel the number of the leaves is mistyped (48 instead of 




[The ms contains the following responsa related to conversos:  
34a-35a: no. 89; 35a-35b: no. 90; 77a-77b: no. 223; 105a-105b: no. 287; 137b: no. 368; 
157a-158a: no. 414; 160a: no. 418; 206a-207a: no. 553] 




St. Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy B 130 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 53065 
Description: Sephardic script, 16th cent., 198 folios  
Contents: Responsa by various authors (Solomon b. Abraham Adret, Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, Solomon b. Simeon Duran, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran, 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran, R. Joseph ibn Zimron) most of them abbreviated. 
 




Escorial, Biblioteca de San Lorenzo del Escorial G-IV-737 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 10075 
Description: Sephardic script, 146 folios, according to the colophon (143a) copied in 1447, 
Algiers 
Contents: collection of responsa (Solomon b. Simeon Duran and Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran), 
legal documents, etc.  
 
[The ms contains the following responsa written by Solomon b. Simeon Duran: 
1b-8a: no. 512; 8b-23a: no. 513; 24a-b: no. 607; 25b: no. 374; 26a-27a: Teshuvot mi-ketav 
yad38 no. 13; 27a: Teshuvot mi-ketav yad nos. 14, 15, 16; 27b: Teshuvot mi-ketav yad 17; 
39b: no. 2; 43b: no. 294; 44a-47a: no. 287; 47a-49a: no. 289; 57b: no. 231; 62a-b: no. 25; 
63a-64b: no. 274; 65a: no. 275] 
 




London, Montefiore Library 101  
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 4615 
Description: Sephardic script, 15-16th century, 128 folios 
Contents: responsa written by Solomon b. Abraham Adret, Slomon b. Simeon Duran and 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran. 
 
[The ms contains the following responsa written by Solomon b. Simeon Duran: 
64a-70b: nos. 266-267, 232; 70b-75a: no. 613; 75a-76a: no. 78; 76b-78b: no. 170; 91b-92a: 
no. 335; 92b-93b: no. 93; 93b-94a: no. 336; 94a-94b: Teshuvot mi-ketav yad39 no. 18; 94b-
97a: no. 412; 113b-116a: no. 173; 122b-126a: no. 1; 126a-127a: no. 7] 
                                                 
37 The online catalogue of the National Library of Israel gives the number of the ms erroneously (Escorial G-
VI-7); however, the number written in the ms itself is: G-IV-7.   
38 Responsa from manuscripts included in the edition of Sobel (1998). 








Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms Guenzburg 1596 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 48948 
Description: Sephardic and Maaravic script, 15th cent., 130 folios  
Collection of responsa by various authors. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran and Solomon b. 
Simeon Duran: 11a-105b 
 
[The ms contains the following responsa written by Solomon b. Simeon Duran: 
33a-35a: no. 19; 35b: no. 329; 36a-37a: no. 20; 37a-38b: no. 21; 38b-39a: no. 22; 39a: nos. 
23, 24; 65b-70a: no. 89; 70b: no. 509] 
 
[Responsum related to conversos: 65b-70a: no. 89] 
 
[There are no significant differences from the first printed edition.]  
 
6) 
New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1477/4 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 43496 
Description: Sephardic script, 16th cent., pp. 166-169 
Contents: correspondence between Solomon b. Simeon Duran and Nathan Nagar from 
Constantine.  
 




ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran (Yakhin u-Voaz 1) 
 
1) 
St. Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy B 130 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 53065 
Description: Sephardic script, 16th cent., 198 folios  
Contents: Responsa by various authors (Solomon b. Abraham Adret, Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, Solomon b. Simeon Duran, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran, 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran, R. Joseph ibn Zimron) most of them abbreviated. 
 
[110b-111a: an abbreviated version of Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3. In the ms this responsum is 
attributed to ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran (the author of Yakhin u-Voaz 1).] 
 
 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran (Yakhin u-Voaz 2) 
 
1) 
St. Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy B 130 
Jewish National and University Library Mss. Reading Room Film No.: F 53065 
Description: Sephardic script, 16th cent., 198 folios  
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Contents: Responsa by various authors (Solomon b. Abraham Adret, Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, Solomon b. Simeon Duran, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran, 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran, R. Joseph ibn Zimron) most of them abbreviated. 
 
[110b-111a: an abbreviated version of Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3. In the ms this responsum is 
attributed to ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran (the author of Yakhin u-Voaz 1).] 
 
 
VIII. List of manuscripts related to conversos 
 
The number of the responsum is always that of the first printed edition. 
 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
 
Responsum no. 1  
1. New York – Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1410, fols. 39b-40a 
2. St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fol. 69a  
3. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 94a-b 
 
Responsum no. 2 
1. New York – Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1410, fols. 38b-39b  
2. St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fols. 69a-b 
3. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 94b-95a 
 
Responsum no. 4 
1. St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fols. 70a-b 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 95b-96b 
 
Responsum no. 5 
1. St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fols. 70b, 72a-b 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 96b-97b 
 
Responsum no. 6 
1. St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fol. 72b 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 97b-99b 
 
Responsum no. 11 
1. St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fol. 73b 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 102b-104a 
 
Responsum no. 12 
1. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 104a-b 
 
Responsum no. 14 
1. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 105b-108b 
 
Responsum no. 43 
1. St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fol. 84a-b 
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2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 129a-130b 
 
Responsum no. 46 
1. St. Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fol. 84b 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 133a-134a 
 
Responsum no. 47 
1. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 134a-b 
 
Responsum no. 48 
Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 134b-135a 
 
Responsum no. 49 
1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 263, fols. 55a-b 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 135a-b 
 
Responsum no. 50 
1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 263, fols. 55b-56a 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 135b-136a 
 
Responsum no. 51 
1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 263, fols. 56a-b 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fol. 136a  
 
Responsum no. 52 
1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 263, fols. 56b-57b 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 136a-137a 
 
Responsum no. 61 
1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 263, fols. 64a-66a 
2. Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fols. 141a-143a 
 
 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
 
TashbeÛ 1:58: 
1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 401/2, fols. 78b-81b 
2. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 46a-47a 




1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 401/2, fols. 81b-82a 
2. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 47a-b 
3. St. Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy B 130, fol. 33b 
 
TashbeÛ 1:60 
1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 401/2, fols. 82a-82b 
2. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 47b 





1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 401/2, fols. 82b-84a 
2. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 47b-48b 
3. St. Petersburg, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy B 130, fols. 34a-b  
 
TashbeÛ 1:62 
1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 401/2, fols. 84a-85a 
2. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 48b-49a 




1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 401/2, fols. 85a-88b 
2. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 49a-50b 




1. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms. Guenzburg 401/2, fols. 92a-98b 
2. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 52a-55b 




1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 158a 
 
TashbeÛ 2:139 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23. fol. 179b 
 
TashbeÛ 2:201 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 190b 
 
TashbeÛ 2:215 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 192a-b 
 
TashbeÛ 2:225 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 193b 
 
TashbeÛ 2:278 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 208a 
 
TashbeÛ 3:40 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 232b 
2. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms Guenzburg 1596, fols. 57a-57b40 
 
TashbeÛ 3:43 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 233a 
                                                 
40 According to the erroneous pagination of the ms: 55a-b. See the description of the ms in the previous list. 
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2. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms Guenzburg 1596, fols. 57b-58b41 
 
TashbeÛ 3:47 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 234a-235b 
2. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms Guenzburg 1596, fols. 63a-67a42 
 
TashbeÛ 3:83 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fols. 243b-244a 
 
TashbeÛ 3:227 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 278b 
 
TashbeÛ 3:312 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 299a 
2. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms Guenzburg 1596, fols. 27a-b43 
 
TashbeÛ 3:323 
1. London, Beth Din and Beth Hamidrash 23, fol. 302b  
 
 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran (Rashbash) 
 
Responsum no. 89 
1. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; JTS Ms. 7196, fols. 34a-35a 
2. Moscow, Russian State Library, Ms Guenzburg 1596, fols. 65b-70a 
 
Responsum no. 90 
1. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; JTS Ms. 7196, fols. 35a-b 
 
Responsum no. 223 
1. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; JTS Ms. 7196, fols. 77a-b 
 
Responsum no. 287 
1. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; JTS Ms. 7196, fols. 105a-b 
  
Responsum no. 368 
1. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; JTS Ms. 7196, fol. 137b 
 
Responsum no. 414  
1. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; JTS Ms. 7196, fols. 157a-158a 
 
Responsum no.418  
1. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; JTS Ms. 7196, fol. 160a 
 
Responsum no. 553 
1. New York, Jewish Theological Seminary Rab. 1352; JTS Ms. 7196, fols. 206a-207a 
 
                                                 
41 According to the erroneous pagination of the ms: 55b-56b 
42 According to the erroneous pagination of the ms: 61a-65a. 




Simeon b. Solomon Duran (Yakhin u-Voaz 2) 
 
Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3 




Chapter 2 – Marriage 
 
I. Marriage customs in the Middle Ages 
 
Before discussing the problems that were dealt with in the responsa regarding the 
marriage of conversos it might be of interest to give a short introduction about prescriptions 
and customs concerning Jewish marriage in medieval Iberia.1 
Jewish marriage in the Middle Ages consisted of three steps: engagement 
(shiddukhin), betrothal (eirusin / kiddushin), and nuptials (nissuin / Îuppah). Shiddukhin 
meant a general agreement concerning the terms and conditions of the marriage, like the 
obligations of the parties, the time and place of the wedding ceremony, the amount of the 
dowry, and other financial arrangements. After the parties reached an agreement, they 
generally put the terms into writing in the document called tnaim (conditions). They usually 
agreed on a payment of a certain sum in case one of the parties broke the engagement.2 The 
shiddukhin was revocable without consequences with regard to the marital status of the 
persons involved, that is, they did not need to divorce to annul it (but they had to pay the fines 
they had agreed on). The shiddukhin did not have religious aspects, there were no blessings 
associated with it, and it did not surpass the framework of a private agreement. That did not 
mean the engagement was necessarily a private affair; the fear of breaking the engagement 
often lead to celebrate it in public, as publicity meant a kind of binding force.      
The betrothal (eirusin / kiddushin, both terms were used) consisted of reciting the 
blessing of betrothal (birkat eirusin) over a cup of wine; the groom symbolically bought the 
bride by giving her money or an object worth at least a fixed minimal value (perutah3) and he 
recited the formula “you are betrothed to me according to the law of Moshe and Israel.” These 
two acts, the acquisition and the declaration established the binding relationship between the 
bride and the groom; and the dissolution of this relationship was possible only by a formal 
divorce. For this reason, betrothal in Jewish law had much more significance than in Christian 
law. The couple however was not permitted to live together as husband and wife until the last 
                                                 
1 About ceremonies and customs related to marriage see e.g.: Grossman 2004:49-51; Klein 1992:390-395; Falk 
1966 
2 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5. 
3 Various coins issued by the Hasmonean and Herodian dynasties, as well as by Roman procurators were 
denominated as perutah. Cf. Kindler: “Coins and Currency” EJ 5:695-721. The Mishnah established three ways 
of betrothing a woman, one of them is buying her. The minimum price of a woman is a perutah according to the 
school of Hillel. Cf. mKid 1:1.  
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step of marriage, the nuptials took place. Before or after the betrothal, the groom gave bridal 
gifts to the bride.4 The time that passed between the betrothal and the nuptials varied 
according to the specific circumstances of the families involved. After the betrothal 
ceremony, the bride usually (but not necessarily) stayed at her father’s house until the 
wedding. The groom paid regular visits to his bride particularly on Sabbaths, when he joined 
the Sabbath meal of the family.5 During the nuptials, the bride and the groom were brought 
together under the Îuppah (bridal canopy), benedictions were recited, and afterwards, the 
couple remained alone in a separate place with those present at the event witnessing the fact 
of their private meeting.6  These two formal ceremonies (eirusin / kiddushin and nissuin / 
Îuppah) gradually became united in most Jewish communities during the Middle Ages, 
especially in Europe, while in the majority of the North-African communities betrothal was 
kept separately from nuptials. In Iberia, the two models coexisted (Falk 1966:36-37). In 
Levant, betrothal and marriage became combined in the 16th century, and the terms 
shiddukhin (engagement) and eirusin (betrothal) became interchangeable in the responsa.7 In 
the opinion of Avraham Grossman, the main reasons for the unification of the two ceremonies 
were practical ones: the purpose of reducing the costs of the marriage (this reason is 
mentioned by Rashi8); and the large number of childhood marriages. Many betrothals took 
place at a young age, and since the brides who had already been betrothed were still children, 
they had to wait many years till marriage was finally formalized. During these years, they 
were bound to their intended husband and could not marry another person without obtaining 
divorce previously. Moreover, it frequently happened that the groom disappeared in the 
meantime (often due to commercial journeys to distant places) and the bride thus remained 
agunah (woman prevented from marriage). The prevalence of this phenomenon in Iberia lead 
to the propagation of a communal edict in the eleventh century that required to stipulate at 
                                                 
4 The customs concerning the timing of the bridal gifts varied from time and place. In Majorca, the custom was 
to send them before the betrothal, cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5. 
5 Ruth Lamdan mentions the custom of visiting the bride regularly, a practice prevalent among Sephardic Jews 
of 16th century Levant, as opposed to the custom of Ashkenazic Jews, who did not foment meetings between the 
groom and the bride even under the supervision of the parents. I suppose that the custom of the Sephardic Jews 
with all probability had its origin in a longer tradition that went back to their customs practiced in Iberia. About 
the 16th century Sephardic custom see Lamdan 2000:37.   
6 It is prohibited that a man and a woman may remain alone in a separate place unless they are husband and wife 
or close relatives, like father and daughter etc. It is supposed that private meeting (yiÎud, “uniting, being 
together”) may lead to sexual intercourse. The yiÎud of the groom and the bride at the wedding symbolizes the 
consummation of the marriage. About a detailed discussion concerning the laws regarding yiÎud see: s.v. 
“YiÎud” ETal vol. 23, cols. 632-732.    
7 About the change these terms underwent see Lamdan 2000:37, and especially note 46 there. 
8 The opinion of Rashi is quoted by Avraham Grossman: “Since it is shameful for the bridegroom and his 
relatives if they do not make a large feast and celebrate the entire day, some people make the erusin and 
qiddushin together so as to discharge their duty for both of them in one feast on one day.” (Grossman 2004:288, 
n. 3.)  
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time of the betrothal that it would be nullified if the bridegroom was absent for more than a 
year.9 In the opinion of Grossman, the unification of the ceremonies reduced the dependence 
of women on their future husbands, since shiddukhin assumed a part of the functions of the 
betrothal. Retracting from shiddukhin was much easier than breaking a betrothal.   
It is prerequisite that prior the marriage a document (called ketubah) should be written 
containing the obligations of the husband towards the wife, like provision of food, clothing, 
etc., and the sum he must pay his wife in the event of divorce. The ketubah must have been 
signed by two witnesses who were present at the nuptials. The wedding had to be public, that 
is, in the presence of ten adult Jewish males (minyan). The Talmud established that a minyan 
must be present at the groom’s blessings (cf. bKet 7a). When in the High Middle Ages secret 
marriages and abuses became frequent, several leaders of the Jewish communities decided 
that the whole ceremony must be public in order to avoid taking advantage of fraudulent 
marriages. In response, Jewish communities begun to issue communal ordinances establishing 
that marriage ceremonies without the presence of a minyan were null and void (Freimann 




Polygamy was permitted in Biblical law, and until the Middle Ages, it was an accepted 
custom, but then a prohibiting ban was issued which later became gradually accepted in the 
majority of the European communities. The promulgation of the ban that prohibited polygamy 
is generally attributed to Rabbenu Gershom Meor ha-Golah (c. 960-1028, Mainz), although 
the scholarly opinions differ concerning the historical development of the ban.11 The ban 
became accepted by the communities of Ashkenaz and France during the twelfth century. In 
the Iberian Peninsula, the influence of the Muslim culture on Jewish marital customs did not 
abate even after the last period of the Reconquista. In the territories under Muslim dominion, 
polygamy was not opposed either by Jewish or Muslim authorities. Moreover, the halakhic 
authorities of Iberia were under the influence of the Babylonian authorities, who favored 
polygamy (Falk 1966:11). Most Jewish families in the Iberian Peninsula were monogamous, 
but polygamy was not rare and keeping concubines was also accepted by the communities.12 
                                                 
9 The edict is referred to by Isaac b. Jacob Alfasi (11th century, North Africa and Spain) in his Responsa no. 118. 
Cf. Grossman 2004:49, 288, n. 4. 
10 The following short presentation is based on Grossman 2004:68-101 and Falk 1966:1-34.   
11 For a comprehensive discussion of the question see Grossman 1988. See also the bibliography cited there.  
12 About concubinage and related issues see Assis 1988.  
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When the Christians reoccupied the Iberian Peninsula, the situation changed, since Christian 
rulers prohibited polygamy. It was possible, however, to obtain the permission of the crown to 
marry a second wife in exchange of paying a considerable sum. Shlomo Z. Havlin (1975) in 
his article discussing the influence of the ban in Iberia cited R. Nissim of Gerona, according 
to whom polygamy was customary in Castile. Yom Tov Assis (1981) examined sources from 
the royal archives of the Crown of Aragon, and found fifteen cases of polygamy between 
1318 and 1338. The conclusion of his research was that polygamy was equally widespread 
both in Castile and Aragon. On the basis of the evidence of the responsa and the archival 
sources of the royal archives studied by the scholars, the proportion of the polygamous 
marriages in Christian Spain cannot be clearly determined. In any case, the study of the 
responsa literature of the High Middle Ages led to the conclusion that polygamous marriages 
were not limited to cases involving a religious precept, i.e., when the woman was barren, or 
cases of levirate marriage (Grossman 2004:79). It is also obvious that the ban prohibiting 
polygamy was known in Iberia and some responsa even refer to it;13 it might have been even 
accepted by some communities.14 In Provence, there existed also local ordinances prohibiting 
polygamy (Grossman 2004:88).  
It is evident, that the ban accepted by the communities of Ashkenaz and France was 
never unequivocally adopted in Iberia, and even in the fifteenth century, polygamy was 
practiced and accepted either in Castile or in Aragon. Women, however, could request the 
insertion of a specific stipulation in the marriage contract prohibiting the husband to marry a 
second wife as long as the first wife is alive.15 This custom already appeared in Aramaic 
marriage documents of the fifth century, but it was not practiced continuously until the 
Middle Ages. On the other hand, such stipulations were common among the Muslims. It 
seems to be plausible that mediaeval Jews in Iberia adopted this custom from the Muslim 
environment.16 
                                                 
13 Although it is not entirely clear if the edict mentioned in the responsa refers indeed to the ban of Rabbenu 
Gershom, or to other, local edicts. Grossman cited a responsum in which the reference was made in his opinion 
to the ban of Rabbenu Gershom. The quotation is from a responsum of Solomon b. Abraham Adret (13th century, 
Barcelona): “The edict [i.e., of Rabbenu Gershom] did not take hold in all our boundaries. Nor have we heard 
that it took root even in Provence, adjacent to France. And there have been cases in our place where Talmudic 
scholars married a second wife, as did many others, and no person has ever been concerned about this matter.” 
Translation of Grossman 2004:84. The responsum was published by Havlin 1975:234-235.   
14 See the discussion about the acceptance of the ban in Montpellier: Grossman 2004:87. 
15 Cf. e.g. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 98, 99. 
16 Cf. Falk 1966:12: “The ancient custom referred to above, of ensuring the status of the wife by means of a 
condition stipulated between bride and bridegroom at the time of the marriage, began to win acceptance among 
western Jewry. [...] Since there are no signs of a continuous tradition, stretching from the Aramaic documents in 
which this clause features all the way through to its reappearance in medieval times, we must assume that it is 




III. Marriage of conversos in the responsa literature 
 
Problems relating marriage were the most discussed topic in the responsa concerning 
conversos. The fundamental question was whether a converso was fit for establishing marital 
union from a halakhic point of view at all. According to Jewish law, a Jew can marry a 
Jewess only, a Gentile has no “marital status” (ishut). Since the conversos abandoned Jewish 
faith ––or voluntary or under duress–– they became similar to the Gentiles to a certain extent. 
Therefore it had to be decided if they had marital status at all. Most of the responsa dealing 
with a particular question related to marriage strove to clarify this fundamental issue as well. 
No halakhic authority held that a convert per se was unfit for marriage in principle. The 
existence of an opposite view can be inferred on the one hand from the fact that the issue was 
dealt with extensively, and, on the other hand, from passages quoted in the responsa that 
reflect the opinion of the inquirers.  
Although conversos were fit for marriage in theory, their marriages were not always 
accepted as valid in practice. The reason was, in the first place, that conversos, being 
Christians, had no choice but to contract their marriages in Christian churches, under 
Christian law. Circa half of the responsa written on the subject of marriage discusses the issue 
of Christian marriage ceremony.17 In some instances, the Christian ceremony was 
accompanied by acts that could be considered as establishing marital union in accordance 
with Jewish law as well. These acts could be intentional, in order to contract the marriage 
appropriate for Jewish law as well (like organizing a Jewish betrothal privately just before the 
Christian marriage ceremony18); or unintentional, when certain circumstances or 
consequences of the Christian marriage had a legal effect even in the halakhic sense (like 
having the cohabitation of the pair publicly known, and having Jewish witnesses fit for 
testifying about it19).  
Conversos usually married within the converso community. This tendency had two 
reasons: the first is that most conversos preferred to establish marital union with persons who 
had similar social and cultural background to theirs, all the more so, if they wished to stick to 
their former faith as much as it was possible. Mixed marriages evidently made Judaizing 
                                                 
17 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 5, 6; Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47; Simeon b. Solomon 
Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19 
18 Cf. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47; Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19 
19 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 5, 6; Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47  
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efforts extremely difficult.20 The responsa often mention that conversos refused to marry 
Christians, and if they did marry, the family originated from such a mixed union became 
ostracized among the conversos.21 The other reason is that Old Christians themselves were 
reluctant to marry conversos (Beinart 1992: 348-349). Still, according to both Spanish22 and 
Hebrew sources,23 mixed marriages were not entirely uncommon. Extra-marital sexual 
relations among conversos and Old Christians were equally or even more frequent.24 The 
responsa naturally do not present statistics about the frequency and proportion of mixed 
marriages or extra-marital relations with Old Christians. The statements formulated by the 
halakhic authorities concerning this issue are not independent from the context of the 
discussion of the specific case they happened to deal with. Consequently these statements do 
not have an absolute value, as they were not intended as comprehensive and precise 
descriptions of the situation prevalent in Iberia, but as arguments used pro or contra in a given 
discussion. This does not mean of course that they lack verisimilitude.  
Those conversos who left Iberia in order to return to Judaism could not necessarily 
prove their Jewish descent. Therefore, the authorities had to formulate legal presumptions to 
make dealing with controversial cases possible. They had to take a stand in the question 
whether the conversos in general descended from mixed marriages or not.25 Once the descent 
of the conversos was clarified, several aspects of the marriages contracted in Iberia had to be 
                                                 
20 Cf. Levine Melammed 1999:6: “While New Christian women married Old Christian men with far less 
frequency than they married men of converso extraction, her options were inherently limited by the choice of 
spouse. These conversas feared judaizing while living with Old Christian men, who certainly would have no 
sympathy for their religious inclinations and loyalties.” 
21 Cf. Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3; 2:31; Moses b. Josef Trani (Mabit, 1500 Salonika - 1580 
Constantinople): Responsa, 2:83 
22 The most conspicuous examples are two books written in the 16th and 17th centuries; the “Libro verde de 
Aragón” (Green Book of Aragon) and the “Tizón de la nobleza de España” (Blot on the Nobility of Spain), 
tracing back the Jewish and converso origin of Spanish nobility. (About these books see e.g. Kamen 1985:22-
23.) One should not forget however, that both books belong to the genre of anti-Semitic literature, therefore their 
statements and inferences have to be dealt with reservation. 
23 See below, the instances mentioned in the responsa.  
24 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 6: “Their deeds give evidence of their licentiousness and their 
frivolousness, that even amidst of the sufferings after the gezerah (religious persecution), with the exception of 
some individuals, the minority of the minority, most of them permit themselves to engage in sexual liaisons with 
Gentile women…;” See also the remarks concerning this issue made by later authors, e.g. Josef ibn Lev (16th 
century, Constantinople): Responsa, 2: 45: “But some [...] [said that] the converts were not presumed to marry 
Gentile women as wife, but they had no scruples about engaging in licentious sexual relations with them, since 
they attached importance only to marriage.“ Cf. Jacob Berab (16th century, Safed): Responsa, no. 39; David ibn 
Avi Zimra (16th century, Cairo and Jerusalem): “It seems to me unlikely that it could be established by means of 
witnesses or legal presumption (Îazakah) that they never begot children with Gentile women since the 
conversion of their ancestors until now, as the first [wave of] conversion was more than two hundred years ago, 
and who would attest to this Îazakah.” This responsum does not appear in the printed editions of the responsa 
written by Ibn Avi Zimra. For the Hebrew text see: Zsom 2008:285-286   
25 In the responsa of the authors presented in this chapter, the general assumption was that the conversos were of 
pure Jewish descent. For the contradictory opinions and remarks concerning this issue made by authors from the 
16th century, see the previous note.  
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examined, such as the nature of the marriage ceremony and the trustworthiness of the 
witnesses. A Christian marriage ceremony evidently did not constitute marriage under Jewish 
law, but it had to be decided whether it could be simply overlooked or whether it should be 
considered as an overt declaration of intent not to marry as Jews, but as Christians – even in a 
case when the groom explicitly stated that he made efforts to make his betrothal valid also 
under Jewish law.26 
Betrothal in the presence of disqualified witnesses is null and void. The question 
arose, whether the testimony of converso witnesses could be accepted as valid or not. A 
person who committed idolatry or violated the Sabbath in public is unfit for testifying.27 But if 
he committed these offenses under coercion, he is not disqualified as a witness.28 The 
conversos were forced to transgress the prescriptions about idolatry and observing the 
Sabbath. The question was, whether they transgressed certain laws when they were not in 
imminent danger. If the identity and the conduct of the witnesses were known, and the 
halakhic authorities had specific information about the witnesses in question, they could base 
their decision on these facts. However, they did not necessarily dispose of specific 
information regarding the conduct of the witnesses. Therefore, in case of necessity, they had 
to formulate their opinion relying upon a presumption (Îazakah) established concerning the 
conversos in general; whether they adhered to Judaism in secret as far as they can, or they got 
used to committing transgressions against Jewish law and violated it even if they were not 
literally forced to. The decisive factor concerning the judgment of the reliability of the 
converso witnesses was the period of time they lived as Christians. For the act of conversion 
under compulsion was not regarded as a sin, but staying in the country where they were 
forced to transgress Jewish law had serious consequences to their halakhic status. Most 
authorities assumed that those who did not leave Iberia and stayed under Christian control 
gradually became accustomed to transgress the Jewish law and committed offences against it 
even when they were not compelled by the circumstances to do so.29 Such persons were unfit 
for bearing testimony. Consequently, marriages witnessed only by conversos were declared 
                                                 
26 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5 
27 Even one who commits a minor transgression, on account of which he is liable to punishment of lashes, is 
disqualified as a witness; cf. MT Hilkhot Edut, 10:1-2. As Maimonides put it, it is self-evident that converts 
(mumarim) are disqualified; cf. MT Hilkhot Edut 11:10. 
28 For a detailed discussion of this question see Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11 concerning converso 
witnesses of divorce documents (divorce and marriage pertain to the same halakhic category, therefore the 
statements relating to divorce are similar to those relating to marriage).  
29 With regard to marriage this opinion was formulated only by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47 as only 
he discussed whether conversos in general qualified as witnesses; other authorities either had to formulate their 
opinion regarding the validity of specific witnesses (and not in general), or left this problem unmentioned.  
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null and void. It was also suggested that if non-converso Jews were aware of the cohabitation 
of the couple, that might endow their relationship with legal validity from a halakhic point of 
view.30                
Some inquirers thought that uncircumcised conversos had no marital status at all, and 
therefore all marriages contracted by them were null and void. This opinion had no legal basis 
in Jewish law, but it seems to have been quite widespread among contemporary Jewry, as it is 
mentioned by various authorities.31    
 
Summing up, the most frequent considerations that appear in the responsa with regard to the 
validity of a convert’s marriage are the following: 
1) whether a convert can contract marriage at all (if he has marital status as a 
Jew): 
- whether the forced / voluntary convert can be considered Jew 
- whether his descendants can be considered Jews 
- whether an uncircumcised person can be considered Jew 
 
2) the witnesses: whether converts can be valid witnesses of the marriage / the 
cohabitation: 
- if they commit idolatry and profane the Sabbath publicly 
- if they commit other transgressions when they are not actually 
forced to do so 
- if for a long time, they remained in a Christian territory where 
they were subject to religious persecution 
 
3) the ceremony:  
- whether a convert can contract marriage “according to the faith 
of Moshe and Israel” even though he abandoned the faith 
- whether in the case where Jewish ceremony is followed by a 
Christian ceremony (or inversely), the Christian ceremony 
invalidates the Jewish one 
                                                 
30 Cf. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47 
31 Cf. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47; Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 89; ÚemaÎ b. Solomon 
Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:107; Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz  2:3; 2:19, 2:31 
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- whether for lack of Jewish ceremony the cohabitation of the 
couple can be supposed to have the intention of marriage 
- whether problems connected to ritual purity can invalidate the 
marriage  
 
Marriage is the most discussed topic in the responsa literature regarding converts. 
Responsa that were written specifically in this issue are the following: Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
nos. 5, 6, 14; Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47; ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-
Voaz 1:75, 1:107; Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19. However, as the responsa 
generally do not concentrate on one topic exclusively but deal also with related issues, 
references to marital status can be found in halakhic decisions that deal with other matters, 
like priestly lineage, reintegration of the returning conversos into the Jewish community, etc. 
Decisions dealing extensively with marriage, but having a different central topic are: Solomon 
b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 89; Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3; 2:31 – 
the relevant passages of these decisions are presented in this chapter as well. The responsa 
concerning divorce and levirate marriage, discussed separately in the following chapters are 
naturally relevant to marital status in general as well, and frequently contain explicit 
references to marriage.  
 
IV. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 5: on a Christian betrothal in Majorca 
 
The responsum which lacks the original question, was sent from Honein,32 and 
discusses the validity of a betrothal performed in compliance with Christian customs 
by a converso couple in Majorca. The bridegroom, who was apparently the sender of 
the question to Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet claimed that several acts connected to the 
betrothal had legal implications according to the Jewish law, and consequently it was 
valid. The acts considered by the inquirer as means of betrothal are the followings: 1) 
he sent bridal gifts to the woman (sivlonot)33 after the Christian ceremony,34 2) after 
that he stood together with her in a courtyard and he remained alone with her (yiÎud); 
                                                 
32 Honein was an ancient port city of the kingdom of Tlemcen (Algeria). After 1391, a large number of Jewish 
emigrants arrived in Honein, but the Jewish population left the city in 1509 due to the Spanish invasion of the 
territory. Cf. Corcos: “Honein” EJ 8:962   
33 Cf. bKid 50b 
34 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet explained that the Christian betrothal ceremony consisted of the blessing of the couple 
and the handing over of a ring, both acts performed by a priest. See below.  
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3) both acts were attested by witnesses; 4) the fact that these acts took place was well-
known in Majorca. The father of the woman, however, changed his mind and refused 
to give his daughter in marriage to the converso. The converso in turn stated that the 
woman was betrothed to him both by means of the presents sent to her and by the 
implications of their private meeting, since the witnesses to their being together alone 
were to be considered ipso facto the witnesses to their intercourse, i.e. marriage. This 
statement is based on the Talmudic discussion of the following passage of the 
Mishnah:  
 
If a man has divorced his wife and she spends with him a night in an 
inn, the school of Shammay says that she does not require a second bill 
of divorce from him; and the school of Hillel says that she requires a 
second bill of divorce from him. When [does it apply]? When they have 
divorced after the marriage, [but even the school of Hillel would] agree 
that if they have divorced after the betrothal she does not require a 
second bill of divorce from him, because [in that case] he would not 
take liberties with her.35  
  
The Talmud discusses the reasons of the difference of opinion and it is 
suggested that there were witnesses to their being alone, but there were no witnesses to 
their intercourse; and one party regarded the witnesses of their being alone as 
witnesses of their intercourse (school of Hillel), while the other party refused this view 
(school of Shammay).36 The inquirer held that the witnesses of his private meeting 
with his fiancée could be considered as the witnesses of their intercourse.   
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet did not leave any doubt about his unwillingness to 
answer the question. He explained that it was not an accepted custom to take a stand in 
a quarrel where he knew the statements of one of the interested parties only, and had 
no chance to hear the other party; the question should have been posed by both parties 
or by the judge who was entrusted with deciding the case. Therefore he intentionally 
omitted the original question and replaced it with a short exposition of the case. He 
explained that by doing so the inquirer could not make ill use of his answer; for the 




                                                 
35 mGit 8:9 
36 Cf. bGit 81b 
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IV.1. Legal value of acts accomplished during Christian betrothal 
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet argued that two requirements had to be accomplished 
for the betrothal to have legal effect, and these are the “declaration” [of the intention 
of betrothal] and the “handing over” [of an object of a determined minimum value 
which becomes the property of the bride]. According to Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, 
however, a betrothal carried out in conformity with the Christian custom did not 
contain these elements, consequently, it had been void even if the witnesses of the 
betrothal were valid. Even if he supposed that they gathered together for the 
engagement to be considered as a declaration of intention, “still, he did not give her 
anything, it was merely the priest who blessed them aloud – may it be considered as a 
curse for him – and gave a ring to both of them.”37 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet did not 
mention the possibility that delivering the ring could be considered as “handing over,” 
presumably because the ring was handed over by the priest, even if it was a gift from 
the bridegroom to the bride. The priest could not by any means be considered as an 
agent of the bridegroom who could carry out an act on his behalf.38  
 
IV.1.1. Bridal gifts 
As for the effect of sending bridal gifts without explicit declaration of the intention of 
betrothal, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet maintained to have any legal effect only in a place where the 
custom was to send presents after the betrothal. He supports his view through a precedent 
discussed in the Talmud (bKid 50b) according to which presents sent before the betrothal had 
to be suspected of being intended for kiddushin. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet explained that in this 
case, if a person departed from the general custom (of sending gifts after the betrothal) it 
could be supposed that he did not intend to change the custom, but had sent the presents for 
the sake of betrothal. But as Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet pointed out, in Majorca the custom was to 
send the presents before the betrothal (and therefore for the Majorcan community, it was clear 
that gifts themselves did not have the effect of betrothal),39 and even if the custom had been 
the opposite it would not have had any legal implication regarding the actions of the converso. 
But ––in the reasoning of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet–– the custom was suppressed by the 
persecution and therefore it could not longer serve as a basis for comparison and legal 
decision. Moreover, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet attached great importance to the fact that the first 
                                                 
37 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5 
38 MT Hilkhot Ishut 3:17 
39 Cf. MT Hilkhot Kiddushin 9:28: “In a place where the custom is to send gifts first and then to betroth, if the 
witnesses saw presents [being sent] it is not a cause for suspicion [that she has been betrothed].”  
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action in connection with their engagement was carried out according to the Christian ritual. 
In that light, every further act became questionable, because it could not have been decided 
whether they were meant as a completion of the Christian procedure, or on the contrary, as a 
means to establish their relationship in accordance with the Jewish law: 
 
…all the more so in your case, where you began the marriage negotiations 
(shiddukhin) in compliance with the custom of the Christians, either under 
compulsion or willingly, and one might say that [the gifts] were sent in 
pursuance of the custom of the Christians and on account of those marriage 
negotiations [which follow the Christian customs]. This is analogous to what 
we have learnt concerning one who betroths a woman with less than a 
perutah’s worth, notwithstanding that he sends gifts afterwards, the gifts are 
not suspected [to have legal implications], since he sent them on account of 
the first, invalid betrothal.40 
 
Moreover, in the opinion of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, even those authorities who “paid regard 
to gifts” i.e. accepted them as evidence of betrothal meant that they suspected that the person 
who sent gifts had betrothed the woman beforehand in a valid way. “But in your case, you do 
admit that you did not betroth the woman by virtue of money before sending the gifts, but you 
claim that the gifts were intended as betrothal.”41 Consequently, they did not make any 
change in the status of the woman.  
 
IV.1.2. YiÎud 
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet refused the claim of the converso regarding the legal effect of 
the yiÎud (being together with a woman privately). He argued that the case discussed in the 
Talmud42 concerned a divorced couple; the private meeting of a divorced couple was not 
analogous with the private meeting of two persons who were never before in an intimate 
relationship. Moreover, the yiÎud might have had any legal effect only in case the converso 
had declared clearly in the presence of witnesses that his intention was to establish sexual 
relation with the woman in order to contract marriage with her in this manner. Only in this 
case, the witnesses of their being together could have been considered ipso facto as witnesses 
of the intercourse. In the opinion of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, even if the converso had claimed 
that he had an intercourse de facto with the woman it would not have a legal effect, because 
                                                 
40 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5 
41 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5 
42 Cf. bGit 81b 
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the universal custom of the Jewish communities was to contract marriage through acquisition 
(transfer of money or a valuable object) and not through establishing sexual relation.43 
 
IV.1.3. Publicity of the betrothal  
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet refused the other argument of the converso, namely, that the 
betrothal was well-known among the Jews of Majorca. The converso referred to a passage of 
the Mishneh Torah according to which if a report circulated that a woman has been betrothed, 
and witnesses gave testimony about the ground for such a rumor in the rabbinical court of 
law, it could be supposed that the betrothal indeed took place.44 But, as Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
pointed out, the case of the converso was completely different from the example mentioned in 
the Mishneh Torah, since in the former case the betrothal was celebrated in compliance with 
the Christian tradition, and consequently was invalid from the outset.  
 
IV.2. Stipulations involving payment in case of breaking the engagement 
 After refuting the arguments of the converso, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet advised him not 
to persist in his claim by stating that the betrothal was valid because by that the marital status 
of the woman could become controversial and the woman might become agunah. On the 
other hand, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet encouraged him to reclaim the expenses he spent on the 
woman in the belief that they would give her in marriage to him:  
 
But you can legally demand the repayment of the expenses you had because 
of them, and the costs you spent on them, since they promised to give her to 
you and now they changed their mind. And if you made stipulations 
involving payments [if one of you retracts], as it was accustomed among 
Jews, you can claim them before the judges of the country (shoftei ereÛ), but 
nothing else.45  
 
The expression shoftei ereÛ refers to Christian jurisdiction. As Avraham Grossman 
pointed it out, in Spain, it was an accepted routine to provide financial guarantees that 
compelled the party breaking the engagement to pay monetary penalty, and it was even 
                                                 
43 MT Hilkhot Ishut 3:21: “It became a custom that all Israel betroths by virtue of money or by [an object] worth 
of money. […] If a man betroths a woman through sexual relations, he is subject to the punishment of lashes.” 
Cf. bKid 12b 
44 MT Hilkhot Ishut 9:22: “If two witnesses came and said: ‘We saw something similar to the festive rejoicing of 
betrothal and we heard noise [of celebration] and we heard from so-and-so who heard form so-and-so that so-
and-so was betrothed in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so but the witnesses left to an other country or they 
died.’ – this is a report on the basis of which an assumption can be established concerning her marital status.”  
45 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5 
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permitted to turn to the Gentile authorities to enforce payment if the party obliged to penalty 
refused to pay.46 
 
IV.3. Conclusion 
 As far as it can be deduced from the text of the responsum, the converso had every 
intention to make the betrothal valid according to the Jewish law, although he did not turn to 
the Jewish community in order to formalize the betrothal in the presence of the 
representatives of the community, conforming to Jewish laws and customs. The reason is not 
mentioned in the responsum, therefore several possible explanations can be suggested. Maybe 
a secret Jewish betrothal that had involved the presence of Jewish witnesses would have been 
public enough to convey a considerable danger for the converso couple. An event like that 
could not be easily hidden from the Christians or from any possible denunciator (Christian, 
converso or Jew). Or maybe the bride or her family did not want to hold a Jewish betrothal at 
all. The remark of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, that the custom of sending gifts after the betrothal 
was suppressed due the persecution indicate a major discontinuity in the life of the Majorcan 
Jewish community in general. One might suggest that the Jewish community of Majorca was 
weakened to such an extent that they did not wish to endanger themselves by further 
organizing Jewish betrothal ceremony to a converso couple.47 In any case, the converso tried 
to attach legal value to the betrothal from a Jewish point of view, and his intention regarding 
the case seems to be evident – at least, according to his presentation of the events. Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet, however, did not accept his efforts as proof of his intention to arrange a 
Jewish betrothal, and the main argument for the refusal was the fact that the marriage 
negotiations started with the involvement of the Christian church. On the other hand, Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet recognized that the converso had justified claims to the expenses of the 
preparations for the marriage, and he advised him to try to enforce his rights in the possible 
extent, even by turning to the Christian authorities.   
 
                                                 
46 Cf. Grossman 2004:51: “Such a document is preserved in R. Judah Barzeloni’s Sefer ha-Shtarot (late eleventh 
and early twelfth century), which even involves permission to make use of the Gentile authorities to force the 
one cancelling the engagement to pay the fine, a fact indicative of the widespread nature of the phenomenon and 
the seriousness with which it was regarded.” 
47 When disturbances in Majorca begun in 1391, hundreds of Jews were killed, others fled to Algiers, many were 
forcibly baptized, and some 800 Jews managed to seek refuge in the fortress of the city, where they were under 
the protection of the governor. In the subsequent months, however, the rioting peasants of Majorca demanded 
again and again the baptism of these Jews. It seems that a large number of them had been forcibly baptized in the 
end. Although in 1434-35, the Aragonese government made some efforts to restore Jewish communities 
pertaining to the Crown of Aragon, but without much success. Cf. Baer 1966:102-103, 245 
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V. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 6: on a Christian marriage in Majorca 
 
The following question was asked by a certain Binyamin Ammar from Bejaia.48 The 
responsum shows considerable similarity to the previous one. It discusses the validity of a 
marriage contracted in accordance with the Christian laws, before a Christian priest. The 
difference lies in the fact that in the case presented in the former responsum, the converso 
intended to make the betrothal effective through various acts that might have legal effect 
according to the Jewish laws; while here the couple married in every respect as Christians do, 
and they did not have the slightest intention to follow the Jewish tradition in their marriage (or 
at least, nothing in the responsum hints at it). 
The converso couple was married by a Christian priest a week after the end of the riots 
and religious persecution (gezerah) in Majorca. The husband left his wife after three months 
of living together. The wife gave birth to a child with whom she immigrated to North Africa. 
Her legal status had to be clarified. If the marriage contracted in Majorca was considered 
valid, she would have been prohibited to marry another man, if she did not divorce the 
converso before. But as the converso left the woman and traveled to a distant land the 
arrangement of the divorce would have been virtually impossible.  
 The question is the following: 
 
A woman from among the forced converts came from Majorca with her 
child. She was asked about her conditions and about that of the child, and 
she said that a forced convert from Aragon wanted to marry her before the 
gezerah according to the law of Moshe and Yehudit but he could not. A 
week after the gezerah, a Gentile49 friend of that converso came and set his 
eyes on her and persuaded her to marry him. And she consented and the 
marriage was contracted but there were neither [valid] witnesses nor ten 
adult Jewish males present, but the marriage was contracted in the presence 
of Gentiles, in accordance with the laws of their religion and by the agency 
of their priests. She stayed at his house as his wife in every respect, and she 
was considered as a married woman. This was widely known among the 
conversos. She stayed with him for about three months, and she got 
pregnant, and she gave birth to this child. But the man left and went to the 
other side of the sea, and he did not return to her.50  
  
                                                 
48 Bejaia (Bougie ) is port city in North Africa, East from the city of Algiers. 
49 The discussion of the case makes it evident that although the husband is called “Gentile” by the inquirer, he 
must have been a converso himself. If he was a Gentile, the whole question and discussion would have been 
unnecessary, since Gentiles have no marital status. The word goy (Gentile) appears also in the manuscripts (St. 
Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fol. 72b and Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fol. 
97b). 
50 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 6 
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V.1. Legal value of acts accomplished during Christian betrothal 
 The beginning of the answer corresponds almost word by word to the first lines of the 
former responsum; it emphasizes that the Christian wedding ceremony has no validity from 
the halakhic point of view since the two main requirements of betrothal51 are not realized in it.  
 
V.2. YiÎud  
 The main topic of the answer is the discussion of the cohabitation; whether the fact 
that a couple lived together for a period can be considered as a kind of marital union or not. 
The text that serves as basis of this reasoning is again the case of the divorced couple who 
spent a night together in an inn.52 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet remarked that the divergence of 
views concerning the judgment of the legal consequences of the case mentioned in the 
Mishnah originated in the interpretation of the word “divorced;” whether it was a divorce 
after betrothal or after nuptials. In the latter case, it could be supposed that the couple had 
sexual relation (since they used to be in an intimate relation beforehand), and that they had it 
with the purpose of marriage. But it is agreed that if there was no doubt that they had 
intercourse, they had to be considered as a married couple regardless of the exact nature of 
their former marital status. Since in the case discussed in the responsum, the woman got 
pregnant, thus it was clear that they had sexual relation, but it still remained controversial 
whether their intention was marital union or not. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet observed that some 
geonim ruled on the basis of the Mishnah that sexual relation with an unmarried woman 
established with the knowledge of witnesses had the legal validity of marriage. But he added 
that this conclusion was refuted by the vast majority of the later authorities, among them 
Maimonides,53 Solomon b. Abraham Adret,54 and Asher b. Jehiel (Rosh).55 In the opinion of 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, the intercourse can be regarded as a means of marriage only if the 
man declared explicitly in the presence of witnesses of yiÎud that by secluding himself with 
the woman his intention was to engage in sexual relation with her with the purpose of 
marriage. This never happened in the case of the converso couple under discussion. Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet raised and refuted a possible counter-argument: one may say that since the 
converso made wedding arrangements and he talked with the woman about the wedding, 
                                                 
51 The declaration of the intention of marriage (statement) and the handing over of money or an object worth of 
money (acquisition). 
52 Cf. mGit 8:9, bGit 81b 
53 MT Hilkhot Gerushin 10:19 
54 Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Íiddushei ha-Rashba, Gittin 81b 
55 Quoted by Jacob b. Asher: Tur, Even ha-Ezer no. 149. Asher b. Jehiel: c. 1250-1327, France, Ashkenaz, from 
1305 rabbi in Toledo.  
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these preparations might be considered as a declaration of his intention to marry her. But 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet interpreted these arrangements in the opposite way: in his opinion the 
fact that they married according to Christian law proved that they did not wish to establish 
their union according to Jewish law:  
 
Here, in this case, he did not have sexual relation with her for the sake of 
kiddushin, since they negotiated their marriage according to the laws of the 
Gentiles, in the house of their altar [i.e. church], and they have heard the 
curse [i.e. the wedding benediction] from the mouth of the priest – this is 
like the explicit statement that they do not wish to marry under the law of 
Moshe and Yehudit, but as Gentiles do. […] Therefore she is not like a 
married woman but she is at his place as a concubine without ketubah and 
kiddushin.56 
 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet treated briefly the possibility that the marriage might be valid 
in accordance with the law of the sons of Noah, as they also recognize marriage bond.57 He 
concluded however, that this question was indifferent at last, since the sons of Noah were not 
obliged to divorce by giving a get, but simply by abandoning each other. 
 
V.3. Licentiousness of the conversos  
 The final part of the responsum contains some derogatory remarks on the sexual 
behaviour of the conversos:  
 
In the case under question, it is evident that none is more licentious than 
these who present themselves before the idols in order to prostrate 
themselves by their free will. Their deeds give evidence of their 
licentiousness and their frivolousness, that even amidst the sufferings after 
the gezerah, with the exception of some individuals, the minority of the 
minority, most of them permit themselves to engage in sexual liaisons with 
Gentile women, moreover, they think that sexual relation with the 
unmarried women of Israel is absolutely permitted. And this is evidently so 
in case of such a worthless man; the end [of his deeds] shows [his intention 
at] the beginning, that he left the pregnant woman and he went away.58 
 
The generalizing observation that most of the conversos had liaisons with Gentile 
women might be an exaggeration but in any case, it shows the presence of a tendency of 
                                                 
56 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 6 
57 Cf. bSanh 57b; 82a 
58 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 6 
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abandoning the observance of the Jewish law concerning private life and intimate 
connections.  
 
V.4. Ritual purity of marital life 
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet brought one more argument in order to prove that the sexual 
relation of the couple lacked the intention of establishing marriage bond under Jewish law. 
For a Jewish woman is obliged to undergo ritual immersion before marriage, but this was 
evidently impossible a week after the riots that seriously damaged the infrastructure of the 
Jewish religious establishments: “At that time, they had no pure ritual baths (mikveh) after the 
gezerah.”59 Therefore the woman in question evidently did not purify herself after her 
menstruation. Sexual relation with such woman is prohibited. In the opinion of Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet, this prohibition being a so-called “issur karet”60 was more severe than the 
prohibition of establishing sexual relation with a maiden: “If he permitted himself [to 
disregard] a karet prohibition by establishing sexual relation with her, how should he respect a 
light prohibition concerning sexual relation with a maiden?!”61 It follows, according to Isaac 
b. Sheshet Perfet, that the converso did not have any intention of marrying the woman in 
compliance with Jewish law.        
 
V.5. Conclusion 
 This decision was favorable for the woman, who left Majorca and moved to North 
Africa with her child,62 where she returned to Judaism. If the marriage was null and void, she 
did not have to obtain a divorce from the husband who had disappeared, and she could marry 
again. The argumentation of the responsum shows great similarity to the reasoning of the 
former one: the fact that the marriage was celebrated according Christian law proves that the 
couple did not have intention of getting married as Jews. The difference lays in the 
circumstances of the wedding: in the former responsum the converso – according to his words 
– made several arrangements to give validity to the betrothal also from a halakhic point of 
view, while in the latter case, there was no information about such efforts.  
                                                 
59 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 6 
60 Karet (“extirpation”): punishment at the hands of heaven for certain sins committed deliberately. It is 
understood usually as premature death, although several other explications exist. Issur karet: prohibition for the 
violation of which the punishment is karet. See: Ta-Shma: “Karet” EJ 10:788-789 
61 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 6 
62 The child, although was born from a relationship considered as extra-marital, did not become a mamzer, 





VI. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 14: on reconsidering the terms of marriage 
under the pressure of riots in Majorca63 
 
 The question of the following responsum is quite elaborate and sheds light on the 
difficult circumstances the conversos faced in consequence of the riots in Majorca. It concerns 
the reconsideration of the terms of a marriage defined previously, before the disturbances of 
1391. The new preparations for the marriage were carried out in the greatest haste, as both the 
father of the bride and the future groom were about to leave Majorca escaping from the riots. 
The question is the following: 
 
Before the gezerah in Majorca, Reuben engaged his underage daughter to the 
son of Simeon. He agreed to give him 500 libras as her dowry. Simeon also 
agreed to provide his son at the time of the marriage 1000 libras and a house 
the value of which was then more than 500 libras. Thereafter, the gezerah 
came, in which Reuben and Simeon had lost most of their property, thus both 
of them became unable to comply with the conditions they stipulated. 
Moreover, as they and their families were subject to religious persecution they 
needed to utilize every artifice and ruse in order to escape the upheaval, and 
there was a chance they would lose sight of each other. So both of them 
thought that the engagement and the stipulations should be automatically 
annulled. After this, Reuben boarded a ship that was about to depart to Muslim 
territory to save himself and to escape from the threat of the persecution, and 
he left his wife and his family in Majorca. But the ship tarried in the port of 
Majorca for a number of days. In the meantime, Simeon agreed on new 
conditions [for the marriage] with the wife of Reuben and with his son, and 
they engaged the girl to the son of Simeon. And the son of Simeon even 
betrothed the girl at once in secret with their consent. But the girl was still 
underage, and the betrothal took place without the knowledge of her father, 
although the father was still in the port, and they could have asked his opinion. 
The witnesses of the betrothal were two forced converts who were relatives. 
Their degree of relationship is that the wife of the first is the cousin of the 
other. Even before this betrothal, one of the witnesses got used to profane the 
Sabbath publicly after the gezerah. He used to write on Sabbaths and feasts on 
behalf of the forced converts although he was not forced to do that; he was 
motivated only by financial gain. The other witness used to eat with the 
Gentiles forbidden meat that was not slaughtered according to Jewish law, and 
he used to share their company all the time, and they used to invite him and he 
used to eat their meat. Afterwards the son of Simeon, who betrothed the girl, 
boarded the same ship in order to go with Reuben where he would go. And he 
told Reuben that he betrothed his daughter. Reuben became very angry but he 
                                                 
63 For the discussion of this responsum see Zimmels 1932:90-91. 
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kept silence because he was not in the position to quarrel with him loudly, after 
all he was aboard the ship. So he went far away with the young man who 
betrothed his daughter, and the daughter remained in Majorca. [He kept 
silence] also because he did not dare to speak openly in front of the Gentiles 
with whom he was aboard the ship [saying] that his daughter was betrothed 
without his consent, for fear that they would denounce that they were still 
observing Jewish law. But he sent a letter to his son in secret, in which he 
rebuked him for doing what he did without his consent, and that he did not 
confirm this betrothal. Tell us, our master, whether this betrothal has any 
validity and whether she is obliged to obtain a get or not.64                                    
                                                                                                                                                                               
 Underage engagements and betrothals were not unusual phenomena in medieval 
Jewish society (both in Muslim and Christian countries).65 According to Grossman, one of the 
factors that led to the growing number of child marriages66 was the involvement of Jews in 
international trade: “Due to the numerous journeys of Jewish tradesmen to other countries, 
and the grave dangers of the roads, they preferred to see their sons and daughters “arranged” 
in life as early as possible.” (Grossman 2004:45) One may suggest also that in the Iberian 
Peninsula at least, the influence of Muslim culture was and remained strong even after the 
advancement of the Reconquista. In medieval Muslim society, most children were betrothed 
and married at a very young age, although the marriage was not consummated until they have 
reached sexual maturity (defined by a minimum age and physical signs).67 The reason of this 
phenomenon might have been the high infant mortality; most families had only one or two 
                                                 
64 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 14 
65 See Grossman 2004:34, and the bibliographical references cited there. Grossman admits that this view is not 
shared by Goitein, who, on the basis of the material contained in the Cairo Genizah, concluded that child 
marriages were a rare phenomenon and were limited above all to orphan girls. See Goitein 1978:76-79. 
66 Apparently Grossman used the term “marriage” in a broader sense, mostly referring to betrothal, although 
some of the cases discussed by him indeed concerned childhood marriages. See the second chapter, entitled 
“Age at Marriage” (Grossman 2004:33-48), where most of the responsa quoted by him deal in fact with 
betrothals (not marriage) of underage children, but Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Responsa 4:169 for example 
concerns a married couple in fact, where the wife was a minor: “You have asked further: if the husband is 
obliged to hire a maidservant for her to make his bed since she is small (ketana), and her hands are not fit for this 
work.” Ketana as a term means minor, that is, a girl under the age of twelve (cf. MT, Hilkhot Ishut 1:1). Making 
the bed is one of the special obligations of the wife that is supposed to awaken the love of the husband towards 
his wife.      
67 About cases of child marriages among Muslims of al-Andalus and North-Africa in the second half of the 
fifteenth century see the responsa of Wanšarīsī (d. 1508): Kitāb al-miÝyār, vol. 3, pp. 96-97, 196-198. About 
child marriages in the Ottoman Empire see the entry by Yazbak 2006:57-58. There it is explained that according 
to the Hanafi legal school (the one which was adopted by the Ottoman state) a minor is a person who has not yet 
reached physical puberty, which is marked for girls by the first menstruation (held to be at the age of 12 or 13), 
and for boys by the first nocturnal seminal emission (at the age of 13 or 14). If no physical signs appeared, both 
girls and boys were acknowledged as matures at the age of 15. On the other hand, sexual maturity could be 
acknowledged by the age of 9 at girls and 12 for boys. There was no minimum age fixed for concluding marriage 
contracts on behalf of children, and it was a widespread custom that marriages were arranged on behalf of 
babies. However, contracting marriage and its actual consummation was clearly distinguished by Islamic law, 
permitting the consummation only after reaching maturity. On the other hand, on the evidence of the court 
records from Haifa, Nablus, Jaffa and Jerusalem it is clear that the phenomenon of consummating marriage with 
prepubescent girls did exist.      
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children who reached the age of ten. By arranging early marriage for the children, the families 
could supply their households with lacking members; the underage girl for example usually 
moved in with the family of the future husband, where she shared the housework with the 
mother-in-law. The same phenomenon could be observed in medieval Jewish society, namely, 
that girls betrothed or even married at a very young age (under the age of ten) went to live 
with the parents of the groom or husband, where they were subject to the will of their mother-
in-law.68 
 In the case under discussion the underage girl was betrothed to her future groom by 
her mother and brother in a situation which probably was considered an emergency; they had 
previously agreed on the terms of the marriage, but the events of the riots and the religious 
persecution changed their prospects. Both families lost their wealth and some of their 
members were about to leave the family while others were still remaining. The responsum 
does not contain detailed information about the split of the families apart from the remark 
about the father’s intention of saving himself by fleeing to Muslim territory. His plans 
concerning his family are not stated. It could be supposed that they did not have enough 
money to board the ship together as the costs of maritime travel were quite high;69 or maybe 
other members of the family refused to leave; or the father wished to prepare the emigration 
for the family first, and they were expected to follow him. In any case, in a situation like that, 
the mother and the brother of the girl might have seen appropriate to arrange the marriage of 
the girl urgently, before his fiancé would have left, too. This haste might be indicative of the 
financial pressure and the existential insecurity the family experienced in consequence of the 
riots. If they lost the major part of their possessions during the riots, they might have been 
afraid that they would be unable to find an appropriate husband for the girl, and therefore they 
wished to reformulate the conditions of the marriage with the former fiancé and even to 
perform the betrothal in a formal way as far as it was possible. The fact that the witnesses of 
the betrothal were conversos further corroborates the assumption that the betrothal was not 
carefully arranged and that it was performed in complete haste. One can only guess the 
reasons why they did not ask the father’s permission although he was still in the port; maybe 
they were unaware that he did not leave yet, or they knew he would not agree to the betrothal, 
or they did not know that the permission of the father was absolutely essential for the validity 
of the betrothal.       
                                                 
68 For the consequences of early marriage or betrothal see Grossman 2004:46-48. 
69 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11 
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 The betrothal was therefore problematic in several respects, and it was declared null 
and void by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet. His decision was based on three arguments: 1) According 
to Jewish law a minor could not be betrothed without her father’s knowledge and consent, 
even if the father later consented.70 In this case, however, the father was clearly displeased 
with the betrothal, even if he did not express his feelings openly due to the circumstances. 
Moreover, it would have been possible to ask his opinion before the betrothal since he was 
still in the city. 2) The witnesses were relatives, and due to the family relationship between 
them they were disqualified by Torah law according to Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, although he 
mentioned that in the opinion of Maimonides, maternal relatives were disqualified according 
to rabbinic law only.71 3) The witnesses were conversos who violated the precepts of the 
Torah by their own will without being forced to do so. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet explained that 
converts in general were not disqualified from being witnesses, if they only violated the law 
under coercion. However, if they committed a transgression for which the punishment was 
lashes without being compelled to do so, they became disqualified.72 Therefore neither the 
converso who was accustomed to write on Sabbaths nor the other who was accustomed to 
share the company of Christians and eat with them meat of animals that were not ritually 
slaughtered could serve as witness: “If he was able to avoid the company of the Gentiles but 
he did not avoid them, but was in their company and imitated their ways and ate their meat, 
by that he became undoubtedly disqualified.”73 
 
 
VII. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47: on marriage of conversos returning to 
Judaism74 
 
 The following is the sole responsum by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran relating to the marital 
status of conversos. It contains a very detailed discussion of marriage and levirate marriage75 
                                                 
70 Cf. MT Hilkhot Ishut 3:13 
71 Cf. bSanh 27b; MT Hilkhot Edut 13:1 
72 The argumentation concerning transgressions committed under coercion is a brief version of the reasoning in 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11. The prooftexts that are mentioned in this responsum (i.e., no. 14) are 
the following: Lev 18:5, 22:32; Deut 6: 5, 22:26, 25:2; bBK 28b; bSanh 26b, 27a, 74a-b; MT Hilkhot Edut 10:2. 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11 offers a more detailed discussion of the subject.  
73 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 14 
74 For the discussion of this responsum see Netanyahu 1966:38-41, Orfali Levi 1982:28 




as well, treats the issue of marriage celebrated with the involvement of the Christian Church, 
and the capacity of conversos to bear witness.   
 The question arrived from Oran bears evidence of a great perplexity concerning the 
marital status of conversos who left Iberia in order to return to Judaism in North Africa:  
 
Concerning these forced converts who marry forced convert women by 
means of Îuppah and kiddushin – if one of these forced convert women 
leaves [Christian territory] in order to enter our covenant, and her husband is 
still alive: should she be considered as a Gentile, or as a yefat toar,76 since 
Gentiles have no marital status? Does the same rule apply to a person who is 
uncircumcised because he was born after the massive forced conversion 
(shemad) and to a person who married after being converted?77  
 
 The inquirer evidently did not attach any legal consequence to the marriage of 
conversos even if it was contracted according to Jewish law (Îuppah and kiddushin). These 
two terms cover the two main parts a Jewish marriage consisted of: kiddushin being the 
betrothal and Îuppah the ceremony by which the marital union was finally established. In the 
question, there is no indication of any Christian ceremony that necessarily followed the 
Jewish marriage. This might be a simple omission since for the inquirer the Jewish marriage 
bore primary importance; or it might be suggested that some conversos established their 
marital union under Jewish law only, and lived together in extramarital relationship in the 
eyes of the Christians, that is, without having been married in a Christian church.78 
The reason of the clear-cut opinion of the inquirer disregarding the Jewish marriage of 
the conversos is not specified in the question. In any case, the wording of the question makes 
evident that in the view of the inquirer, conversos by and large were like Gentiles: this might 
explain why according to his words women who escaped from Christian territory had to 
“enter the covenant” (le-hikkanes le-briteinu) although the term normally used for returning to 
                                                 
76 Yefat toar: “Beautiful [Gentile] woman” captured as a prisoner of war. Cf. Deut 21:11; MT, Hilkhot 
Melakhim u-MilÎamot 8:1-9. 
77 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47 
78 In mediaeval Christian society, marriage was not the only possibility of cohabitation for a couple. In the 
eleventh century, the relationship of Concubinage (or extramarital relationship) was still accepted by the Church. 
In the council held in Roma in 1069, the resolution of the council of Toledo of the year 398 prescribing 
monogamy, whether in the form of marriage or concubinage, was repeated. Until the twelfth century, marriage 
was a private matter in Christian society, performed at home. The involvement of the Church began only in the 
twelfth century, but marriage ceremonies performed in churches became widespread only by the end of the 
thirteenth century. Although in the fifteenth century, celebration of the marriage in church had already been an 
established practice, cohabitation without being married was still a possibility. See Duby 1987:144, 185, 187-
189. About marriage in mediaeval Christian society see Duby 1994. 
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Judaism is “to repent” (la-Îazor bi-teshuvah, la-asot teshuvah).79 The two possibilities 
mentioned by the inquirer concerning the legal status of the women (Gentile or yefat toar) are 
identical in the sense that the second category is a subclass of the first (the yefat toar is 
Gentile); although the laws regarding the conversion of a Gentile women or a yefat toar so 
that a Jew could marry her are, of course, different. But in either case, the woman can be 
married by a Jew after she “entered the covenant” even if she was married to a Gentile before, 
since “Gentiles have no marital status.”80 
 The answer presents a very detailed discussion of the converts’ marital status, dealing 
first with marriage and then with levirate marriage. 
 
VII.1. The marital status of the conversos 
VII.1.1. A Jew, even if he sinned, is still a Jew   
 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran started his discussion with quoting a well-known passage of 
the Talmud which ascertained that a Jew who committed transgressions still remained a Jew. 
“Israel hath sinned. [Jos. 7:11] R. Abba b. Zabda said: Even though [the people] have sinned, 
they are still [called] ‘Israel’. R. Abba said: Thus people say, A myrtle, though it stands 
among reeds, is still a myrtle, and it is so called.” (bSanh 44a) 
 
VII.1.2. If the betrothal of a proselyte who later renounced Judaism is valid, all the more so 
that of a converso  
In the view of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran the passage quoted above (bSanh 44a) proves 
that there is no difference between the marital status of a Jew and a convert. He backed up this 
statement with two other passages of the Talmud that ascertain that even the marriage of a 
proselyte who later renounced Judaism was valid: 
1) [The proselyte] “When he comes up after his ablution he is deemed to be an Israelite in all 
respects. In respect of what practical issue? – In that if he retracted and then betrothed the 
                                                 
79 Cf. Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 89; ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75, 1:107; 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19. An other expression used is “to return to their former faith” (la-
hazor le-datam ha-rishonah), cf. Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31 
80 By which the inquirer meant here that the marriage of a Gentile couple is not recognized as a bondage by 
Jewish law and therefore establishing sexual relation with a married Gentile woman was not adultery; if the 
Gentile woman became a proselyte she could be married by a Jew without obtaining divorce from her Gentile 
husband. About the possibility of recognizing the marriage of Gentiles in accordance with the law of Noah see 
bSanh 57b, 82a.  
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daughter of an Israelite he is regarded as a non-conforming [mumar] Israelite and his 
betrothal is valid.”81    
2) “…a proselyte, who accepted the teachings of the Torah, though he is suspected of ignoring 
only one religious law, is suspected of disregarding the whole Torah, and he is considered as a 
non-observant [mumar] Israelite. […] if he betroths a woman, […] his betrothal is valid.”82     
  That is, if the betrothal of a non-observant proselyte is valid, all the more so the 
betrothal of a non-observant Jew (i.e., converso).  
 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran mentioned a possible counter-argument that might challenge 
the applicability of the quoted passages: a proselyte who retracts is a sectarian (min).83 (That 
is, his status is inferior to that of a non-observant Jew.) 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran refuted this argument with the following explication: the statement 
in bGit 45b (that a non-observant proselyte is a sectarian) referred to a specific matter 
discussed in the Talmud, but had no universal validity; it did not affect the marital status of 
the sectarians in general. Consequently, if the marriage of a sectarian is valid, the marriage of 
a converso must be valid, too.   
 
VII.1.3. Disparity between the conversos and the ten lost Israelite tribes 
 The next issue explained by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran concerned the second generation 
of conversos. He established that the second generation did not differ from the first with 
regard to marital status, “even if he was born to convert parents, and he is uncircumcised.”84 
He clarified, however, that the mother should be of Jewish origin, no matter whether she was 
a convert or not. Even if the father was a Gentile, since “the son of your daughter, even if the 
father [of the son] was a Gentile, is called your son.”85 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran reinforced 
this ruling by making reference to a discussion that concerned the descendants of the ten lost 
Israelite tribes.86 The Talmud, by means of two alternative explications, establishes that the 
descendants of the ten tribes got entirely mixed up with the Gentiles and therefore their 
marriages were invalid. The conversos of Iberia may show a certain similarity to the members 
of the lost tribes, as they were equally exposed to the immense influence of the Gentile 
environment. Therefore one may assume that their marriages were invalid, too. Simeon b. 
                                                 
81 bYeb 47b 
82 bBek 30b 
83 bGit 45b. The matter of dispute in this passage of the Talmud is a Torah scroll written by a sectarian.  
84 Simeon b ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47 
85 bYeb 23a, my translation. 
86 The ten tribes who were taken captives by the Assyrians and finally got mixed up totally with the nations of 
the Assyrian empire. See: II. Kings 15:29; 16:9  
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ÚemaÎ Duran explained that the ruling concerning the lost tribes was of no universal value, 
and was not applicable to the conversos in general. The passage of the Talmud referring to the 
lost tribes goes as follows: 
 
Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav Assi: Nowadays, if a Gentile betroths a 
Jewess, we suspect that the betrothal is valid, because he might be [a 
descendant] of the ten tribes. [And therefore he is not a Gentile but a Jew. An 
objection is raised:] But [there is a rule according to which] everything that 
originates [from a heterogenic group], originates from the majority? [As the 
majority of men are Gentiles, it should be assumed that the man who betroths is 
Gentile as well. This argument is refuted by stating that the statement of Rav 
Assi referred to a place] where [the ten tribes] are settled. [If the origin of a 
settled (kavua) thing is doubtful, the law of majority does not apply. In this 
case it is assumed that the chances concerning its origin are fifty-fifty; the 
chance that it is from the majority is equal to the chance that it is from the 
minority. Consequently, the probability of the man in question being a Jew is 
fifty percent.] [...] [In the following the Gemarah enumerates places where the 
ten tribes were settled.] R. Yohanan said: [These places were enumerated] in 
order to declare them unfit. When I said this [halakhah] before Shmuel, he 
said: Your son who comes from a Jewish woman is called your son; but your 
son who comes from a Gentile woman is not called your son, but her son. [That 
is, the descendants of the ten tribes were not Jews, since the male members of 
the tribe married Gentile women. An objection is raised:] But there were no 
[Jewish] daughters? [The members of the ten tribes were not males only, but 
females as well. Even if these Jewish women married Gentiles, their 
descendants were still Jews, consequently the man in question might be a Jew.] 
Ravina said: It follows, that your daughter’s son who comes from a Gentile 
[father] is called your son. [That is, he is a Jew, and his marriage is valid. But 
this objection is refuted:] We have learned that the daughters of that generation 
were barren. [Consequently the descendants of the ten tribes came from Gentile 
women, and therefore they are Gentiles. An alternative tradition is quoted:] 
Some say [the previous tradition as follows:] When I said this [halakhah] 
before Shmuel, he said: They did not move from there until they became 
Gentiles completely, as it is written: ‘They are unfaithful to the Lord;  
they give birth to illegitimate children.’ [Hosea 5:7]87        
 
 It follows that according to both versions the descendants of the ten tribes, who got 
mixed up with the Gentiles are not Jewish, and their marriages are invalid. This is a possible 
argument for declaring that neither the conversos are Jews, and consequently their marriages 
are invalid. But Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran explained that the two cases (that of the ten tribes, 
and that of the conversos) are not commeasurable, because the objections of Shmuel 
(according to whom the descendants of the ten tribes were not Jews) referred only to the 
following specific cases: 1) if the descendants came from a Gentile woman, as in case of the 
                                                 
87 bYeb 16b-17a, my translation. 
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ten tribes where they indeed came from Gentile women, since the Jewish women were barren 
(first version of the tradition quoted in the name of Shmuel); 2) if the descendants became 
Gentiles completely – but this applied only to that generation and to the ten tribes88 (second 
version of the tradition quoted in the name of Shmuel). Consequently, the objections raised in 
the name of Shmuel were irrelevant with regard to the conversos. As Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
explained, it followed that even Shmuel would agree that the descendants of the conversos 
were Jews, if their mothers were of Jewish origin.        
 
VII.1.4. Marital status of conversos who desecrate the Sabbath and participate in Christian 
worship 
 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran discussed extensively a passage of the Sefer Ittur Sofrim that 
deals with the status of Jews who commit idolatry or publicly profane the Sabbath.89 The 
arguments brought there are the following:  
1) One who profanes the Sabbath publicly is not regarded as a Jew, “…you must observe my 
Sabbaths. This will be a sign between me and you for the generations to come…” (Ex 31:13) 
2) “One should accept sacrifices from the transgressors of Israel, so that they may be inclined 
to repent, but not from an Israelite apostate [mumar], or from who offers a wine libation [to 
idols], or from one who profanes the Sabbath publicly.” (bÍul 5a)  
The Sefer Ittur Sofrim raised the possibility that Jews who commit these two transgressions 
are not to be considered Jews at all, and that they may not have marital status.  
But this proposal is refuted by the author, Isaac b. Abba Mari immediately with the following 
arguments: 
1) Only performing a derivative work pertaining to the primary category of agriculture is 
considered as a public profanation of the Sabbath. Unfortunately this statement is not further 
expounded. 
2) Gentiles (with the exception of those living in Israel) are no longer considered as idolaters: 
“The Gentiles outside the land [of Israel] are not idolaters; they only continue the customs of 
their ancestors.” (bÍul 13b)   
According to the interpretation of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, it might follow that a convert who 
commits idolatry in the land of Israel, or who profanes the Sabbath in public by performing a 
                                                 
88 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran adopted the explication of Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Hiddushei ha-Rashba, Yeb 
22a 
89 Cf. Isaac b. Abba Mari of Marseilles (12th century): Sefer Ittur Sofrim, Ot Kof (Kiddushin) no. 37-42, p. 78. 
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derivative work pertaining to the primary category of agriculture “is not called a Jew”90 (i.e., 
he has no marital status). But he explained that this did not seem to be correct for him, since 
in his opinion, these kind of transgressors also are called Jews, as it can be seen from the 
following passage of the Bible: “Speak to the children of Israel and say to them: When 
someone among you brings an offering...”91 In the Talmud the expression “among you” is 
interpreted as phrase of exclusive meaning in order to emphasize that “someone among you” 
may bring an offering, but not “anyone among you,” thus excluding the converts (cf. bÍul 
5a). According to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran this expression excludes the converts from 
bringing offerings indeed, but does not exclude them from those called “sons of Israel.” 
Consequently, in the view of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, even those converts who commit 
idolatry and profane the Sabbath publicly are “called Jews” and have marital status. He 
reinforced his opinion by quoting the Tur: “A convert (mumar) Jew who betroths a woman, 
his betrothal is valid, and she needs a get in order to be divorced. And some say that the 
convert who profanes the Sabbath publicly and commits idolatry is to be considered exactly 
as a Gentile from the halakhic point of view, and his betrothal is null and void. But this 
position is not clear.”92 The opinion introduced by the phrase “some say” is a minority view, 
and the remark of Jacob b. Asher stating that “this position is not clear” indicates that he 
refuted this view.  
 
VII.2. Witnesses of the betrothal       
 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran dealt extensively with the problem of the validity of the 
converts’ testimony, which could invalidate the marriage and consequently annul the 
obligation of the levirate marriage as well.  
In his opinion, if the marriage was celebrated in the presence of Jewish witnesses, it 
was valid. However, if the witnesses were conversos, the marriage was undoubtedly null and 
void, as the legal presumption concerning the conversos was that they were unfit for bearing 
witness:  
 
As they remained there [in Iberia] on their own accord, they permit 
themselves to disregard certain prescriptions of the Torah even if they are 
alone [i.e., when Gentiles do not see them], such as eating non-kosher meat 
and profaning the Sabbath, let alone committing idolatry. It is evident that 
                                                 
90 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47 
91 Lev 1:2, my translation. 
92 Jacob b. Asher (ca. 1269 Cologne – ca. 1343 Toledo): Tur, Even ha-Ezer no. 44. 
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they are unfit for bearing witness, and the woman betrothed before them is 
not betrothed at all.93     
 
VII.2.1. Betrothal under Jewish law before converso witnesses followed by Christian 
marriage ceremony 
 It has already been noted that the conversos if they wished to establish marital union 
had no choice but to celebrate their marriages according to Christian law.94 Some of them 
tried to stick to the Jewish customs to a certain extent, and performed acts connected to the 
betrothal or the marriage that had legal validity under Jewish law as well,95 while others 
organized their marriage completely conforming to Christian customs and law.96 As it has 
already been presented, the opinion of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet concerning marriages 
celebrated partly or entirely under Christian law was that these marriages were null and void 
from the halakhic point of view, as the mere fact that the couple negotiated their marriage as 
Christians questioned their intention of marrying under Jewish law; and it even could be 
suggested that the involvement of the Church is an explicit declaration from the part of the 
couple that they did not wish to establish a marriage union but a sort of concubinage (zenut). 
It has to be emphasized that in practice both decisions issued by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet in this 
matter favored the women. As to the first case, it can be surely ascertained that the decision of 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet aimed to dissolve every doubt concerning the marital status of a 
woman (by establishing that she was never betrothed to the converso who posed the question, 
after her father decided not to give his daughter in marriage to the converso), and having a 
doubtless marital status is in general from the women’s best interest.97 In the second case, the 
woman left Majorca and immigrated to North Africa without having been divorced from his 
husband who left her. Obtaining a divorce probably would have been impossible to her, and 
therefore nullifying the marriage was the best way to solve her problem and to let her to marry 
again.98  
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran discussed the issue of a double, Jewish and Christian 
marriage ceremony, too. The (hypothetical) case presented by him differs from the cases Isaac 
                                                 
93 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ, 3:47 
94 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 14 discusses a betrothal without reference to a planned Christian 
ceremony, but in that case the betrothal was not followed by marriage and actual cohabitation, since the bride 
was still a minor, moreover, the couple apparently planned to leave for North-Africa as soon as possible.    
95 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5 discussed above, and Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 
2:19 to be discussed later. 
96 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 6 discussed above. 
97 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5 discussed above. 
98 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 6 discussed above. 
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b. Sheshet Perfet dealt with, and consequently the conclusions reached by both authorities are 
divergent. 
 
If he betrothed the woman according to the law of Moshe and Israel before 
forced convert witnesses, as their custom, if it is a widespread custom among 
them, and he married her afterwards as Gentiles marry, according to the law 
of the Gentiles they got mixed up with, could it be supposed that the marriage 
was valid [...] since they expressed their wish that they do not want to live 
together in mere cohabitation (be-torat zenut) [but as a married couple] [...] 
and since there are a lot of Jews fit [for testifying] in the city, and they were 
aware of their cohabitation, so we could say that the witnesses of the yiÎud 
are ipso facto the witnesses of the sexual intercourse, and the betrothal [i.e. 
the marriage] is effective from the moment of their [first] intercourse.99 
  
 As opposed to the cases discussed by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
deals with the (hypothetical) case of Jewish betrothal preceding a Christian marriage 
ceremony. Although the betrothal follows the Jewish customs, it is performed in the presence 
of converso witnesses. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran held that this kind of Jewish betrothal was to 
be considered as a declaration from part of the couple that they did not wish to establish 
extramarital relationship merely but aimed to live together as a married couple. Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran referred to the same precedent as Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet,100 but due to the 
difference between the cases discussed by them they reached opposite conclusions. Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet and Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran agreed on the point that it was necessary that the 
man who engaged in sexual relation with a woman with the knowledge of witnesses had to 
declare explicitly his intention of establishing with her a marital union by means of 
intercourse in order to make the union effective.101 In the opinion of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, 
preparations for the marriage according to the Christian customs, or a Christian marriage 
ceremony could not be considered as such a declaration; on the contrary, in his view, it was an 
evidence that they did not wish to establish marital union. If the marriage negotiations were 
started in accordance with the Christian customs, every subsequent act related to the marriage 
supposedly was meant to complete the first act; even if the groom explicitly stated otherwise. 
No matter that he tried to validate his betrothal with acts that had legal validity under Jewish 
                                                 
99 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ, 3:47  
100 Cf. bGit 81b, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 5 
101 As it has been discussed above, in the view of certain geonim sexual relation with an unmarried woman 
established with the knowledge of witnesses had the legal effect of marriage. This view was refuted by 
Maimonides, Asher b. Jehiel (Rosh), and Solomon b. Abraham Adret. Both Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet and Simeon 
b. ÚemaÎ Duran held however, that if the man declared explicitly his intention of marriage before witnesses, the 
intercourse indeed established marital union.    
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law; the first, Christian act related to the marriage negotiations was to be considered as a 
declaration of intent to form a marital union under Christian law. 
 In the case discussed by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, however, a formal Jewish betrothal 
preceded the Christian marriage, which is a completely different situation than those 
discussed by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet. In the opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, the Jewish 
betrothal could be considered as a declaration of intent from the part of the couple, namely, 
that they wish to establish marital union under Jewish law, even if the betrothal was invalid 
due to the presence of converso (that is, disqualified) witnesses. The following Christian 
marriage does not overrule this declaration, and it can be simply ignored. In the opinion of 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, as the converso betrothed the woman before converso witnesses, he 
probably thought that she was his wife under Jewish law, and therefore his intimate relation 
with her was not a sort of licentiousness (zenut) but an act by which he meant to accomplish 
the marital union. Consequently, if they lived together with the knowledge of (non-convert) 
Jewish witnesses, all requirements of establishing marriage were fulfilled: 1) removal of the 
doubts concerning the nature of their intimate relationship (if it was licentiousness or a marital 
act) by means of the invalid betrothal before converso witnesses; 2) Jewish witnesses of their 
living together, considered as the witnesses of their union. 
 
Since he betrothed her before forced convert witnesses similar to them, it is 
beyond doubt that their intimate relation had the purpose of accomplishing 
marital union and was not an act of licentiousness. And that he did not betroth 
her before valid (kosher) witnesses [i.e., non-convert Jews] is because in his 
opinion the forced converts are more kosher than the [non-converso] Jews. It is 
similar to what is said […] concerning the ignorant (am ha-areÛ): “The vessel 
of an am ha-areÛ is unclean or clean? He said to him: Unclean. But if you say 
to him that it is unclean, he won’t listen to you. On the contrary, he will say to 
you: Yours is unclean, but mine is clean!”102 Similarly here, if the forced 
convert asks you, whether he is kosher or non-kosher [for testifying]; if you say 
to him that he is non-kosher, he won’t listen to you, on the contrary, he will say 
to you: You are the one who is non-kosher, but I am kosher! – because his 
heart is directed towards Heaven. [i.e., he is prevented from observing Jewish 
laws in public, nevertheless, he strives for observing them to the possible extent 
in private.]103 
 
These observations regarding the self-esteem or even pride of the conversos are 
indicative of a certain tension that obviously existed between the converso and the Jewish 
communities. It is not hard to imagine that the conversos might have felt a kind of resentment 
                                                 
102 bÍag 22b, my translation 
103 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ, 3:47 
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towards their former brothers of faith, who disqualified them in several respects due to their 
failure of observing the commandments. This could have meant a serious psychological 
burden especially for those who indeed tried to adhere to Judaism in secret, notwithstanding 
all the dangers involved. 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran remarked that it might be objected that as the betrothal before 
converso witnesses was invalid, every act accomplished mistakenly on account of the first, 
invalid act became of no legal effect. He refuted this possible counter-argument by saying that 
this reasoning would hold true in case of bridal gifts sent mistakenly on account of an invalid 
betrothal,104 but not in case of intercourse.105 
 
 VII.3. Conclusion 
The conclusions reached by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran are the following: 1) if the 
converso betrothed the woman before (non-convert) Jewish witnesses, the betrothal is valid; 
2) if the converso betrothed the woman before converso witnesses, the betrothal is null and 
void; 3) if the converso married the woman under Christian law, the marriage is null and void 
and the woman is like a concubine; 4) if the converso betrothed the woman before converso 
witnesses, and after the betrothal he married her under Christian law in a city where there 
were Jews fit for testifying, then it might be suggested that the marriage was valid.   
 
 
VIII. Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsum no. 89: excursus on the marital status of 
conversos returning to Judaism106 
 
 The responsum discusses the formalities the conversos had to undergo if they decided 
to return to Judaism.107 First of all however, Solomon b. Simeon Duran found it necessary to 
clarify that returning converts were similar to repentant Jews, and not to Gentiles accepting 
Jewish religion. He expounded upon the marital status of the conversos in this context.   
The considerations that are relevant regarding the marital status of the conversos were 
discussed formerly by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran:     
1) A Jew, even if he sinned, is still a Jew. (cf. bSanh 44a)   
                                                 
104 Cf. bNid 52a 
105 Cf. bKid 50b 
106 For the discussion of this responsum see Netanyahu 1966:45-48. 
107 For the discussion of this responsum see the chapter about returning to Judaism. 
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2) If the betrothal of a non-observant proselyte is valid, all the more so that of a convert. (cf. 
bYeb 47b, bBekh 30b)  
3) The descendant of a Jewish mother is a Jew, even if his father is Gentile.108 This ruling is 
proved by expounding the passage of the ten lost Israelite tribes.109 Solomon b. Simeon 
Duran’s explication about the lost tribes does not present any novelty compared to the 
explication of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, discussed above. On the other hand, concerning the 
Gentile fathers Solomon b. Simeon Duran added an argument which was not previously 
mentioned by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran; namely, that “the Merciful detaches his seed from its 
owner,”110 which statement in its original context in the Talmud was aimed as an explication 
to the assertion that “Egyptians have no father” (ibid.), by what it is meant that due to a 
rabbinic prohibition their fatherhood is not recognized. The scope of this statement is widened 
by Solomon b. Simeon Duran to include all Gentiles.     
 
 
IX. ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75: on the marital status of a converso 
proceeding from an adulterous relationship111 
 
The following responsum discusses the difficult situation a second-generation 
converso had to face after he left Christian territory and returned to Judaism. Conversos from 
the second generation onwards had limited knowledge of Jewish law, and were unable to 
foresee all halakhic consequences of their decision of joining the Jewish people.  
 The inquirer presented his case in person, as it becomes clear from the text of the 
responsum. ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran described in detail the antecedents of the case. Some 
thirty years beforehand in Algiers a Majorcan converso merchant committed adultery with a 
married Jewess, whose husband had been absent for years. The converso merchant moved to 
the house of the Jewess and they lived together openly to the indignation of the Jews of the 
town. The Jews tried to put an end to this relationship and “they took pains and tried to put 
pressure on them by different means, sparing neither trouble nor expenses.”112 But all their 
efforts were futile, as the merchant was wealthier and more influential than them, “and his 
hand was stronger than the ruler of the city, because he was a merchant and also because he 
                                                 
108 Cf. bYeb 23a 
109 Cf . bYeb 16b-17a 
110 bYeb 98a, my translation. 
111 For a bried presentation of this responsum see Zimmels 1932:100-101. 
112 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75 
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had spend a lot of money against the Jews [i.e., bribed the Muslim authorities], more than the 
Jews did in order to cross their plan.”113 Time passed and the couple continued to live 
together, and they even had two children. The husband of the woman did not turn up during 
these years. Finally, the merchant decided to return to Majorca and to take the woman and the 
children with him. When they arrived at Majorca, the woman and the children were baptized. 
Some time after that news arrived at Algiers about the death of the husband, but the news did 
not reach the woman. Many years later, one of the sons who were born in Algiers decided to 
immigrate to North Africa and to return to Judaism. As the merchant engaged in the 
adulterous relation some thirty years before writing the responsum, it is clear that the son was 
a relatively young man. He returned to Judaism in the city of Constantine114 where he wanted 
to marry a Jewess. After the engagement they were told that in the opinion of ÚemaÎ b. 
Solomon Duran the young man was a mamzer115 and thus prevented from marrying a Jewess. 
The unhappy man went personally to Algiers in order to ask ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran to find 
a solution to his problem. 
 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran explained that if the converso merchant was considered a 
Gentile, the children born from his relationship with the Jewess (whether married or not) 
would have the marital status of a Jew.116 On the other hand, if the conversos in general were 
considered Gentiles,117 after their return to Judaism they would be proselytes, and would be 
permitted to marry native Jews. In both cases, although the general ruling would have been 
that the conversos are not Jews, this exclusionary ruling would have favored the converso 
youth in practice, because this ruling would have made possible for him the easiest integration 
to the Jewish community. Therefore ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran asked the question “whether 
these meshummadim who are called anusim have to be considered as Jews or as proselytes 
[i.e., after they return to Judaism]?”118 His answer was that the conversos were Jews, and he 
made reference to the passages of the Talmud that were mentioned in the responsa discussed 
formerly as well.119 Consequently, if the father of the converso youth, the merchant had the 
marital status of a Jew, his relationship with the married Jewess was adultery from the 
halakhic point of view, and their son was a mamzer, therefore he could not marry the Jewess 
engaged to him. He gave two pieces of advice to the converso:  
                                                 
113 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75 
114 Constantine (Qusantinah): In North-Eastern Algeria, about 80 kilometers from the Mediterranean coast. 
115 Person born from a relation prohibited by Torah law, like the adulterous relationship. Cf. Deut. 23:3; MT 
Hilkhot Issurei Biah, 15:1  
116 Cf. MT Hilkhot Issurei Biah 15:3 
117 Irrespective of their descent, i.e., even if the mother was a Jewess. 
118 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75 
119 Cf. bSanh 44a; bYeb 23a, 98a 
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1) He may marry a proselyte woman (ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran emphasized that by 
proselyte he did not mean converso, but someone who is of Gentile descent and 
embraced Judaism), as the marriage of a mamzer and a proselyte is permitted. In this 
case however, the children born from this marriage would inherit the marital status of 
the father, and will be considered mamzerim.120         
2) He may marry a maidservant who underwent ritual immersion and accepted upon 
herself the prescriptions bounding for servants.121 For Jews this kind of marriage is 
prohibited,122 but for mamzerim it was made possible by a rabbinic permission, so that 
they could legitimize their descendants, because although the children born from such 
a marriage are servants like their mother, they can be freed, and after that they could 
marry Jewish women.123       
 
X. ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:107: on the validity of a marriage 
contracted by a convert woman without divorcing from her former Jewish husband124 
 
Voluntary conversion of one party of a married couple in theory should have led to the 
dissolution of the marriage. This was not necessarily complied with in practice, however. If 
the person converted under force, the marriage should not have been dissolved, but the couple 
was obliged to find a way to escape persecution and to resume their normal life as Jews. As 
for the Christians, they naturally did not approve of marital relation between two persons who 
followed different religions. From the Christian point of view, marital relation established 
under any other law than Christian was null and void, therefore no divorce was necessary in 
order to establish a new, Christian marriage.125 
The following responsum treats the case of a wife who converted to Christianity and 
married a converso without divorcing first his Jewish husband. The circumstances of the 
conversion are not specified, and it is not clear whether it occurred voluntarily or under 
duress. The couple finally decided to return to Judaism, so they moved to Malaga,126 which 
was under Muslim rule at that time. The Jewish community took care of their reintegration 
                                                 
120 Cf. MT Hilkhot Issurei Biah 15:7 
121 Cf. bGit 41b; MT Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:11 
122 Cf. MT Hilkhot Issurei Biah 12:11 
123 Cf. MT Hilkhot Issurei Biah 15:3-4 
124 For some brief references to this responsum see Netanyahu 1966:53, Orfali Levi 1982:32. 
125 Cf. Gratianus de Clusion: Decretum Collectanea Paris 1547, vol. II., fols. 505b-508b 
126 Malaga, a port city in Andalusia, Southern Spain, was under the control of the Muslims till 1487 when the 
troops of the Catholic Monarchs captured it. And that time some 100 Jewish families lived there, and some 55 
other Jews lived in the nearby Vélez-Malaga. See: Beinart: “Malaga” EJ 11:817-818 
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and formalized their marriage under Jewish law by issuing a Jewish marriage document. But 
then it turned out that the first husband of the woman, whom she never divorced, was alive. 
     
You have asked about a Jewish woman who was married [to a Jew] in Toledo 
(Tuletula), but she converted (hemirah datah) and married a forced convert 
and they had five children. After eighteen years they came to Malaga and 
returned to Judaism, and a marriage document was written for them as to all 
returning Jews (baalei teshuvah). Later on there came witnesses who testified 
that the first husband was alive. What did they do? They sent to him [an 
envoy] and [the first husband] divorced her. So they were very happy with 
this divorce document, but some people said to them that they did not gain 
anything, and that she is prohibited both to her first husband and to her 
second husband. And others replied that [the law prohibiting the woman to 
both husbands] should be disregarded, since forced converts do not have 
marital status. The discussion was not settled, so they asked some learned 
people (yodei sefer), and they answered: Check the books, and you will find 
that it is permitted. You have asked me to tell you the ruling concerning this 
matter.127         
 
 On the basis of the discussion of the case it is evident that in the opinion of ÚemaÎ b. 
Solomon Duran the woman in question was not a forced convert but “she went and converted 
out of her free will.”128 The reasons and circumstances of her conversion unfortunately are not 
detailed in the responsum. 
ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran ascertained that a woman who engaged in an adulterous 
relationship became prohibited both to her husband and the person with whom she had an 
affair, and the children born from the adulterous relation were mamzerim.129 This meant in 
practice that the second husband of the woman was obliged to divorce her (as well as her first 
husband).  
 
X.1. Marital status of conversos 
ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran tried to find out the reason why some argued that the 
woman might marry the second husband. He suggested that those who were of this view 
might have thought that the forced convert husband was in fact a voluntary convert, and 
voluntary converts were similar to Gentiles. Now, if the convert before his return to Judaism 
did not have marital status, their relation was not adultery, and their children were not to be 
                                                 
127 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1: 107 
128 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1: 107 
129 Cf. bYeb 87b; MT Hilkhot Gerushin 10:7 
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considered mamzerim, because the children of a Jewess and a Gentile are Jewish,130 and the 
same applies to the children of a convert woman and a Gentile. But ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran 
proved with passages mentioned in the responsa formerly discussed that the conversos, even 
the voluntary ones were considered as Jews as to their marital status.131 He emphasized that 
this ruling held true concerning the descendants of the conversos as well.     
 
X.2. Circumcision 
ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran discussed the issue of the lack of circumcision in the 
context of marriage, which might indicate that there existed an opinion according to which 
those whose father had been uncircumcised were not to be considered as Jews. ÚemaÎ b. 
Solomon Duran did not explicitly mention such a view, but the fact that he found it necessary 
to discuss the issue of circumcision may suggest that this matter presented problems.132 
ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran explained that there was no difference between conversos born 
from circumcised fathers and those born form uncircumcised ones, since “a Jew, even if he is 
uncircumcised, is regarded as being circumcised.”133 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran illustrated this 
statement with the following passage of the Talmud:  
 
[One who says:] ‘I swear I won’t profit from the uncircumcised’, may profit 
from uncircumcised Jews, […] since ‘uncircumcised’ means: Gentile (goy). 
[One who says:] ‘I swear I won’t profit from the circumcised’, may profit from 
the circumcised Gentiles (goyim), […] since ‘circumcised’ means: Jew. As it is 
written [Jer 9:25]: ‘all nations (goyim) are uncircumcised, and Israel is 
uncircumcised in the heart’ [but only in the heart].134 
 
ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran remarked that this referred to those conversos whose mother 
was of Jewish descent: “but it is necessary that her mother should be a meshummedet and not 
a Gentile woman, because if his father is meshummad or Jew, but his mother is Gentile, their 
child is Gentile.”135 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran repeated the arguments advanced by Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran and Solomon b. Simeon Duran that proved that the statements regarding the 
                                                 
130 Cf. bYeb 44a 
131 Cf. Solomon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47; Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 89; ÚemaÎ b. 
Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75; bSanh 44a; bYeb 23a, 47b, 98a; bKid 68b. 
132 Cf. also the remarks in Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3, 2:19 to be discussed below. 
133 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:107 
134 bNed 31b, my translation. 
135 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:107. He made reference to the passages that had been already 
mentioned in the previously discussed responsa as well, cf. Ex. 31:13; bKid 68b, bYeb 98a, bÍul 5a, etc. 
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marital status of conversos included those who committed idolatry and desecrated the Sabbath 
in public.136  
 The conclusion of the discussion was that the converso couple did not differ in any 
sense from a normal Jewish couple, and exactly the same rules applied to them. In this case, 
that meant the dissolution of both marriages, and the classification of the children born from 
the second marriage as mamzerim.        
  
       
XI. Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3: on kohanim returning to Judaism137 
 
 The question was sent from Fez, by a certain Natan Bustay. It seeks answer to the 
question concerning the status of alleged kohanim (descendants of priestly families), who 
could not prove their descent. The original question did not survive, but some passages of it 
are quoted in the text of the responsum, which makes clear that the question referred to 
conversos of the third or subsequent generation (since according to the quoted passages their 
fathers were uncircumcised) “coming from the kingdoms of Catalonia, Castile and 
Portugal.”138 As an integral part of the discussion, the answer elaborates the marital status of 
the conversos. On the one hand, it repeats the arguments that were advanced by Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran, Solomon b. Simeon Duran, and ÚemaÎ ben Solomon Duran.139 As in the 
formerly presented responsa written by these authors, here again it is repeated that all 
statements about the marital status of conversos apply only in cases where the mother of the 
converso was of Jewish descent.   
 
XI.1. Returning conversos are presumed to have Jewish mothers 
 Simeon b. Solomon Duran established a legal presumption concerning the pedigree of 
conversos that was not formerly formulated. This element of novelty is of great significance 
concerning the conversos’ descendants: in their case, the Jewish origin of their mother has to 
be presupposed. The reason is, that in the opinion of Simeon b. Solomon Duran, it is a well-
known fact that the vast majority of conversos did not marry Gentile women, and they 
adhered to this practice during all the time that had passed from the beginning of the 
                                                 
136 Cf. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47; Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 89.  
137 For the discussion of this responsum see Zimmels 1932:98, Netanyahu 1966:65-68, Orfali Levi 1982:34. 
138 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3 
139 Cf. bSanh 44a; bYeb 37b, 98a; bKid 68b; MT Hilkhot Ishut 4:15 
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persecution until his days. The number of those who did marry Gentiles was so insignificant 
that it could be disregarded when establishing the pedigree, and consequently, the marital 
status of a given converso. All the more so, since the conversos knew each other very well, 
and they kept count of every case of intermarriage with Gentile women:  
 
Although some of them do intermarry with Gentiles, and they do marry the 
Gentiles’ daughters, but their number is insignificant; one from a city, or two 
from a family.140 And the one who does such a thing becomes alienated and 
despised among them, and they do not marry with his descendants, because 
his descendants are considered as Gentiles by them, which is in fact the 
[correct] ruling, since the mother [of his children] is Gentile.141  
   
Simeon b. Solomon Duran explained that the case of the conversos, whose vast 
majority marry only within the converso community, and whose negligible minority marry 
non-Jewish women, is analogous to the Talmudic precedent of the ten meat shops, out of 
which nine sell kosher meat and one doesn’t.142 The meat found in the street is presumed to be 
kosher, since anything separated [from a heterogeneous group] is regarded as having been 
separated from the majority. Similarly, according to Simeon b. Solomon Duran a converso 
who left Iberia in order to return to Judaism had to be considered as originated from the 
majority of the group of conversos, whose mothers were Jewish. Simeon b. Solomon Duran 
made reference to a number of further cases where the halakhah can be decided on the basis 
of established legal presumptions.143 In his opinion, similarly to these cases also the halakhic 
problem of the conversos can be decided on the basis of presumption, namely, that their 
mothers were of Jewish descent.   
 
XI.2. Ritual purity of marital life; circumcision 
 Some passages of the question quoted in the responsum refer to the conditions of the 
marital life of the conversos:  
 
…you have also written – I quote it – but their fathers were uncircumcised 
and were voluntary idolaters, and their mothers were not engaged, neither 
                                                 
140 “Two from a family” does not sound a negligible number at all. Surely, Simeon b. Solomon Duran did not 
mean it in the literal sense of the word, as this is a Biblical expression that appears in Jer 3:14 and was used 
extensively by mediaeval authors. In any case, when this passage of the responsum was referred to by Josef ibn 
Lev (16th cent., Salonika, Constantinople), the expression “two from a family” was changed to “one person out 
of a thousand.” Cf. Josef ibn Lev: Responsa, 1:15. 
141 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3 
142 Cf. bÍul 95a 
143 Cf. bBM 5b; bÍul 12a; bShebu 42b 
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betrothed nor [properly] married, and they did not have marriage documents, 
and they did not observe the precepts concerning the purity of marital life – 
they were born from niddah144 women and uncircumcised men!145  
 
 Simeon b. Solomon Duran refuted these statements firstly as irrelevant to the question 
of being a kohen or not; but then he disproved them also, by citing the same arguments that 
appear in the previously discussed responsa.146 Concerning the marital life of conversos, 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran again went a step further than his predecessors. He established as a 
general rule that conversos, who did not marry their wives under Jewish law, did not cohabit 
with them in licentious relation, but with the intention of marital unity.147 He stated also that 
conversos, even their third and fourth generations, as a rule did observe the precepts 
concerning the ritual purity of marital life, and they did not engage in sexual relation with 
women in their period of menstruation (including the seven subsequent days when women are 
still prohibited to their husbands). It has to be emphasized that these statements were made in 
the context of the status of kohanim. Purity of marital life is irrelevant as to the status of 
kohanim (as it is remarked by Simeon b. Solomon Duran as well), consequently he might 
have permitted himself to make general statements regarding questions that emerged along 
the way, and these statements are not necessarily well-founded. 
   
 
XII. Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19: on double (Jewish and Christian) 
marriage148 
 
 The question was sent by a certain Josef Zurafa, from Valencia. It describes what is 
called by the inquirer the marriage custom of the conversos, namely, that before the Christian 
ceremony organized in the church, they perform the marriage corresponding to the 
prescriptions of the Jewish law. The double, Christian and Jewish marriage ceremony was 
                                                 
144 Niddah: period unfit for marital life; woman who is in a period which is unfit for marital life (like the 
menstruation and the following days).  
145 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3 
146 The betrothal of a willful idolater is valid: cf. bSanh 44a; a Jew, even if he is uncircumcised, is considered as 
being circumcised: cf. bNed 31b, discussed by ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:107, etc. 
147 Simeon b. Solomon Duran did not specify his statement, therefore it can be supposed that it referred also to 
those who married their wives in the church, under Christian law. As it has been already discussed before, such a 
marriage was considered as evidence of the intention of licentious relationship (and not marital union) by Isaac 
b. Sheshet Perfet (cf. his responsa nos. 5, 6); but could have been overlooked in the opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran, if the couple gave evidence of their intention to marry as Jews also (cf. TashbeÛ 3:47).   
148 See a brief reference to this responsum by Netanyahu 1966:66, n. 171a. 
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dealt with by the Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet and also Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran.149 Unfortunately, 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran did not treat the problems that such double ceremony might have 
raised, but limited himself to the discussion of the conversos’ marital status.      
  
You have asked about these forced converts who follow here this custom 
when they marry: that before they go to the [Christian] priest, they bring two 
Jews to their house, and the groom betroths her before them, and they say the 
blessing of the betrothal, and after that they go to the [Christian] priest and 
they marry by means of the Edomites [Christians] (“al yedei ha-seirim”150). 
It happened recently that a woman from among the wives of these forced 
converts climbed down out of the window leaving behind her suckling son 
and her husband, and went to a place where she is [living as a] Jewess now. 
And she says that she wants to marry another Jew, one who returned to 
Judaism like herself. And they say that some learned persons said to her that 
she can marry [again without obtaining divorce from her husband] because 
the betrothals of the forced converts are null and void, since they are not 
circumcised. But others said that their betrothals were valid, since a Jew, 
even if he sinned, is still a Jew. And the problem is not resolved.”151     
   
In his answer, Simeon b. Solomon Duran limited himself to the repetition of the 
formerly presented arguments concerning the marital status of conversos,152 and he 
established that their marriage was undoubtedly valid. He declared that acts connected with 
Jewish divorce were carried out by the conversos frequently and no one questioned their 
legality, therefore the validity of the marriage should not be questioned either: “this is proven 
by such everyday acts as divorce executed by converts, and their bills of divorce are 
considered valid, and all the later authorities agree on this.”153  Unfortunately, Simeon b. 
Solomon Duran did not express his view regarding any possible consequence of the Christian 
                                                 
149 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 5, 6; Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47 
150 The Hebrew word “seir” has various meanings and connotations. Its first meaning is “hairy” and it is an 
adjective that applies in the Bible to Esau (cf. Gen 27:11, 23), the brother of Jacob, considered the ancestor of 
the Edomites (cf. Gen 36:1). It means also goat (cf. Gen 37:31; Lev 4:28); a certain pagan deity (cf. Lev 17:7, 
Isaiah 13:21); the land of the Edomites was called the land of “Seir” (cf. Gen 32:4; Judges 5:4). In rabbinical 
literature Edom became a synonym for Christian Rome and for Christianity in general. See Herr: “Edom” EJ  
6:369-379   
151 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19 
152 Cf. bSanh 44a; bYeb 23b, 47b; bGit 45b; bNed 31b; MT Hilkhot Ishut 4:15, discussed by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47; Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 89, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 
1:107.  
153 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19. In another responsum dealing with marriage (Yakhin u-Voaz 
2:31), he attributed this statement to Isaac b. Abba Mari, the author Sefer ha-Ittur. Yet it seems plausible that the 
remark was originally made by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran. For the discussion of this issue see TashbeÛ 3:43 in the 
chapter about divorce. In any case, it is not evident if the phrase as used by Simeon b. Solomon Duran in 2:19 
described the actual situation in Valencia or elsewhere, or if it is only phraseology adopted from a previous 
author.   
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marriage ceremony (whether it could question the couple’s intention to establish marital union 
under Jewish law, or it could be simply ignored).    
 This answer was unfavorable for the woman in question, who was forced to leave her 
husband and suckling child, supposedly under duress, climbing out of the window. It is not 
mentioned in the responsum to where exactly the woman escaped in order to return to 
Judaism. But as the question was sent from Valencia it is reasonable to suppose that she did 
not leave Iberia. There is practically no information in the responsum about the circumstances 
of the separation of the wife from his husband, and neither about the willingness or 
unwillingness of her husband to give her a bill of divorce. One can only suppose that 
obtaining a divorce document from her husband was not impossible for the woman, otherwise 




XIII. Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31: excursus on the marital status of 
conversos154 
 
 The question concerns a converso of the third or fourth generation living in Iberia. His 
brother immigrated to Muslim territory in order to return to Judaism and married a woman 
there, but died without having a child. The responsum deals with levirate marriage but makes 
references to the marital status of the conversos in general as well. For the extensive 
discussion of the responsum see the chapter about levirate marriage. The considerations 
regarding marriage are the following:  
 
XIII.1. The marital status of a converso is equal to that of a Jew  
The answer uses the general arguments: the converso is fit for marriage; therefore he is 
fit for every act connected to marriage (divorce, levirate marriage, ÎaliÛah), because these 
pertain to the same category; even if he desecrates the Sabbath publicly and commits idolatry, 
even if he is uncircumcised. The descendants of the converts are considered Jews regarding 
their marital status as long as the mother is a descendant of a Jewish or convert woman. The 
problem of the validity of the conversos’ testimony, which would render the decision more 
difficult, is simply disregarded.  
                                                 




XIII.2. Returning conversos are presumed to have Jewish mothers 
 The responsum repeats the novelty concerning the Îazakah of the descendants of the 
returning converts, namely, that their mothers were Jews.155 In conformity with this Îazakah, 
if someone left Christian land in order to revert to Judaism, and could not prove that his 
mother was Jewish, nevertheless he had to be accepted as someone reverting to Judaism 
(baal-teshuvah), and not as a Gentile converting to it (ger).  
 
 
XIV. Conclusion  
 
 Since only about ten responsa survived that deal with marriage or elaborate the issue 
in detail, it is not possible to draw far reaching conclusions regarding the rabbinic authorities’ 
view on marriages contracted by conversos. It can be stated with certainty, however, that the 
marital status of the conversos was not challenged by the authorities, although the inquirers 
were not aware their being equal to that of the Jews. Therefore after the rabbis discussed 
whether the conversos were similar to Gentiles in this respect, they refuted this suggestion 
unanimously. In the opinion of the authorities, marital status of the conversos depended solely 
on their origin, or more precisely, on the Jewish origin of their mother. No other circumstance 
influenced their marital status; the lack of circumcision, disregarding the laws concerning 
purity of marital life, violation of the laws of the Sabbath and other commandments, 
participation in Christian worship––were all irrelevant in this respect. In this context, the 
rabbis discussed extensively the difference between proselytes and repentant conversos; and 
this fact indicates that these terms were confounded by the inquirers and the members of the 
Jewish communities.  
 The question of witnesses in betrothal and marriage ceremonies was not dealt with 
systematically in these responsa, but in the specific cases where the witnesses were conversos, 
the general agreement was that they did not qualify as valid witnesses to a betrothal or a 
marriage. Only Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran formulated this view into a general ruling applied to 
the conversos as a group. On the other hand, he suggested a solution to settle the problem of 
the marriages contracted in the presence of converso witnesses. His suggestion supposed the 
fulfillment of three conditions: 1) Jewish betrothal in the presence of converso witnesses; 2) 
                                                 
155 As in Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3, their case is compared also here to the passage of the 
Talmud about butcher’s shops selling kosher and non-kosher meat, cf. bÍul 95a.  
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Christian marriage; 3) the marriage of the couple should be well-known among Jews fit for 
testifying (publicity). It must be noted, however, that the proposal of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
was only hypothetical and were not connected to a specific case. Moreover, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran himself did not intend his suggestion as a general ruling, but as a possibility to validate 
marriages contracted by conversos.156         
 From a historical point of view, the most interesting information the responsa contain 
are those referring to the conversos’ custom of celebrating their marriages under both Jewish 
and Christian law. That might include a betrothal carried out in the presence of valid Jewish 
witnesses, or of fellow conversos who did not necessarily qualify as valid witnesses. Christian 
marriage ceremony was inevitable for the conversos if they wished to contract a formal 
marriage in Iberia, but it did not necessarily invalidate their efforts of establishing their 
marital union according to Jewish law as well. 
 
 
                                                 
156 The fact he did not take a definite stand is indicated by the cautious wording of his responsum: “What could 
be taken into consideration regarding this is that if he betrothed her before forced convert witnesses, and married 
her under Gentile law in a city where there are Jews living, then it may be said that he had intercourse with her 
with the intent of marriage, and it may be supposed that their marriage is valid. It seems to me like that.” 
(Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47)  
 
 78 
Chapter 3 – Levirate marriage 
 
Levirate marriage (yibbum) is an obligation that falls on the paternal brother1 (levir) 
of a Jew who married a woman but had died without fathering a child. According to the 
regulation of the Torah in a case like that the widow of the deceased cannot marry 
whomever she wishes, but should be married to a brother of his deceased husband.2 The 
widow is prohibited from marrying any other man. If the brother does not want to marry 
the widow (or the widow convinces him not to marry her), he must release the widow from 
the levirate tie in a formal way by performing the symbolic act of ÎaliÛah (loosening, i.e. 
the shoe of the brother-in-law).3 After that, the woman is free to marry anyone she wishes. 
If, for any reason, the brother-in-law does not perform either the levirate marriage or the 
ÎaliÛah, the widow becomes an agunah, that is, a woman prevented from marriage. 
Although the text of the Torah makes evident that refusing levirate marriage is a shameful 
act, yet, in the Talmud, the priority of ÎaliÛah over levirate marriage is under question. As 
opposed to the practice in Ashkenaz and France where during the Middle Ages ÎaliÛah 
became the preferred action, in Iberia and North Africa it was levirate marriage that was 
widely practiced. In the course of the thirteenth century, a gradual growth in the number of 
those Sephardic authorities who held that the commandment of ÎaliÛah took precedence 
over the commandment of levirate can be observed. This phenomenon was due to the 
growing influence of the French Rabbis (Grossman 2004:97-98).   
 Due to massive forced conversions to Christianity in 1391, fulfilling the obligations 
of levirate marriage became a serious problem that affected more and more families. If a 
woman remained Jew, while the brother of her husband was converted, and the husband 
died without fathering a child, in accordance with the law of levirate marriage the woman 
became obliged to marry the brother. However, as the brother was a Christian, the 
fulfillment of this obligation in practice meant dissolving the bound existing between the 
two parties by performing the ÎaliÛah. If this ceremony was not performed, the woman was 
prohibited from marrying again. It has to be noted, however, that levirate marriage became 
a really ferocious issue in the course of the sixteenth century when a great number of 
                                                 
1 Cf. bYeb 17b 
2 Deut 25:5-6: “If brothers are living together and one of them dies without a son, his widow must not marry 
outside the family. Her husband’s brother shall take her and marry her and fulfill the duty of a brother-in-law 
to her. The first son she bears shall carry on the name of the dead brother so that his name will not be blotted 
out from Israel.”   
3 The description of the ceremony can be found in Deut 25:7-10. 
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responsa treated this subject. A possible explanation of this phenomenon might be that 
until the expulsion of the Jews in 1492, the ÎaliÛah ceremony was possible to be organized, 
since Jews and conversos were living still side by side, in the same neighborhoods. Even if 
the woman and the brother-in-law were not living in the same city, country, or land (for 
example, in case the woman had left Iberia), it was still possible, in theory at least, to 
arrange a meeting between the parties. Although this ceremony required the presence of 
three members of a rabbinical court of law, and in fact it was generally performed in the 
presence of ten adult Jewish males, i.e., it was a public act, it was not necessarily 
publicized as, for example, a marriage. It was not a social event like a marriage that 
inevitably would have called the Christian neighbors’ attention. In the responsa, I could not 
find any remark about performing ÎaliÛah being dangerous for the converso brother-in-
law; and the references to this practice in the Inquisitorial processes are also scarce.4 This 
might be a coincidence; but it could also be concluded that performing this particular 
precept did not convey such great dangers as observing other, more commonly known 
Jewish laws, like those connected to Sabbath, or dietary laws. In any case, after the 
expulsion, such arrangements became absolutely impossible. Jews in general, and among 
them Jewish women who were bound to their converso brothers-in-law were prohibited to 
enter the dominium of the Catholic Monarchs; and the conversos, similarly, were 
prohibited to leave the dominium of the Catholic Monarchs.5 Therefore in the years and 
decades subsequent to the expulsion, the controversy concerning levirate marriage became 
quite heated,6 and communal ordinances were accepted to regulate the problematic 
situation.7 In the decades preceding the expulsion, however, references to levirate marriage 
are sporadic in the responsa dealing with the marital status of conversos, and the number of 
the responsa treating this problem in particular is still quite limited. I have found only two 
questions related specifically to levirate marriage (Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 1; 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31). Moreover, a long responsum written by 
                                                 
4 Encarnación Marin Padilla who studied the Inquisitorial processes from the second half of the fifteenth 
century in Aragón had found only two references about the precept of levirate; one detailed description of a 
ÎaliÛah ceremony and a case when the converso brother-in-law insisted to establish sexual relation with the 
widow of his brother (without marriage); a proposal that was refused by the widow making references to the 
licentious sexual behaviour of the brother-in-law, who was also a Christian priest. Cf. Marin Padilla 
1982:293-298 
5 That, of course, does not mean that conversos never left Iberia after 1492, but presumably none of them 
risked such a journey exclusively to perform yibbum or ÎaliÛah.    
6 See for example the debate of Moshe b. Elijah Capsali and Binjamin Zeev (in: Binjaim Zeev: Responsa, 
nos. 75-76), which is not void of some passionate remarks.  
7 Cf. the communal ordinances promulgated in Salonika, in 1499 and 1510 concerning marriage and levirate 
marriage. For the text of the ordinances see: Samuel de Medina (Rashdam): Responsa, no. 10; Zera Anashim, 
Even ha-Ezer, no. 53, pp. 89-90.  
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Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran (TashbeÛ 3:47) about the marital status of the conversos deals 
extensively with levirate marriage. The relevant passages of this responsum will be 
included in the discussion.   
 
The main considerations appearing in the responsa with regard to levirate marriage are 
the following: 
2) whether conversos have marital status at all (see the detailed discussion of 
this question under the chapter about marriage) 
3) whether the fraternal relationship of two brothers ceases with the conversion 
of one of them 
4) whether an elder, converso brother is inferior in position with regard to 
levirate marriage to his younger, non-convert brother 
5) whether the obligation of levirate marriage in case of a convert brother-in-
law means actual marriage or ÎaliÛah only 
6) being anchored to a converso brother-in-law is an unforeseen consequence 
of the marriage that might nullify it retrospectively, since it was contracted 
without the full knowledge of the future consequences8 
 
I. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 1: on the priority of the Jewish brother-in-law 
over the converso  
  
The question was sent from Morvedre,9 by the son-in-law of Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet, Anselmo Descortal.10 It concerns a woman whose husband died 
without leaving a child, therefore the woman became subject to the law of levirate 
marriage. The husband had two brothers. The elder one of them was a forced 
convert (“me-anusei ha-zeman”11) whereas the younger was a non-convert Jew. 
The inquirer asked which one of them should perform the ÎaliÛah, the elder “who is 
                                                 
8 That in practice means that the marriage was mistaken (kiddushei taut): “The determination of kiddushei 
taut was derived from the general principle of mekah taut (‘mistaken transaction’), the rabbinic ruling that a 
commercial transaction based on a mistake was invalid. Rabbis have applied this principle to kiddushin, the 
marital transaction. Since consent based on full knowledge of all the critical facts is a sine qua non of a 
halakhic marriage, if a woman or a man entered a marriage without all of these facts known, the marriage 
might be deemed invalid from its very inception. If a marriage was determined never to have been valid, then 
no get is necessary.” (Hacohen 2004:2)  
9 Now Sagunto, city in the kingdom of Valencia, near to the Mediterranean coast. 
10 The name that appears in the first printed edition is  in later editions it is changed to . 
(Cf. the editions of Vilna, 1879; Jerusalem 1993) 
11 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 1 
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unable to marry her because of the persecution which enforces conversion (gezerat 
ha-shemad)”12 or the younger who can either marry the widow or perform ÎaliÛah. 
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet ruled that the Jewish brother should perform the 
ÎaliÛah, because he was the one who was actually capable of marrying the woman. 
Therefore with respect to levirate marriage he was preferred to his brother, even if 
his brother was elder than him. But if the elder, converso brother had already 
performed the ÎaliÛah, it was undoubtedly valid, “because he is considered as a Jew 
with respect to divorce and marriage.”13 The distinction between the two brothers 
was based upon practical considerations and not upon an inherent inequality 
between them. One of them, due to the religious persecution, could not freely 
follow the precepts of the Jewish law; he might have been able to perform the 
ÎaliÛah which is a more private act than a marriage, and therefore could be 
performed secretly, but being a convert to Christianity he could not marry the 
Jewish woman. Consequently, he was in an inferior position regarding the laws of 
levirate marriage than his brother. The question expressly stated that levirate 
marriage was impossible due to the religious persecution, and the answer accepted 
this statement as given. Unfortunately, the responsum did not deal with the possible 
dangers the converso could incur due to the ÎaliÛah, but both the inquirer and the 
respondent presumed that its execution was feasible. The underlying reason could 
be that in contrast to marriage ÎaliÛah was a single act carried out more privately 
and therefore did not call the attention of the Christian authorities or potential 
denunciators to it. Or maybe, since the ÎaliÛah abolished a certain relationship 
among the convert and a Jewish member of his family, it was not censured by the 
Christian authorities as strictly as other Jewish practices. In this case the ÎaliÛah 
would be similar to the divorce by means of get (divorce document issued 
according to the Jewish laws), about which  the responsa never stated to be 
prohibited or dangerous, their only concern being the opposition of Christian 




                                                 
12 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 1 
13 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 1 
14 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 43 
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II. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47: on converso levirs15 
 
The responsum discusses the validity of marriages contracted by conversos.16 In 
this context, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran extensively treated the issue of levirate marriage as 
well. This topic was originally not mentioned by the inquirer at all; Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran on his part formulated the (hypothetic) question as follows:    
 
What should be discussed concerning this matter is if a non-convert Jew 
married a non-convert Jewess and he died without fathering a child, and 
he had a voluntary convert (meshummad) brother, is the woman bound to 
him by the law of levirate marriage or not?17 
 
II.1. If the marriage of a converso is valid, he is suitable for levirate marriage as well in 
theory, and for giving ÎaliÛah in practice 
 In the first place, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran cited the Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, 
according to which the obligation of levirate marriage exists even in the case of a voluntary 
convert brother-in-law, since his marriage is counted valid; but since he is a convert, the 
obligation of levirate marriage in practice means releasing the widow by means of the 
ÎaliÛah.18 
 
II.2. Kinship between a Jew and his convert brother    
 As the obligation of levirate marriage is based on a duty that concerns the integrity 
of the family by means of substituting the deceased husband by his brother, the obligation 
is annulled if the relationship of brotherhood is broken. It may be suggested that 
conversion puts an end to relation of brotherhood. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran enumerated the 
following arguments supporting this suggestion: 
  
II.2.1. The opinion of R. Judah quoted in the Tur 
  Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran cited the divergent opinions of two geonim19 regarding 
levirate marriage in case of a convert levir. According to the opinion of R. Judah the 
                                                 
15 See the discussion of this responsum by Netanyahu 1966:38-41, Orfali Levi 1982:28.  
16 For the discussion of those parts of the responsum that deal with marriage see the chapter about marriage. 
17 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ no. 3:47 
18 Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, Hilkhot Yevamot, no. 28, p. 290. Halakhot Gedolot is a code from the geonic 
period. 
19 Gaon, plural: geonim: head of academy in the post-talmudic period. 
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relation of brotherhood ceases with the conversion of one of the brothers. This view is 
quoted by Jacob b. Asher in his halakhic compendium:  
 
R. Sherira gaon wrote: a woman, whose brother-in-law is a voluntary 
convert – since [the brother-in-law] was conceived and born in holiness, 
the obligation of the levirate marriage exists, and the woman cannot 
remarry as long as she does not obtain ÎaliÛah from him. But R. Judah 
gaon wrote: if in the moment of the marriage the brother-in-law has been 
already a convert, there is no obligation of ÎaliÛah. And if the husband 
was voluntary convert, and he died without reverting to Judaism – if the 
couple hasn’t got a child, the brother-in-law is not obliged to marry the 
widow, since [the converted husband] is not his brother, and there is no 
obligation of ÎaliÛah either.20  
 
Jacob b. Asher added: “I do not know, why the brother-in-law should not marry the widow 
of the voluntary convert, and I do not understand, what difference it makes if in the 
moment of the marriage the brother-in-law was already a convert or not.”21 Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran remarked that Solomon b. Abraham Adret22  disagreed with R. Judah for the 
reason that “a Jew, even if he sinned, he is still a Jew.”23 
 
II.2.2. “If brothers are living together”(Deut 25:5)   
If a convert brother is not considered a relation any more, the obligation of levirate 
marriage does not apply. The temporal correlation of the marriage and the conversion has 
primordial importance in the argumentation of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran. According to his 
view, if in the moment of the marriage, both the husband and his brother were (non-
convert) Jews, the obligation of the levirate marriage exists, since the existence of the 
obligation is determined by the moment of the marriage. If, however, in that moment one 
of them was already a convert, in the time of the contraction of the marriage they could not 
be considered as brothers, and the protasis of the Torah law “if brothers are living 
together”24 does not concern them. Therefore, if a couple married after having converted to 
Christianity, and the brother of the husband was not a convert in the moment of the 
marriage, he was not obliged either to marry the widow or to give her ÎaliÛah. On the other 
                                                 
20 Jacob b. Asher (ca. 1269 Cologne - ca. 1343 Toledo): Tur, Even ha-Ezer, 157:4-5 
21 Jacob b. Asher: Tur, Even ha-Ezer, 157:4-5 
22 Solomon b. Abraham Adret (Rashba), 1235-1310, Barcelona.  
23 bSanh 44a, my translation. 
24 Deut. 25:5: “If brothers are living together and one of them dies without a son, his widow must not marry 
outside the family. Her husband’s brother shall take her and marry her and fulfill the duty of a brother-in-law 
to her.”  
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hand, if the brother-in-law had converted before the marriage of the non-convert couple, 
the woman was not bound to him in any way. This opinion differs from the codified view 
of Jacob b. Asher.  
 
II.2.3. Non-observant Jews “may be cast in [to the pit],” and “need not be brought up” 
from it 
He who comes under the category of those who “may be cast in [to the pit]” (i.e., 
whose destruction may be actively promoted) is not considered a brother. Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran explained that the converts pertained to this category, as it can be seen from 
the following passage of the Talmud:  
 
R. Abbahu recited to R. Johanan: ‘Idolaters and [Jewish] shepherds of 
small cattle need not be brought up though they must not be cast in, but 
minim,25 informers, and apostates26 may be cast in, and need not be 
brought up.’ Whereupon R. Johanan remarked: I have been learning that 
the word, And so shalt thou do with every lost thing of thy brother's [thou 
mayest not hide thyself],27 are also applicable to an apostate, and you say 
he may be thrown down; leave out apostates! Could he not have answered 
that the one might apply to the kind of apostate who eats carrion meat to 
satisfy his appetite, and the other to an apostate who eats carrion meat to 
provoke? — In his opinion, an apostate eating carrion meat to provoke is 
the same as a min.28 
 
This passage means that a person who violates the precepts out of obstinacy is not 
counted as “brother.” As most of the conversos forsake Jewish faith out of fear or 
opportunism (which is similar to the motivation of those who cannot resist temptation), 
they were not considered to be similar to sectarians, who were not to be counted as 
“brothers.” On the other hand, this interpretation means that according to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran the conversos who converted to Christianity because they despised Jewish religion 





                                                 
25 Sectarians. 
26 That is, mumarim.  
27 Deut. 22:3 
28 bAZ 26b 
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II.2.4. Lending money on interest 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran quoted the view of Nahmanides according to which it is 
permitted to lend money for interest to the son of a non-observant Jewess, because he does 
not count as brother.29  
 
II.2.5. Priests should not defile themselves for the sake of their convert brothers 
A priest should not defile himself for his deceased relatives if they separated 
themselves form the Jewish people, i.e., if they converted. This ruling is based on the 
interpretation of the following verse: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to 
them: ‘A priest must not make himself ceremonially unclean for any of his people who die, 
except for a close relative, such as […] his brother.” (Lev 21:1-2) In the Talmud, it is 
explained that the phrase “of his people” has a restrictive sense;30 if the relatives 
enumerated in the Torah dissociate themselves from the practices of Jewish people, the 
priest should not defile himself by attending, for example, their funeral. This tradition 
presumes that conversion annihilates family relationship. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran added 
that corpse-uncleanness and levirate marriage pertained to the same category as far as the 
meaning of the word “brother” was concerned.31 
  
II.3. Kinship between convert brothers    
Obviously, in Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran’s view, if in the moment of contracting the 
marriage both brothers have already been converted, family relationship existed between 
them, since even the family relationships of the Gentiles were acknowledged,32 a fortiori 
that of the converts. This means that if the woman returned to Judaism afterwards, she 
could not contract a new Jewish marriage without being released by her levir, who possibly 
remained a converso. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran did not explain here the possible 
consequences of this ruling, but it should be remarked, that if in the moment of the 
marriage, the couple have been already converted, their marriage was celebrated in all 
probability according to Christian ceremony (solely, or besides a Jewish ceremony), which 
                                                 
29 Cf. Nahmanides: Hiddushim, Bava MeÛia 71b 
30 Cf. bSanh 47a 
31 The reason is that fraternal relations derive from the father; brothers with same mother but different fathers 
are not subject to the laws of levirate marriage. Similarly, the passage of Lev cited above referred to brothers 
from the same father, and not to brothers with the same mother. Cf.: Sifra, Kedoshim, 11:4 (p.93a); Emor, 
1:8 (p.94a)  
32 Cf. bYeb 62a 
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makes the validity of their marriage dubious, and after all, may result in the nullification of 
both the marriage and the levirate tie.33 
 
II.4. If the woman had known that she would be bound to a convert levir, she wouldn’t 
have married at all. 
 This presumption is based on the following passage of the Talmud: “The woman, 
whose levir is affected with leprosy could be released without the act of ÎaliÛah, for she 
would not have consented to get betrothed [to the healthy husband] if she had known that 
this would happen [if she had foreseen the future consequences].”34 This sentence in its 
original context is intended as an absurd statement. In the Talmudic discussion, one of the 
authorities intended to introduce a new principle according to which if unforeseen 
circumstances bring about an unforeseen obligation, that obligation becomes null, 
supposing that if a person knew that such and such would happen, they wouldn’t have done 
what they did. This proposition is refuted by several examples where although an 
unforeseen circumstance brought about an obligation, the obligation existed nevertheless. 
The case of the levir affected with leprosy is the third of such examples:  
 
But if that would be the case, the woman, whose levir is affected with 
leprosy could be released without ÎaliÛah, for she would not have consented 
to get betrothed [to the healthy husband] if she had known that this would 
happen?! [Refusal of this objection:] In that case we all can bear witness that 
she was pleased in any case, as Resh Lakish used to say: It is better to live 
together than to live in widowhood.35 
 
That implies that it is better to dwell together with another person under all 
circumstances than to be a widow. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran refuted this argument 
declaring that it might be better to live with a leper than to remain a widow, but surely it is 
better to be a widow than to live with a convert. Consequently, the argument that if she 
knew that such and such would happen, she would not have done what she did – is valid in 
the specific case of a woman bound to a convert brother-in-law. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
remarked that this is an argument in favor of Judah gaon, who held that if the levir had 
already converted before the marriage of his brother, the widow was not obliged to obtain 
ÎaliÛah from him. In this case, the condition “if she knew that such and such would 
                                                 
33 About the discussion of the effect of the Christian ceremony and the problems connected with secret 
Jewish betrothal and marriage see the chapter about marriage. 
34 bBK 110b, my translation. 
35 bBK 110b-111a, my translation. 
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happen” does not refer to the conversion of the brother-in-law – for he has been already 
converted before the marriage – but to the fact that she won’t have a child, and that his 
husband will die before her.  
 
II.5. Conclusion 
     Summing up the discussion of the issue, it can be inferred that Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran tended to disqualify some of the potential convert levirs arguing that they ceased to 
be brothers. In his view, as the obligation of levirate marriage becomes existent in the 
moment of contracting the marriage, their family relation existent in that moment was 
decisive. 
It must be noted however, that Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran ascertained that his ruling, 
which made the decision of the question dependent upon the temporal correlation of the 
marriage and the conversion, was intended as a ruling in theory (“le-halakhah” as opposed 
to “le-maaseh” which is a ruling that should be followed in practice). With this remark he 
restricted the applicability of his legal opinion concerning the question, establishing that he 
suggested this ruling in principle, but because of certain considerations he left unexplained, 
he refrained from implementing it in practice. The reason might be that his interpretation 
was unprecedented and was not backed up by other rabbis (that is why Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran did not refer to other authorities who might have shared his view). By suggesting 
the application of this consideration, namely, the decisiveness of the temporal correlation 
of marriage and conversion, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran offered a possibility to resolve the 
problem of a significant number of women anchored to convert levirs.36  
 
 
                                                 
36 According to Netanyahu this responsum proves that in the view of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran the conversos 
were “enemies of the Jewish people”: “It is obvious, then, that Duran completely rejected the idea of 
“brotherhood” between Jews and Marranos, except in a purely ethnic sense, and that he favored separation 
between the groups as the only way out of a harmful entanglement. As he saw it, the Marranos ought to be 
treated realistically according to what they actually were – not unwilling, but willing converts, and 
consequently, traitors of the Jewish religion and the Jewish people.” (Netanyahu 1966:41-42) This kind of 
argumentation is typical of Netanyahu; he interprets passages of the responsa independently from their 
original context. Although Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran in fact raised the possibility of disqualifying some 
converts from being levirs, he did not state that converts, as a whole, were the enemies of the Jewish people; 
neither did he say that they were all willful converts. Moreover, in all probability his intention was to find a 
solution by means of which at least some women bound to their converso levirs could remarry without 
obtaining ÎaliÛah first. However, he did not disqualify the converts as a group from being levirs, not even in 
theory.        
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III. Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31: on a converso levir living in a 
Christian land37 
 
The responsum answers a question concerning levirate marriage but discusses quite 
extensively the marital status of the conversos in general as well.38 The responsum was 
sent to a certain Haggai b. Solomon b. Alzuk, to Mostaganem.39 
The question comprises a kind of historical introduction or evaluation of the 
situation of the conversos. It describes that some ninety years before massive conversions 
occurred in the Iberian Peninsula, and that the conversos, although they could have left 
Iberia and return to Judaism in Muslim territory, choose to stay there: 
 
 It happened that some ninety years ago, or more, in the land of the 
Christians because of the frequent persecutions (gezerot) and forced 
conversions (shemadot) a lot of men, women, and children converted 
(nishtamdu). And this generation, which converted (nishtamed) although 
they could have fled to the land of Ishmael [i.e. Muslim territory], which is 
close to them, in order to return to their first faith, they did not flee; but 
they remained as Gentiles, and they begot sons and daughters being as 
Gentiles. And also their sons, who descended from them, remained as 
Gentiles all of their life. Afterwards their sons, some from the third 
generation, and some from the fourth generation, awake to return to the 
God of Israel, and they fled from the land of Edom [i.e., the Christians] to 
the land of Ishmael, and they returned to their first faith, and these 
persons, when they were still Gentiles, most of them married women of 
their kind, that is, voluntary convert women (meshummadot) of Jewish 
origin, and their minority married Gentile women of Christian origin. And 
now it happened that someone came from the third or the fourth 
generation and became a proselyte (“nitgayyer”) and after that he married 
a woman, but he died without a child. And I ask if the woman is bound to 
the levir, since there remained a convert (mumar) brother of him in the 
land of the Christians, who was born as a Gentile, similarly to his father.40  
 
 It is noteworthy that the question uses the term “nitgayyer” (to become a proselyte) 
with respect to the returning converso. It is evident that this expression is used loosely, 
since the converso in question could not have been a proselyte, because in that case his 
brother would not have been considered a levir. That indicates that these terms were not 
used consequently, and whatever the process of his reintegration to the Jewish community 
                                                 
37 For the discussion of this responsum see Netanyahu 1966:55-65, Orfali Levi 1982:33-34. 
38 For the discussion concerning marriage and marital status in general, see the chapter about marriage. 
39 Mostaganem is a port city in Algiers, about 90 km East from Oran. 
40 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31. See another English translation of the question made by 
Netanyahu (1966:56-57) and the extensive discussion of the responsum there.  
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was, the inquirer called it “giyyur,” like the process Gentiles have to undergo if they wish 
to embrace Jewish faith. Simeon b. Solomon Duran established a legal presumption 
(Îazakah) regarding the descent of the returning conversos in general. According to it, if a 
converso left Christian land with the intention of returning to Judaism, even if he could not 
prove that his mother was of Jewish origin, he had to be accepted as a non-observant Jew 
reverting to Judaism (baal-teshuvah), and not as a Gentile converting to it (ger).41 
 It is also evident from the wording of the text that the terms “meshummad” and 
“mumar” were used synonymously; and that the conversos who were baptized obviously 
by force (because of “the persecutions (gezerot) and forced conversions (shemadot)”42) are 
nevertheless called meshummadim (voluntary converts). That, in my opinion, does not 
mean necessarily that Simeon b. Solomon Duran treated them as such since they remained 
in Iberia, but maybe because the widely used expression for forced conversion is 
“shemad,” and a person converted under the duress of “shemad” might be called 
“meshummad” notwithstanding the exact meaning of this term (that is, voluntary convert). 
 The answer discusses lengthily the marital status of the conversos. An equally long 
discussion is dedicated to the problem of levirate marriage. The argumentation is focused 
on the question whether the convert levir counts as a brother or not. Simeon b. Solomon 
Duran several times referred to the ruling of his grandfather, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
regarding this issue, and he repeatedly stated that Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran had 
demonstrated that the converso undoubtedly had to be regarded as a brother, and the 
fraternal relationship did not cease due to the conversion of one of the brothers. However, 
as it has been presented before, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran in his responsum no. 3:47 
enumerated several arguments supporting the opinion that conversion annuls the relation of 
brotherhood, and he did not refute all of them. On the contrary, he held that under specific 
circumstances, a convert did lose his status of a brother. Moreover, he brought arguments 
that supported the view of Judah gaon, according to which the temporal correlation 
between the contracting of the marriage and the conversion of the levir was a decisive 
factor. On the other hand, Simeon b. Solomon Duran (the author of Yakhin u-Voaz 2) 
presented only those authorities who refuted the view of Judah gaon43 without mentioning 
                                                 
41 The same legal presumption was formulated by Simeon b. Solomon Duran in Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3. The case 
of the returning conversos is compared to the passage of the Talmud about butchers’ shops selling kosher and 
non-kosher meat, cf. bÍul 95a. For the extensive discussion of this issue see the presentation of Yakhin u-
Voaz 2:3 in the chapter about marriage.  
42 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31 
43 Cf. the opinion of Solomon b. Abraham Adret quoted in Vidal mi-Tolouse: Maggid Mishneh, Hilkhot 
Yibbum we- ÎaliÛah 1:6 and quoted in Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47 also; Jacob b. Asher: Tur, 
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any of the arguments brought up by his grandfather. The reason might be that Simeon b. 
Solomon Duran was aware of the fact that his grandfather, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran did not 
intend his argumentation as a ruling in practice, but only as a theoretical possibility, and 
therefore Simeon b. Solomon Duran considered it as irrelevant to the case under 
discussion. 
 
III.1. A brother who converts does not cease to be a brother 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran ascertained that if one of two Jewish brothers converted, 
he still had to be considered as the brother of the other one; the relation of brotherhood did 
not cease because of the conversion of one of them. Thus Simeon b. Solomon Duran 
inferred that a converso brother is fit for being a levir. He mentioned the same passage of 
the Bible that was interpreted by his grandfather, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran beforehand,44 
but in the opposite sense. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran said that if one of the brothers 
converted, then the protasis of the Torah law “if brothers are living together” (Deut 25:5) 
ceased to describe their situation, as they are no longer “living together.” Consequently, the 
apodosis “her husband's brother shall […] marry her” (ibid.) loses its validity. As opposed 
to the view of his grandfather, Simeon b. Solomon Duran put the emphasis solely on the 
first words of the protasis: “if brothers” saying that the only condition implied in this 
sentence is brotherhood, i.e. in the biological sense, any other nature of their relationship 
described by the phrase “are living together” does not count as a the protasis of the 
conditional sentence.  
 
III.2. Even those conversos who were born as Gentiles were born in holiness 
 The aim of this statement is to settle every possible doubt concerning the marital 
status of the converts that could be raised due to the fact that the conversos from the 
second generation onwards were not born in families observant of the Jewish law.45 
Simeon b. Solomon Duran discussed this matter in the context of levirate marriage, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Even ha-Ezer, no. 157:4-5 (also quoted by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran there); the view of Maimonides 
according to the interpretation of Vidal mi-Tolouse in: ibid.  
44 Cf. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:47 
45 It might be suggested also that the expression “to be conceived and born in holiness” refers more precisely 
to the observance of the laws concerning the purity of marital life. However, this supposition leads to a 
contradiction, since Simeon b. Solomon Duran in another responsum (Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3) explicitly states 
that the conversos observe these laws. Therefore, if the expression “to be conceived and born in holiness“ 
had been used by him in this sense, he could have simply repeated his statement, according to which 
conversos observed these laws, instead of advancing the argumentation that is presented below.    
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although these considerations are relevant to the marital status of the conversos in general. 
His argumentation is a kind of reductio ad absurdum, according to which if it was accepted 
that the conversos hadn’t been born in holiness, they would have been similar to 
proselytes, and in this case, they would have been permitted to marry their sisters, as the 
family relationships of the proselytes cease with their conversion to Judaism, and therefore 
in theory, they are permitted to marry their former sisters.46 However, it was evident that 
the descendants of the conversos were not permitted to marry their sisters. Therefore they 
were not similar to Gentiles embracing Judaism, and although the descendants of the 
conversos were born in conditions similar to those of the children of the Gentiles, they still 




 The chapter presented halakhic problems that appear in the responsa regarding the 
obligation of levirate marriage with converts. This obligation in practice meant the 
releasing the deceased brother’s widow by means of performing the ceremony of ÎaliÛah. 
All of the authorities agreed that conversos had a marital status similar to that of the Jews 
and therefore they were fit for levirate marriage in theory, and for giving ÎaliÛah in 
practice. The only question controversial to a certain extent was whether conversion put an 
end to fraternal relationship between brothers. If the convert brother was not considered a 
relation any more, evidently he would be disqualified as a potential levir. This suggestion 
was discussed by two of the three authorities. In the opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, 
the disqualification of the convert brother-in-law on the basis of the argument that he 
ceased to be a brother might be valid in a certain case, namely, if at the moment of a Jew’s 
marriage his brother was already converted. However, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran made it 
clear that he did not intend this ruling as a halakhah to be followed in practice. His 
grandson, Simeon b. Solomon Duran, on the other hand, reasoned in favor of the existence 
of the kinship between a Jew and his converso brother regardless the circumstances, like 
the temporal relation of the conversion and the contracting of the marriage. In short it 
                                                 
46 In practice, however, they are prohibited to do so, but not because their kinship would be recognized, but 
in order not to dishonour Judaism. As Simeon b. Solomon Duran explained, if their marriage was permitted, 
they could say that being Gentiles they were subject to more strict moral requisites, since as Gentiles they 
were forbidden to marry their sisters. This supposition would be dishonourable for the Jewish faith.   
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could be said that in practice, none of the authorities held that a woman might be released 
from the bond of levirate without performing the ceremony of ÎaliÛah. 
It has to be noted that the number of the responsa regarding levirate marriage in the 
period under discussion is very limited, especially compared to the number of responsa 
written on this subject in the decades after the expulsion. Apparently this issue became 
more urgent after the expulsion of the Jews from Iberia, when a lot of women who 
emigrated to North Africa were unable to remarry because they were bound to their 
converso brothers-in-law who remained in Iberia. After the expulsion, performing the 
ÎaliÛah in such cases was practically impossible, which led to the revaluation of the former 




Chapter 4 – Divorce 
 
 The conversion of an individual naturally affected family relationships as well. As 
forced conversion generally was imposed upon communities as a whole, in most cases 
entire families converted.1 This is not to say of course that all members of an extended 
family were necessarily baptized by force during riots causing massive conversions, but 
households or married couples were likely to undergo forced conversions together. 
However, it could happen that a couple became separated by conversion if one of them was 
baptized and the other was not. In such cases if they wished to remain together, they either 
had to leave for a land where they could both practice Judaism openly, or the one who had 
not been converted yet had to accept baptism. The other possibility would have been to 
continue conjugal life in a mixed marriage, but this was not tolerated by the Christian 
environment in general. Although cohabitation not sanctified by the Church was an 
existent phenomenon in the society of the Late Middle Ages, but not a real option for those 
who as recently converted, or as members of a marginalized minority were constantly 
under the watchful and frequently hostile eyes of their Christian neighbours.2 If the couple 
decided to break off, the woman got to a difficult situation in case she wished to remarry 
under Jewish law. In order to do so she had to leave Christian territory with or without her 
children (if she had any), establish herself in a wholly new environment, and be able to 
present a get (divorce document) acceptable for the rabbinical court of law testifying that 
she was not bound to her former husband any more. Also if both of them were baptized, 
eventually only one of them decided to leave Christian territory, which led to the same 
problems as the ones enumerated above. The fact that in the responsa only cases of women 
wanting to obtain divorce from their baptized husband are treated follows from the nature 
of Jewish law that did not grant equality to genders: if the woman converted and wanted to 
stay Christian, the husband remaining Jewish (or returning to Judaism) could marry 
another woman without any difficulty, therefore cases like that are not dealt with in the 
responsa, since they did not lead to a halakhic problem. This should be remembered 
                                                 
1 It is important the recall that collective, literally forced conversions that confronted the communities with 
the option of baptism or death happened only during the riots of 1391 and in Majorca in 1435. The massive 
conversions of the 15th century were motivated by political, social and psychological pressure, but were not 
caused by imminent threat of death.  
2 It has to be remembered that before the foundation of the National Inquisition in 1481 the Papal Inquisition 
(established by George IX in 1230-1232) already has been operating in Iberia. About marital life, sexual 
relations and related issues in Mediaeval Iberian Jews, see Assis 1988.    
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otherwise one would get the erroneous impression that women were more eager in 
returning to Judaism than men, which is not the case. Summing up the possibilities a 
couple had if one of them converted: a) the party remaining Jewish could accept baptism; 
b) they could emigrate together to Granada or North-Africa and live as Jews; c) the party 
adhering to Judaism could emigrate alone, in which case the woman had to obtain a Jewish 
divorce from the husband staying behind, so that she could remarry. This last point is the 
one discussed in the responsa, since only this constituted a halakhic problem.   
 It is needless to say that obtaining a valid divorce document was not at all simple. It 
needed a competent person to write it, witnesses to sign it, and eventually an agent to 
deliver it to the woman. Leaving aside halakhic considerations one should ask whether 
convert husbands were ready to write (or at least, sign) such documents connecting them to 
their former faith at all; whether witnesses were willing to participate; whether convert 
witnesses and husbands were not afraid of using their former Jewish names; whether the 
document could be delivered to the wife; whether there remained any connection between 
them at all if great distance separated them. Divorce documents and arrangements 
connected with divorce apparently are rarely if ever mentioned in inquisitorial processes.3 
Also the number of the responsa dealing with this problem is quite limited, and the 
descriptions of the cases under question generally lack details.           
 
 
I. Divorce according to Jewish Law 
  
Dissolution of Jewish marriage is possible by handing over a divorce document by 
the husband to his wife. The basic formal requirements of this act are referred to in the 
Torah4 and were elaborated by the rabbinical authorities. According to Maimonides there 
are ten requisites deduced from this passage which are indispensable for the validity of the 
divorce document: 1) the husband should divorce his wife by his free will; 2) he should 
divorce her by means of a written document; 3) it should be stated explicitly that the 
husband sends out his wife (and not leaves her); 4) it should be stated explicitly that the get 
severs the relationship between the husband and the wife ; 5) the document should specify 
                                                 
3 For example, I could not find any reference to inquisitorial processes mentioning divorce in Levine 
Melammed 1999 presenting the life of Castilian crypto-Jewish women in the 14-16th centuries based on 
inquisitorial documents. 
4 Cf. Deut 24:1 
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the husband’s and the wife’s name; 6) the get should be complete and elaborate, lacking 
only the act of handing it over in order to be effective; 7) it should be given to the wife; 8) 
it should be given her in the presence of witnesses; 9) it should be given her with the 
intention of divorce; 10) it should be given her by the husband or by his agent.5 Rabbinical 
sources include other requirements, such as those concerning dating and signatures of the 
witnesses. The Mishnah enumerates five categories of those who are unfit for writing the 
divorce document, among them the Gentiles.6 With respect to the issue of conversos an 
important and much quoted statement made by Maimonides establishes that a convert is 
like a Gentile7 and it may be deduced from this statement that he is unfit for writing the 
divorce document.    
Divorce becomes effective when the get reaches the hand of the wife. If for some 
reason the husband cannot deliver the get personally, he can appoint an agent for the 
delivery, who conveys the divorce document to the wife. On the other hand, the wife can 
appoint an agent for acceptance who can receive the get on her behalf. In this case the 
divorce becomes effective when the get reaches the hand of the agent. If the husband is 
unable to make the arrangements for the divorce himself, he can appoint a scribe, witnesses 
and an agent of delivery to settle the whole process of the divorce. In this case the husband 
must state his intention of divorce in the presence of the scribe, the witnesses and the agent 
by saying “write and give a get to my wife.” The get in absence originally was not meant 
to solve problems emerging due to religious persecutions, but a reaction to situations 
arising from the lasting separation of husband and wife due to the engagement of the latter 
in such activities as e.g. long distance trade. These arrangements however became of 
paramount importance in times of religious persecutions when couples easily became 
separated by the vicissitudes of the circumstances.8 It was not infrequent that one of them 
                                                 
5 Cf. MT Hilkhot Gerushin 1:1 
6 Cf. bGit 2:5 
7 MT Hilkhot Gerushin 3:15: “Everyone is suitable for writing a get, with the exception of five: a Gentile, a 
servant, a deaf-mute, a mentally retarded person and a minor. […] A Jew who becomes a voluntary convert 
(nishtamed le-avodah zarah) or violates the laws of Sabbath in public, is like a Gentile in every respect.” It 
has to be noted here that a voluntary convert is not equal to a forced convert, and that the conversos and their 
descendants did not come under the category of voluntary converts inevitably even if their adherence to 
Judaism was questioned more and more with the lapse of time.     
8 Cf. for example Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19 discussing the case of a woman who 
escaped conversion by climbing out of a window leaving behind her suckling son and her husband, and 
wanted to marry again without obtaining a get from her husband. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 14 
treats the case of a betrothed girl whose bridegroom left for Muslim territory by ship, while the girl remained 
with her family in Majorca. ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:107 discusses the case of a woman 
who was baptized and then left her husband without divorcing him. She married a forced convert and they 
lived together for 18 years. Finally they decided to return to Judaism together and to establish their marital 
union according to Jewish law, and they asked the first husband to write a get for the woman. (For the 
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decided to leave the land of persecution and to immigrate to another country while the 
other remained there, in which case, if they could not arrange the divorce before their 
separation, the get had to be sent with an agent.         
 The problems that emerge in the context of divorce documents are the following: 
the capacity of the conversos to bear witness; names used by conversos, which were 
frequently Gentile ones; the capacity of the conversos to write the divorce document.   
The following discussion will present responsa concerning divorce written by Isaac 
b. Sheshet Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran (TashbeÛ), and ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran 
(Yakhin u-Voaz 1). Responsa concerning this issue are quite scarce compared to the 
amount of responsa written regarding other issues of marital status, such as marriage and 
levirate marriage. The problems related to divorce appear in all but one of the responsa 
written by the discussed authors as questions concerning the validity of the divorce 
document. The one exception9 discusses whether a woman is entitled to receive the sum 
fixed in her marriage document for case of divorce, if she had spent too much money on 
escaping from forced baptism.   
 
II. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 11: on converso witnesses10 
 
The responsum was sent to Amram Efrati b. Marwan, possibly to Oran.11 It 
concerns the validity of a get the witnesses of which were conversos. The get was issued 
for a woman, herself a convert, who managed to leave the Iberia12 and to return to Judaism 
in North Africa. It is not stated in the responsum explicitly, but it seems to be most 
probable that her former, converso husband remained in Iberia.13 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
discussed in this responsum extensively the conversos’ capacity of bearing witness; the 
notion of compulsion; and the judgement on forced conversion in general. The question 
goes as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                    
discussion of these responsa see the chapter about marriage.) Furthermore, see below Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran: TashbeÛ 2:176, which deals with the litigation between a husband who managed to escape forced 
conversion, and his wife who was forcibly baptized by the rioters who plundered their home.    
9 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:176 
10 For the discussion of this responsum see Netanyahu 1966: 29-31. Netanyahu however limits himself to 
presenting the passages referring to informers, and conversos staying or leaving Iberia, without even 
mentioning the subject of the responsum, let alone the actual question, or any part of the halakhic discussion. 
See also some brief references by Orfali Levi 1982:26.  
11 Responsum no. 8 written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet was sent to the same person. The inscription of that 
responsum contains the indication of the place.  
12 The expression ereÛ ha-shemad (land of forced conversion) and the whole context of the responsum 
indicate that the couple lived in Iberia.  




You have asked about a forced convert woman who was divorced by her 
forced convert husband, and the witnesses of writing, signing and 
delivering the get were forced converts. That woman by the grace of God 
and by her own efforts managed to escape from the land of forced 
conversion (ereÛ ha-shemad), and came to the land of Ishmael [Muslim 
territory] so that she may serve God without fear. And you said that the 
legal presumption concerning the witnesses was that they were fit when 
among the people of the Name [i.e. the Jews], and unfit, when among 
Gentiles. Some of them were unable to leave [Iberia] for a number of 
reasons. You cannot decide whether the forced converts pertain to the 
category of “the wicked ones of Israel,” who are disqualified from bearing 
witness by Torah law, if it becomes clear that they are remaining there 
because of financial reasons […]. And if you said that the forced converts 
pertained to the category of wicked for the sake of gain, [I would ask] 
whether all of them pertain to this category or whether we could except 
some of them who keep themselves away from transgression as far as they 
can…14 
 
II.1. Whether those who commit transgressions under compulsion pertain to the category 
of “the wicked ones of Israel” 
The inquirer quoted a passage from the Iggeret ha-Shemad (Letter about the forced 
conversion) written by Maimonides on the occasion of the Almohad persecution that 
affected al-Andalus and North Africa. In the Iggeret ha-Shemad Maimonides exposed his 
views on the tactics to be followed by forced converts during the persecution, and he 
attacked harshly the opinion of a contemporary authority who held that those who under 
coercion admitted that MuÎammad was the prophet of God15 denied the whole Torah, and 
they were consequently unfit for witnessing. This letter (iggeret), which is classified as 
such because it differs in several respects from the genre of responsa, can be divided in two 
main parts.16 One that contains practical, moral, even political or rhetorical arguments; and 
another which follows the method of the halakhic discussion more closely, i.e. operates 
with halakhic arguments. The first part, however, makes abundant references to aggadic 
material or historical precedents known from the Bible or the Talmud. The passage 
referred to in the question is from the first part: 
 
                                                 
14 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11 
15 It seems certain that this refers to the Muslim form of declaring one’s belief, i.e. the šahāda, by the 
pronouncement of which one accepts the Muslim religion.    
16 About the criteria for the distinction between the so-called letters and the responsa, see the introduction of 
Shilat 1995: vol.1 8-9 to the letters of Maimonides. 
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It is well-known what happened to Israel in the days of Nebuchadnezzar, 
the wicked, that everyone in Babylon bowed to the idol except for 
Hananiah, Mishael and Azariah […] and maybe the craftsmen and the 
smiths17 were among those who bowed to it if they were in Babylon, but 
we have never seen anyone who called them wicked or Gentiles or held 
them disqualified for bearing witness, and God – may He be exalted – did 
not blame them for committing idolatry, since they were compelled.18 
 
The inquirer to whom responsum no. 11 of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet was sent 
observed that the words of Maimonides called for interpretation and he certainly meant 
that the craftsmen and the smiths were not called wicked since they repented and did 
penance, but until their repentance they were undoubtedly deemed unfit for testifying and 
pertained to the category of “the wicked ones of Israel.” He based this observation on the 
apparent contradiction between the above quoted passage of the Iggeret ha-Shemad and a 
ruling that Maimonides himself emitted in the Mishneh Torah:  
 
The masters did not need to enumerate the informers, the epicureans and 
the converts (mumarim) among those who are unfit for bearing witness, 
because they enumerated only the wicked ones of Israel, but these persons 
who are to be cast [into the pit],19 these renegades (kofrin) are less than 
Gentiles, because the Gentiles are not to be cast into [the pit] and not to be 
pulled out [from it], and the righteous among them will have part in the 
world to come. However, these who are to be cast [into the pit] and who 
are not to be pulled out [from it] won’t have part in the world to come.20  
        
The fact that the inquirer raised this argument and interpreted the words of 
Maimonides in this manner suggests that he did not fully understand the purpose and 
massage of the Iggeret ha-Shemad, since he committed exactly the same error as the 
authority against whom the letter was directed. Namely, he did not differentiate properly 
between forced converts and voluntary apostates.21  
                                                 
17 The craftsmen (Îarash) and the smiths (masger) mentioned in the Bible (II Kings 17:2) are identified in 
bGit 88a with the scholars. 
18 Shilat 1995:41. The responsum does not contain the full text of the passage mentioned above, therefore I 
decided to quote it from the edition of the Iggeret ha-Shemad for the sake of better comprehension.  
19 Concerning the expression those who “may be cast into [the pit] and need not be brought up” cf. bAZ 26b. 
See the more extensive discussion of the issue in the chapter about levirate marriage, TashbeÛ 3:47. The 
expression refers to those whose ruin is desirable and may be promoted actively. The lot of those who “need 
not be brought up though they must not be cast in” (bAZ 26b) is indifferent, however; a Jew should neither 
pressure, nor prevent their death. 
20 MT Hilkhot Edut 11:10 
21 As Maimonides sarcastically put it: “This astute man cannot differentiate at all between a man who is not 
observing the Sabbath because [he is threatened by] the sword, and another, who is disregarding it by his own 
will.” (Shilat 1995:32) 
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 The answer presents the legal considerations concerning transgressions committed 
under coercion in general, and discusses lengthily the practical consequences of such 
transgressions with regard to attestation. The notion of coercion is treated in detail and 
some general observations are made regarding the conversos’ morals and attitude.  
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet analyzed systematically the problem of transgressions 
committed under coercion. According to his explication a person forced to violate any law 
of the Torah, even if he commits idolatry, does not become disqualified from witnessing, 
since “he was forced [by an accident, or by the circumstances, and has not acted willfully] 
and [he who acts under] compulsion is exempted by God”22 and “if out in the country a 
man happens to meet a young woman […] and rapes her […] do nothing to the woman.”23 
If he violates a precept that should be observed even at the expense of his life,24 then he 
transgresses the positive commandment of “Love the Lord your God with all your heart 
and with all your soul and with all your strength.” (Deut 6:5). If he commits a transgression 
of this kind publicly (that is, in the presence of ten adult Jewish males), he violates a 
further positive commandment: “…I must be acknowledged as holy by the Israelites” (Lev 
22:32) and also a negative one: “Do not profane my holy name…” (ibid.). In spite of this, 
he is still fit for testifying, since he does not transgress the law by his own free will, but 
under compulsion. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet proved this statement by making reference to the 
ruling of Maimonides and Solomon b. Abraham Adret. Maimonides expounded the 
regulations concerning testimony in Hilkhot Edut: 
 
…wicked ones are unfit for bearing witness in accordance with the law of 
the Torah, because it is said: “You shall not put your hand with the wicked 
to be a false witness”25 [...] What does “wicked” mean? Everybody who 
commits a transgression the penalty of which is lashes is wicked and unfit 
[for witnessing], since the Torah called wicked those who are liable to 
punishment of lashes, as it is said: “if the wicked is to be beaten”26 – and it 
is needless to say that he who is liable to capital punishment by the 
rabbinical court of law is disqualified...27  
 
                                                 
22 bBK 28b, my translation. 
23 Deut 22:25-27: “But if out in the country a man happens to meet a young woman pledged to be married 
and rapes her, only the man who has done this shall die. Do nothing to the woman; she has committed no sin 
deserving death. This case is like that of someone who attacks and murders a neighbor, for the man found the 
young woman out in the country, and though the betrothed woman screamed, there was no one to rescue 
her.”  
24 There are three such commandments that should not be violated even in case of danger of life: the 
prohibitions concerning idolatry, murder and illicit sexual relations. Cf. bSanh 74a-b 
25 Ex 23:1, my translation. 
26 Deut 25:2, my translation. 
27 MT Hilkhot Edut 10:1-2 
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Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet contrasted this ruling with the following regulation of 
Maimonides that appears in Hilkhot Sanhedrin:  
 
The person who under coercion committed a transgression for which he 
would be liable of capital punishment by the rabbinical court of law is not 
executed, even if he violated a precept that should be observed even at the 
expense of his life, even if he profaned the Name. In case he was 
compelled to do so, he is not to be killed, as it is said: “do nothing to the 
woman” (Deut 22:26) – this is a warning for the court of law, that they 
shall not punish the forced ones.28 
 
 The conclusion of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet is that there is no contradiction between 
the two regulations, but the second ruling restricts the applicability of the first one. It goes 
without saying that if a person liable to capital punishment is exempted, then he who is 
liable to punishment of lashes only is all the more so exempted. Maimonides did not say it 
expressly, but Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet deduced that if the person in question is exempt, than 
he is obviously fit for testifying also.  
 The other authority quoted by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet in order to prove his position 
is Solomon b. Abraham Adret29 according to whom he who violated the law under 
coercion, in order not to be killed, was “a Jew, even if he sinned”30 and was not liable to 
punishment, since it is written: “You shall keep my laws and statutes, which a man shall do 
and he shall live by them”31 – but shall not die by them, as this precept is explained in the 
Talmud.32 
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet supported this view further with a passage taken from the 
Torat Kohanim according to which it is written regarding him who sacrifices his son to 
Molech (a Gentile deity): “I myself will set my face against him” (Lev 20:5) – but only in 
case he did it deliberately and consciously, not if he did it unintentionally, or under 
coercion, or by mistake.33      
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet emphasized that these rulings applied to those who 
committed transgressions exclusively in case of emergency, when their life was in danger. 
Those however, who violated a precept of the Torah when they were not exposed to 
                                                 
28 MT Hilkhot Sanhedrin 20:2 
29 Cf. Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Responsa, 7:51. Solomon b. Abraham Adret (Rashba), 1235-1310, 
Barcelona.  
30 bSanh 44a, my translation. 
31 Lev 18:5, my translation. 
32 Cf. bYoma 85b 
33 Cf. Sifra, Kedoshim 10:13 (Torat Kohanim, the title used by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet is an alternative name 
of Sifra, a halakhic Midrash to Leviticus.) 
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imminent danger, in the privacy of their homes for example, where Gentiles could not see 
them, were not to be included in this category. If a person, who had been forced to abandon 
Jewish law, but was obviously capable of observing certain precepts in private violated one 
of the precepts making liable to punishment of lashes, then he became disqualified for 
witnessing. 
 
II.2. Conversos remaining in Iberia got used to transgress Jewish law  
 After the general observations presented above, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet discusses 
the specific case of the conversos. Due to their peculiar historical circumstances, the 
conversos formed a special subgroup of apostates who differed in several aspects from the 
renegades or transgressors mentioned in the quoted sources. As Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
remarked, the most important difference was that the forced conversion caused a 
permanent compulsion, under which the conversos were forced to renounce their religious 
obligations definitively. Therefore it could be supposed that they became used to violate 
Jewish law, and in spite of the fact that in the beginning they committed transgressions 
only under real pressure and in order to save their lives, in the course of time they got 
accustomed to Christian ways of life. Consequently, it could be assumed that they did not 
adhere strictly to Jewish faith even if it was possible, and they willingly renounced the 
observance of certain precepts: 
 
Therefore these forced converts (anusim), above whom has passed the 
sword of the forced conversion (Îerev ha-shemad), and who remained for 
a long time among the Gentiles who decreed the forced conversion (gozrei 
ha-shemad), and did not flee to another country where they could serve 
God without fear – it is preferable to inquire about them exhaustively. 
Because some among them had the possibility to leave that country and to 
escape from the forced conversion, but since they converted, although the 
beginning of the conversion took place under compulsion, afterwards they 
cast off the heavenly yoke and tore off the reins of the Torah, and now 
they are following the laws of the Gentiles willingly.34 
 
 This means that it could not be automatically supposed that the conversos were 
adhering to Jewish law in secret; consequently there was no established legal presumption 
(Îazakah) regarding their halakhic status. Each case had to be decided according to the 
attitude of the specific persons involved. The investigation concerning the behaviour of the 
                                                 
34 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11 
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conversos was still feasible in this age, when Jewish communities existed in Iberia. It was 
possible to ask representatives of the nearest Jewish community to give a testimony 
concerning the person in question, and to send it to the interested parties. Of course this 
procedure took time and was not always realizable. An example of how such an inquiry 
proceeded can be found in two responsa of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran (nos. 3:40; 3:43) that 
will be discussed later.             
 
II.3. Converso informers 
 Responsum no. 11 by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet contains a rather heated onslaught on 
those conversos who after abandoning the Jewish faith became the enemies of their former 
coreligionists. They threatened both Jews and conversos secretly observing Jewish law, 
and informed against them the Christian authorities. It is important to note that Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet mentioned particularly that informers from among the conversos themselves 
used to denounce those converts who intended to leave the Christian territories where they 
were subject to persecution. This is not a negligible detail, since most halakhic authorities 
discussed the issue of remaining in Iberia or leaving it; and they agreed that this was the 
criteria that determined whether a converso was to be held for a voluntary or a forced 
convert.35 The Christian authorities prohibited the converts from leaving their dominium 
for theological reasons (not to mention other, financial and political reasons), as it was 
supposed that they would return to their former faith if they left the Christian kingdoms. 
Therefore leaving the land where they were under persecution and returning to Judaism 
meant more difficulties than the hardships of emigration in general. However, the responsa 
do not contain much information about the practical aspects of the emigration. As to the 
dangers involved, it is remarkable the observation by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet concerning 
the conversos who were forced in the beginning, but later got used to their new conditions 
and followed the laws of the Gentiles by their own will:  
 
They pursue the poor Jews among them and they produce false charges 
against them in order to eliminate them completely, so that the name of 
Israel would not be remembered more. Moreover, these wicked ones 
denounce to the government the forced converts who adhere to Judaism 
and who make every effort to leave the land of forced conversion, as we 
have heard from some of them who are in Valencia and Barcelona.36 
                                                 
35 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4; Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ nos. 1:63, 1:66, 3:47. 
36 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11. Netanyahu 1966:30 draws far-reaching conclusions from this 
passage dealing with converso informers: “These statements implicitly offer us a new view of a social 
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II.4. Reasons for remaining in Iberia 
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet offered another explanation to the converts’ tardiness in 
leaving, namely that the costs of the emigration were so elevated that many of them were 
unable to afford it. Others might have managed to leave alone but they did not want to 
leave their family behind. As Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet explained, these people were 
concerned about the possibility that their descendants might became assimilated 
completely to the Christian majority, therefore they decided to remain near them in order 
to help them preserve their Jewish identity. He added that this reason for delaying 
emigration was unacceptable, but did not disqualify the conversos from being witnesses, 
since they renounced emigration out of ignorance. For they were not aware of their fault in 
remaining with their families, and thought that they acted in accordance with the 
requirements of the Torah. However, according to halakhah they should have left behind 
their families if they could not manage to flee together, since each person is obliged to love 
God and the Torah more than his family:  
 
There are others, who would leave the land of persecution readily and 
willingly, but they are unable to do so because they do not have the means 
to cover the expenses of moving for themselves, their wives, sons and 
children. Maybe they could manage to leave alone, but they are afraid that 
if they left their families behind among the Gentiles they would mix with 
them and they would adopt their customs, and they would never emigrate 
from there. So they choose to stay there in order to keep the members of 
their families in the bridle of the Torah and its precepts until Heaven 
would have mercy upon them and the gates of salvation would be opened 
for them. In the meantime, they beware of defiling themselves with the 
impurity of transgressions except in dangerous situations. Although in fact 
they are obliged to leave [even] alone if there is a chance, even if they 
have to abandon their sons and their families, since the love of God and 
his Torah comes before all, and “No one can redeem the life of another” 
[Ps.49:8]. […] In spite of that, these persons are not unfit for bearing 
                                                                                                                                                    
panorama which was now split wide open into two conflicting factions. One faction comprised those who 
earnestly desired to retain their Jewishness, or who still had Jewish interests at heart; the other consisted of 
renegades from Judaism who not only practiced Christianity willingly, but also worked relentlessly to bring 
the rest of Jewry into the Christian folk.” The novelty of the “new view of social panorama” consists in that 
in the other responsum of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet discussed by Netanyahu just before this one (Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4) informers were not mentioned. The conclusion of Netanyahu is that since in 
responsum no. 4, (which was written before no. 11), converso informers are absent, while in no. 11 they are 
mentioned, they evidently appeared in the meanwhile, moreover, they formed such a considerable group that 
their appearance led to a changed “social panorama which was now split wide open into two conflicting 
factions;” although nothing proves that beforehand there were no informers amidst the conversos, or that 
there hadn’t been any “split” among different groups of the converso society. It has to be noted furthermore, 
that nowhere in the responsum it is stated that informers were trying “to bring the rest of Jewry into the 
Christian folk” – as opposed to the statement of Netanyahu.           
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witness, since they do not know that they are committing a transgression 
through staying there…37    
 
 It is of prime importance that the conversos, according to Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
ignored that they transgressed the law by staying in a land where they were forced to 
abandon the observance of the precepts. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet quoted a relevant passage 
of the Mishneh Torah in order to demonstrate that he who out of ignorance violates a 
precept not well known among the people is not disqualified from witnessing until he is 
not warned and he is not informed about the precept in question.38 Since the conversos in 
general did not know that halakhah ordered them to emigrate at whatever cost, even 
abandoning their families if there was no other option, the fact that they stayed in the land 
where they were persecuted could not be considered as disregard for the law.  
The conclusion of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet is that the adherence of the conversos to 
Judaism became questionable. Some of them remained under Christian dominion for too 
much time to stay loyal, whereas a lot of others were able to flee from there to other 
countries where they could return to Judaism and practice their religion freely. Among 
those who left were both wealthy and poor people, which proved that emigration was not 
impossible even for the needy: “Since they have remained there for such a long time and 
they did not escape from there as a lot of them did, among them rich and poor, their legal 
status became controversial.”39 Therefore the status of each person had to be determined 
according to the information that could be obtained concerning him, by inquiring about 
him at the local Jewish community. If it could be certified that a converso witness adhered 
to Jewish law and did not transgress it except in case of imminent danger, he could qualify 
as a witness for the get. If such information was not obtainable, however, a get attested by 
conversos was not to be accepted, the legal presumption concerning the conversos being 
that they became accustomed to neglecting the Jewish law and violated its precepts even if 




                                                 
37 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11 
38 Cf. MT Hilkhot Edut, 12:1 
39 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 11 
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III. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 43: on converso husband called by his 
Christian name 
 
The responsum was sent to Moshe b. Ammar of Majorca. The question concerns a 
divorce document sent to Majorca for a convert woman. The wording of the question 
seems to have been inaccurate from the outset, as it follows from the introductory remark 
of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: “You haven’t explained what your problem with this get is.”40 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet therefore presented various explanations to the possible underlying 
question, among them the use of the husband’s Gentile name in the document. The short 
and indistinct question goes as follows:   
     
What shall be the rule concerning a divorce document which was sent here 
for a converso woman, and it is written in it: ‘I, Dalmab,41 called [also] 
Josef b. so-and-so, and whatever designation and surname [by which I am 
known] etc.’42 And the woman is dependent on her levir, since the 
husband died after she received the divorce document.43 Explain us, our 
master, what should she do, because the levir is not in the city, and the 
situation is pressing.44     
 
 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet exposed two possible reasons that could invalidate the get: 
1) the Gentile name of the husband was written as his main name, and the Jewish name as 
secondary; 2) the Gentile name was mentioned in the get at all. According to Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet, as both names appeared in the get, it was undoubtedly valid,45 and it made 
no effective difference which one of the names was written before the other; in any case, 
the get was valid ex post facto. Nevertheless, the course to be followed was to specify the 
                                                 
40 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 43 
41 The name in the printed edition is dlmab  and in Ms Oxford, Bodleian Library MS Mich. 557, fol. 
85b appears as dalmab . These forms are too corrupted to reconstruct the original name. In MS St. 
Petersburg, Russian National Library Evr. II A 116, fol. 84a the last letter of the name is erased. 
42 This is the formula that should be included in the get in order to avoid confusion concerning the identity of 
the divorcee. See mGit 4:2: “the man so-and-so, and by whatever names he is known.” 
43 That is, in accordance with the laws of levirate marriage expounded in Deut 25:1-9, if a couple does not 
have any child, and the husband dies, the woman is required to marry the husband’s brother (levir), and she is 
prohibited to marry anyone else. She can be released from this obligation by performing the act of ÎaliÛah. 
This obligation could be burdensome, and therefore the inquirer felt necessary to mention this circumstance. 
Practical considerations, like the probable consequences of the decision upon the life of the person involved 
of course influenced the Rabbis’ ruling.    
44 Isaaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 43 
45 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet refers to bGit 34b, where the divorce document of a woman known by two names is 
discussed. It is stated there that she has to divorce under the name by which she was known to most people, 
and her other name should only be implied in the expression “whatever designation and surname.” Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet added that according to the consensus of the scholars’ majority, the get was invalid if it 
specified only her lesser known name, but it was valid if it mentioned both. 
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Jewish name solely and include the Gentile one in the expression “and whatever 
designation.”  
 The most important point of the responsum is a suggestion that even ab initio 
permitted to write in the get the Gentile name only, without even mentioning the Jewish 
name. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet stated that Christian authorities strictly prohibited the 
conversos to use Jewish names, and that defiance of this law involved serious danger. This 
remark requires some consideration, as it is evident that conversos continued to use their 
Jewish names even when dealing with Christian authorities, and this fact was well known 
for Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet as well. The proof is that in his responsum no. 52 he quoted in 
Hebrew translation a letter written in 1401 by the Christian treasurer of Majorca, in which 
the Christian official designated all converso subjects mentioned in the letter both by their 
Christian and Jewish names.46 It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude of the Christian 
authorities to the use of Jewish names varied according to time and place, and presumably 
even according to the persons involved. In any case, it was not without precedent that the 
laws of the kingdom or even its expectations were taken into consideration when writing 
the divorce document; it is established in the Mishnah that the get should be dated 
according to the era of the state where it was drawn up (but not according to the calendar 
of any other Gentile state),47 although this ruling was surpassed by the custom of dating 
from the time of creation.48           
  
We could say also that the kingdom censures the use of Jewish names for 
the convert’s (mumar) designation, and permits the use of Gentile 
[Christian] name solely, and they impose penalty for this. And due to our 
sins the converts (mumarim) became numerous there, and among them are 
informers and “tellers in the dark”49 to denounce the Jews. So the scribe 
and the witnesses, and the convert (mumar) himself are afraid to write in 
the divorce document the Jewish name as the main one. Therefore we 
could say that the Gentile [Christian] name is the main one, and it is 
enough to imply the Jewish name by the expression “and whatever 
designation.” We have already found cases where the scholars took into 
consideration the laws of the kingdoms, and for the sake of peace with the 
government they ordained to date the get according to the era of the 
kingdom that ruled in the city in which the get was drawn up. […] 
Therefore it can be said that the Gentile name should be written as the 
                                                 
46 For the discussion of this responsum see the chapter about inheritance. 
47 Cf. bGit 80a 
48 Cf. MT Hilkhot Gerushin 1:27 
49 “Tellers in the dark” (maggidei be-alata): This is a Talmudic expression that appears in bErub 53b as an 
example of enigmatic speech, and its meaning there is “roosters” (cf. Rashi ad loc.). Here, however, the 
expression is used in another sense, namely, as a synonym of the word informer.   
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main one even ab initio, due to the fear from the kingdom, and the Jewish 
name should be implied in the expression “and whatever designation,” 
except where [the use of Jewish name] does not involve danger.50   
 
 Similarly to the preceding responsum, the conclusion reached is that concerning the 
use of Christian names there is no general ruling applicable under all circumstances but the 
course to be followed is dependant on the measure of the danger involved: “In things like 
that, you have to decide according to the specific place and time.”51 
 
IV. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:176: on the husband’s obligation towards 
contributing to the expenses of his wife’s emigration from Majorca  
 
 The question concerns the obligations of a husband to pay the ketubah of his wife 
who was forcibly converted in Majorca (in 1391 or in 1435). The husband escaped riots 
and forced baptism by leaving behind his wife and his properties. The Christians plundered 
their home and baptized his wife by force. The husband had some of his goods stored up in 
a warehouse that remained untouched by the looters. The woman rented a boat for 150 
doblones (gold coin which circulated in Iberia) and emigrated to North Africa “…although 
the Gentiles said to her that if she stayed there they would pay her ketubah from what had 
remained in the warehouses.”52 Of course the inquirer formulated the events in this 
manner, for it is hardly believable that the Christians were concerned with the ketubah of 
the woman. It seems to be probable that the Christians offered the woman to compensate 
the loss caused by the plunderers by selling the stored up goods (that was the property of 
the husband anyway) and handing over its value to the woman. But she decided to depart 
immediately leaving behind everything. Apparently husband and wife rejoined in North 
Africa but the husband decided to divorce her. Moreover, he stated that he had no 
obligation towards her, as she was overhasty in departing from Majorca, and due to her 
precipitated departure he incurred a loss, for which the responsibility rested upon his wife. 
The husband claimed also that the price of chartering the ship had to be deducted from the 
ketubah, as he was not liable to finance the escape of his wife.     
 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran justified the claims of the husband. He pointed out that 
one of the required conditions of a marriage contract is that the husband is obliged to 
                                                 
50 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 43 
51 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 43 
52 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:176 
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redeem his wife if she is taken captive.53 It is striking however, that Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran draw analogy between captivity and embarking the ship; not between captivity and 
being defenseless at the mercy of the Christians who plundered the house and forcibly 
baptized the woman: “…and [this case] pertain to the category of redeeming, despite she 
delivered herself into the hands of the sailors of her own accord.”54 The possibility that 
maybe the riots, the plundering, the Christians threatening with death in case of refusing 
baptism would meant a kind of coercion that forced the woman to seek the service of the 
sailors is not mentioned. Neither is it suggested that staying in Majorca (even temporarily) 
would be a kind of captivity. In any case, according to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, 
redemption of the wife is obligatory, but not at whatever costs: the husband is obliged to 
pay the “value” of his wife,55 that is, the price one would receive if they sold her as a slave. 
If the woman promised more to the capturers, that is, the sailors, she has to meet the rest of 
the expenses. 
 As for the financial damage caused by the wife by her “premature departing” 
according to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran she is to be held liable for it. For it is not from 
among the conditions of a woman’s ketubah that her husband should bear the expenses of 
her “sanctifying the Name of God” (kiddush ha-Shem), as the act of leaving Majorca is 
considered by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: 
 
 Regarding the fact that she had lost everything that he had in the 
warehouses, because she hurried to depart from there, apparently she is 
liable for that damage. It is not from among the conditions of a ketubah 
that she may sanctify the Name by departing from Majorca. […] 
Especially, if in accordance with the law of the government his property is 
confiscated because of her leaving [in order to return] to the faith of 
Yehudit [i.e., to Judaism], since in accordance with their laws her property 
is confiscated if she abjures their faith. Therefore it is evident that the 
husband is exempted from paying her ketubah, for the government has 
confiscated it, and it has been established that the law of the government is 
binding (kayyama lan dina de-malkhuta dina).”56          
 
 The last statement means that the law of the government supersedes halakhah in 
civil affairs. This argumentation of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran ought to be contrasted with his 
position taken up in his responsum no. 1:61 (about litigation concerning inheritance under 
                                                 
53 Cf. bKet 46b; MT, Hilkhot Ishut 12:2 
54 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:176 
55 Cf. MT Hilkhot Ishut 14:19 
56 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:176 
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Christian law), where he differentiated between fair and unfair jurisdiction, although he 
accepted that governmental law (if it is administered justly) is binding.57 On the other 
hand, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet expressed his view that oppressive laws, including the 
confiscation of the property of Jews and conversos leaving Christian territory, do not 
pertain to the category of dina de-malkhuta dina (Aramaic, the law of the government is 
binding), and could be evaded, if there was a possibility.58  
 From the reasoning of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran it follows that in his view the wife 
should have remained in Majorca and arrange her departure with more circumspection. She 
is made responsible for the financial loss her husband incurred, and it is not even suggested 
that she was forced by the circumstances, and therefore exempt from liability. Apparently 
her financial liability does not exceed the sum fixed in her ketubah as it is not stated in the 
responsum that she should compensate the husband from her own property (if she had 
any).  
 
V. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:40, 3:43: on a converso scribe 
 
 The following two responsa written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran are related to the 
same case: the validity of a divorce document written by a converso scribe (sofer). The fact 
that a converso could continue to pursue this profession to any extent is interesting in itself. 
In accordance with the Jewish tradition a scribe must be an irreproachable person as he is 
supposed to write down the name of God, an act that should be carried out with a proper 
intention and in a state of ritual purity. Of course, the divorce document does not contain 
the name of God and the conditions of its writing differ completely from that of a 
mezuzah59 for instance, but people in general were not fully aware of distinctions of this 
kind.60 In any case it is noteworthy that a converso scribe was entrusted with a task which 
pertains to the religious sphere.        
 
                                                 
57 For the discussion of this responsum see the chapter about inheritance.  
58 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 2. For the discussion of this responsum see the chapter about 
returning to Judaism. 
59 The mezuzah is a parchment containing Deut 6:4-9 and 11:13-21 fixed to the door-post in a small box. 
60 That is the reason why every kind of documents can be found in the genizot where in principle only sacred 
texts, or texts that contain the name of God should be stored. As people could not differentiate between the 
various types of texts, they tended to store every kind of texts, sacred and profane alike, in order not to 
destroy something that might contain the name of God. About the above mentioned conditions of writing a 
get on the one hand, and sacred texts on the other, see especially MT Hilkhot Tefillin, Mezuzah we-Sefer 
Torah 1:13, 15; Hilkhot Gerushin 3:15.   
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V.1. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:40 
 The question of the responsum is missing. As can be concluded from the answer, a 
convert61 scribe in Majorca wrote a divorce document for a woman in Tenes,62 who then 
divorced by means of this get, and married another man. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran stated 
that the get was invalid, since a person who committed idolatry or desecrated the Sabbath 
publicly had to be considered as one who disregarded the entire Torah.63 Therefore he was 
similar to a Gentile, and as such was unfit for writing the divorce document.64 
Consequently, the get was invalid, and so was the divorce. If she had children from the 
second man, they should be considered as mamzerim (offspring from an adulterous union), 
and if the woman wanted to remarry, she had to divorce her first husband again. However, 
she was forbidden to marry her second husband, as she had had an adulterous relation with 
him. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran suggested that the leaders of the Majorcan Jewish 
community specify why they held the converso scribe suitable for writing the divorce 
document. Until the answer of the Majorcan community arrived, the discussion should be 
suspended.    
 
V.2. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:4365 
 This responsum contains further details concerning the previous issue. In fact it 
comprises the substantial information supplied by the Majorcan community about the 
converso scribe who wrote the get. Unfortunately, the full text of the evidence given by 
                                                 
61 The expression that appears in the text is meshummad (voluntary convert). However, from the other 
responsum dealing with this case it is obvious that the person in question was forced convert. 
62 Tenes is a port city between Mostaganem and Algiers. 
63 bÍul 5a: “Grave is idolatry in that he who denies it is as if he accepts the whole Torah.” It is inferred from 
this that he who accepts idolatry is as if he denied the whole Torah.  
64 bGit 23a and MT Hilkhot Gerushin 3:15 
65 The responsum was briefly mentioned by Netanyahu 1966:44: “In summarizing the contents of a question 
addressed to him from Majorca, Duran speaks about “one of those who are called anusim and who 
doubtlessly kneel to a foreign deity and violate the Sabbath publicly.” The name “anusim” is thus for him 
clearly a misnomer for the members of this group who, in all propriety, should be called apostates 
.” It has to be noted, that Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran never stated in this responsum that the term 
anusim was improper, neither does it follow from the wording of his summarizing; since in order to be 
classified as a voluntary convert (meshummad) it is necessary to state that the person committing idolatry and 
violating the Sabbath publicly does so by his own choice. In my opinion the wording of the question 
indicates merely that the person involved pertains to the group commonly called anusim, that is, conversos, 
who were forcibly converted either in 1391 or 1435, and that these conversos do commit the above 
mentioned transgressions (not necessarily by their own free will). The fact that a converso remains in 
Christian territory possibly renders him disqualified as a witness (cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4; 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63, 1:66, 3:47), but does not inevitably makes him a meshummad. Cf. 
also the remark of ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: “I say concerning these forced converts [remaining in Majorca] 
that it is evident that they do not commit idolatry voluntarily, and they have no faith in it at all.” (Yakhin u-
Voaz 1:125)   
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them is not included in the responsum, but the main points are disclosed: the scribe was 
forcibly converted but he always made every effort to observe the Jewish laws when it was 
possible. On the other hand, he undoubtedly participated in Christian worship and 
desecrated the Sabbath publicly when his life was in danger. As it can be inferred from the 
responsum he refused to partake of the sacraments before his death: “…even when he died 
he did not follow the custom of the Gentiles, so they did not want to bury him, as [it is 
their] custom [with] those who abjure their religion, until his wife spent a lot of money [in 
order to bribe them to bury him].”66     
 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran’s answer discusses the passage of the Mishneh Torah 
according to which it might seem that converts are unfit to write divorce document: 
“Everyone is suitable for writing a get, with the exception of five: a Gentile, a servant, a 
deaf-mute, a mentally retarded person and a minor. […] A Jew who becomes a voluntary 
convert (nishtamed le-avodah zarah), or violates the laws of Sabbath in public, is like a 
Gentile in every respect.”67 In the opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, this ascertainment 
might imply a contradiction: if the convert is unfit to write the get, he would presumably 
be unfit to conclude a marriage, since there is no legal basis for a distinction between one 
and the other. However, Maimonides himself declares the marriage of a convert to be 
valid,68 for this is clearly established in the Talmud, even in case of a voluntary convert or 
a proselyte who returns to his former faith.69 Now, if the marriage of a voluntary convert 
was valid, it could be supposed that a get given or written by him was valid as well. 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran added that this argumentation was already proposed by Isaac b. 
Abba Mari, the author of Sefer ha-Ittur.70 Furthermore, according to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran, it was a widespread custom among converts to marry and divorce according to 
Jewish ritual, and the validity of such marriages or divorces was not questioned by anyone. 
The latter remark was repeated with the same phraseology by Simeon b. Solomon Duran 
(the author of Yakhin u-Voaz 2, the grandson of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran) in two of his 
responsa dealing with marriage. In the first instance (Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19) he does not 
specify the origin of the phrase, but in the second responsum (Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31) he 
attributed it to Isaac b. Abba Mari, the author of Sefer ha-Ittur. Apparently he had copied it 
from the responsum of his grandfather, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, as it can be seen from the 
                                                 
66 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:43 
67 MT Hilkhot Gerushin 3:15 
68 MT Hilkhot Ishut 4:15: “If a voluntary convert (meshummad) betroths a woman his marriage is absolutely 
valid, even if he commits idolatry by his own free will; and she needs get [in order to be divorced].” 
69 Cf. bYeb 16b, 47b; bBek 30b.  
70 Cf. Isaac b. Abba Mari: Sefer ha-Ittur. Kof (Kiddushin) nos. 37-42, p. 78a. 
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correspondence of the wording of the two responsa in these passages, and he attributed the 
remark to Isaac b. Abba Mari because the latter was mentioned in his source immediately 
before the quoted phrase.      
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran offered two explanations why a Gentile was unfit for 
writing a divorce document. According to the first reason issuing the get was an act of 
agency. A Gentile was unfit for writing the get because he had no marital status (ishut) and 
therefore he could not act as an agent in tasks related to it.71 According to the second 
reason writing the get required proper intention. But a Gentile is not subject to Jewish law, 
consequently he follows his own intention and does whatever he wishes, therefore proper 
intention for writing the get cannot be assumed in his case. A converted Jew, however, if 
he agrees to write a divorce document would presumably follow the intention demanded 
by the halakhic authorities.   
These observations concerning the quoted passage of the Mishneh Torah were only 
of theoretical interest, since Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran closed his discussion remarking that 
these considerations are redundant in the case under question, since it was testified by 
witnesses that the converso who wrote the get observed the Jewish laws as far as it was 
possible and committed transgressions only under severe pressure. Therefore, the get 
written by him was valid even according to Maimonides’ ruling. 
 
 
VI. ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125: on a converso occasionally writing 
a get72 
 
The responsum, sent to Solomon Zalmati of Játiva, was written by ÚemaÎ b. 
Solomon Duran when he was suffering from an illness in Majorca, which makes possible 
its approximate dating. ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran returned from Majorca to Algiers in 
1468,73 therefore the responsum was written before that date. 
Similarly to the preceding responsum, this one also treats the issue of a get written 
by a converso, but it is not explicitly stated in this case that the converso was a professional 
scribe. The responsum shows further similarity to the former one in certain respects; 
especially because the deliverer of the question gave testimony about the personality and 
                                                 
71 MT Hilkhot Ishut 3:17 
72 Cf. Netanyahu 1966:51-52, Orfali Levi 1982:32  
73 Cf. H. J. Zimmels: “Duran, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon” EJ 6:307 
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the attitude of the converso in question: “…he is a God-fearing person and he does not eat 
meat of an animal which was not slaughtered in compliance with the laws of ritual 
slaughter, and he does not eat leavened food during the Passover, and he refrains from 
every transgression as far as he can, and he never desecrates the Sabbath.”74 
In the opinion of ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran, there is no general rule that would 
allow to determine whether a convert is fit for the writing of the divorce document. He 
referred to the passage of the Mishnah75 and the Mishneh Torah76 discussed by the authors 
before him. He repeated that the two criteria for determining the status of a converso were 
the participation in idolatry and the public desecration of the Sabbath. He added however, 
that the forced converts were evidently not willful idolaters, and that they had no faith in 
the religion which they were forced to adopt: “I say concerning these forced converts that 
it is evident that they do not commit idolatry voluntarily, and they have no faith in it at 
all.”77 He remarked also that many of them observed the Sabbath as well.78 As to the case 
in question it was obvious for ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran that the get written by the forced 




 All legal opinions presented in the foregoing agreed upon the fact that conversos 
differed from willful apostates and therefore they were not necessarily disqualified from 
writing or attesting a divorce document. On the other hand, they were not to be held 
unconditionally fit for writing or attesting a get either. They thought to be exposed to the 
effects of religious persecution continuously, and it was assumed that the permanent 
influence of the Christian religion and way of life made impressions on the conversos so 
that they got accustomed to neglecting Jewish law. Therefore in each controversial case an 
investigation had to be carried out; if the local Jewish community could certify that the 
converso in question adhered to Judaism as far as he could, then he was considered fit for 
writing and attesting divorce documents. In the cases under discussion such an 
                                                 
74 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125 
75 Cf. bGit 2:5 
76 Cf. MT Hilkhot Gerushin 3:15 
77 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125 
78 Cf. the contrary opinion expressed by his father, Solomon b. Simeon Duran (Rashbash): Responsa  no. 553 
about testimony concerning wine, in which the author states that all of the forced converts violate the Sabbath 




investigation was feasible, or had already been carried out with the result that the converso 
was declared observant of the Jewish law to the possible extent. Consequently, these 
rabbinical decisions did not put the women in extremely difficult situations. It has to be 
noted that Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet was willing to accept ab initio divorce documents 
containing the husband’s Gentile name only, considering the fact that the Christian 
authorities prohibited the conversos to use their former Jewish names. The rabbinical 
authorities emphasized the conclusion that in these questions one should not follow an 
established routine without careful consideration of the specific case, circumstances and 




Chapter 5 – Dietary laws 
 
In the edict of expulsion, the Catholic Monarchs expounded the reasons that––
according to their statement––necessitated the expulsion of the Jews from their kingdoms. 
These all can be reduced to a single cause: the influence Jews had on their former 
coreligionists. The edict enumerated the means by which Jews tried to persuade the 
conversos to observe Jewish law:  
 
…notifying them of Passover before it comes, advising them what they 
should observe and do for it, giving them and taking unto them the 
unleavened bread and the [ritually] slaughtered meats with their 
ceremonies, instructing them on the things that they should stay away 
from, thus in the foods as in other matters…1 
 
 The observance of dietary laws appear in this list in the context of Passover, but it 
is reasonable to suppose that if Jews used to give advices and instructions to the conversos 
concerning dietary laws, this activity was not limited exclusively to this period of the year. 
 With regard to Passover, Levine Melammed (1999:20-21) claims that the 
information available in the Inquisitorial trials slightly modifies the image of Jews doing 
their outmost to make sure for the conversos to have unleavened bread for the days of the 
Passover. Although if conversos were unable to bake unleavened bread for themselves, 
they in fact turned to their Jewish neighbours for supply, but the transaction was generally 
a commercial act. That is, the Jews did not necessarily rush to provide the conversos with 
unleavened bread, but obviously were ready to sell it to them. It does not mean, of course, 
that unleavened bread was not given as a gift to conversos if so needed. 
 According to Levine Melammed (1999:21-22), the Inquisitorial trials confirm that 
conversos used to eat meat ritually slaughtered by Jews. Some purchased meat from Jewish 
butcher-shops, while others called the ritual slaughterer in order to slaughter their own 
animal and to carry out the examination which established if the meat was permitted for 
consumption. Apparently some conversos bought meat from Muslim butcher-shops as 
well, although the consumption of meat slaughtered by Muslims is not permitted by Jewish 
law. In any case, the Muslim method of slaughtering shows great similarity to the Jewish 
                                                 
1 Cited by Melammed 1999:16 in the translation of Raphael 1992:182-193. The original text of the edict can 
be found in Suarez Fernández 1964:391-395.  
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prescriptions, and these conversos possibly preferred Îalāl (Arabic, ritually permitted) 
meat to that slaughtered by a Christian butcher.           
 I find important to remark that the fact that conversos continued to buy meat in the 
shops where they had bought it previously, is not necessarily a sign of adherence to the 
Jewish faith, but could be a mere custom as well, all the more so, since conversos in 
general continued to live in their former houses after their conversion, that is, in the Jewish 
quarter. The easiest and most natural way of acquiring meat was to go to the nearest shop 
in their vicinity, which in all probability was a Jewish butcher-shop. Moreover, it could be 
a question of taste also, since a person accustomed to observe the dietary laws could find 
non-kosher meat disgusting, especially if it happened to be pork. It does not mean that 
buying kosher meat could have never been a conscious decision as a way of preserving 
Jewish identity.  
References to ritual slaughtering and dietary laws in the responsa are sporadic only. 
The only related issue discussed extensively is the wine prepared and handled by 
conversos, but it has to be noted that the problem of wine is unique, since it is directly 
connected with idolatry and therefore the prescriptions concerned are very severe. Other 
issues mentioned are cheese made by conversos (Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:201; 
3:83); converso refraining from eating non-kosher meat (ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin 
u-Voaz 1:125); converso refraining from eating leaven during Passover (Solomon b. 
Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 90; ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125); 
conversos inviting Jews to eat together meat prepared by conversos in their own dishes 
(Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4); converso eating together with Gentiles food 
prepared by the latter (Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 14); a minority of conversos 
is supposed to eat non-kosher food regularly, even if kosher food is available (Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:60). 
When massive forced conversion was a new phenomenon, the position of the Jewish 
community towards conversos was far from being well-defined. Certain indecisiveness can 
be observed regarding questions whether they could be relied on in such everyday matters 
as kashrut, or in more formal and official issues, such as bearing witness in front of a 
rabbinical court of law, writing a divorce document, etc. The problem of kashrut is quite 
unique because it is the only topic that completely disappeared from the subjects discussed 
in the responsa in a relatively short time. In the decades after the great persecutions in 
1391, there are some responsa that deal with cheese, meat and wine of the conversos, but 
this issue disappeared completely later on. 
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I. Refraining from eating leaven on Passover 
 
According to Jewish law, leaven must be avoided during the days of the Passover. 
The prescriptions concerning the disposal of leaven are very elaborate. The responsa do not 
supply much information about the customs followed by conversos during the Passover. 
Apart from a responsum written by Solomon b. Simeon Duran (no. 90) and a remark in a 
text dealing with unrelated issues (ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125), the 
halakhic decisions written by the authors presented here do not treat problems connected 
with the observance of the laws of Passover. Both references deal with the issue of 
refraining from eating leaven during the days of Passover. This prohibition limits the 
number of foodstuff permitted for consumption considerably. In this respect, the most 
striking difference between the days of the Passover and the rest of the year is that during 
Passover the consumption of ordinary bread is prohibited. In the Middle Ages, when bread 
was the most basic aliment, abstaining from it was even more difficult, not to mention the 
fact that it conveyed an uncommon and conspicuous alteration of ordinary alimentation, 
that could easily be caught by observers. Notwithstanding the dangers involved, some 
conversos evidently tried to observe the dietary laws prohibiting leaven. 
The first responsum presented here, (Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsum no. 
90) gives very detailed advices to the conversos how to prepare food without arousing the 
suspicion of the Christians who might realize that the conversos change their diet during 
the Jewish feast. The other text (Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125) contains a short remark about the 
behaviour of a certain converso who tried to adhere to Judaism in secret, and therefore he 
observed dietary laws connected with Passover. 
 
I.1. Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsum no. 90: on preparing food during Passover 
The responsum gives advices to forced converts who intend to observe the laws of 
Passover as far as possible. It is remarkable that the targeted audience of the responsum is 
the converso community and not the Jewish community, or any individual pertaining to it. 
The responsum lacks the original question, although it is evident that the answer does not 
deal with a hypothetical case but responds an actual question (asked in all probability 




I have been asked concerning these forced converts who are devout to 
God, and wish to observe the commandments as far as they can: what shall 
they do during Passover with regard to eating […] leaven, since they 
cannot abstain from it [completely]. Even if they were eating only rice2 
and similar things, surely the Christians would denounce them, saying: 
“You are still following the laws of your fathers by eating rice during 
Passover, for in every house [only] rice is being cooked.” And they [the 
converts] are worried about that […].3 
 
According to the reasoning of Solomon b. Simeon Duran, the case of the conversos is 
analogous to the Talmudic precedent of a sick person or a pregnant woman in need of food 
on the day of Atonement (when eating and drinking is prohibited).4 Such as the sick person 
or the pregnant woman may be fed with a minimal amount of food needed to safeguard 
their life, the conversos are permitted to consume a minimal amount of leaven5 mixed into 
their food in order to mislead the Christians who might inform the authorities against them. 
However, transgression of the law is to be avoided to the possible extent. Therefore 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran suggested to prepare maÛÛah ashirah (enriched maÛÛah), that is, 
unleavened bread baked from dough containing milk, oil, honey or wine. The obligation of 
eating unleavened bread (baked under special prescriptions from dough containing solely 
water and flour) is fulfilled by eating a minimal quantity of it in the first night of the 
Passover;6 during the subsequent days of the festival one may eat enriched maÛÛah, which 
is thicker and therefore is more similar to the ordinary bread consumed by Christians. 
According to Solomon b. Simeon Duran, it is also permitted to scald grain in boiling water, 
since scalded grain does not come to fermentation.7 He enumerated a couple of ways 
making special kinds of grain or flour, and advised to prepare these well before Passover.8 
However, he suggested that if it was impossible to abstain from leaven completely, they 
                                                 
2 As opposed to the custom of French and Ashkenazic Jews, Sephardic Jews eat rice (and other kinds of 
pulses) during Passover. 
3 Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 90. See an alternative English translation of the question and 
some parts of the responsum in Zimmels 1971:392-393  
4 Cf. bYoma 82a 
5 Less than the size of an olive, as it will be discussed by Solomon b. Simeon Duran in the following. It has to 
be noted that during Passover, leaven cannot be nullified the way most prohibited foods are nullified (in 
general, forbidden food is considered as nullified if it is mixed in more than sixty times its volume of 
permitted food). Any amount of leaven, however, renders the food a mixture of leaven. For a short discussion 
about laws concerning fermented dough during Passover and related issues see Rabinovitz: “ÍameÛ” EJ 
7:1235-1237   
6 Cf. bPes 120a 
7 Cf. bPes 39b 
8 According to the explication of Solomon b. Simeon Duran, preparing these kinds of grain and flour were 
originally permitted (in the time of the Talmud), but later it became prohibited, because if they are not 
prepared with the greatest caution, they might come to fermentation. However, in the opinion of Solomon b. 
Simeon Duran, since the conversos had the intention of observing the precepts, they surely prepared their 
food with the greatest possible care, therefore in their case the reason for the prohibition did not apply.      
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could mix some leaven to the dough so that it might rise a bit; in any case, the amount of 
leaven mixed to the dough should not exceed the size of an olive.9 He emphasized that his 
permissive ruling concerned only the conversos, but were not intended as general 
permissions for the rest of the people. He explained that in the case of the conversos, 
requiring strict adherence to the law would lead to abandoning it completely. He 
mentioned as well that eating different kind of beans during Passover was evidently 
permitted, and it was the custom followed by the Jews of Iberia – as opposed to the custom 
of French (and other European) communities.           
 
I.2. ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:125: remark about a converso observing 
dietary laws10 
The responsum was written probably before 1468, and was sent to Játiva. It 
discusses the validity of a divorce document written by a converso. The deliverer of the 
question testified that this converso adhered to Judaism, since he refrained from eating 
meat not properly slaughtered and abstained from leavened food during Passover. He 
claimed also that the converso never desecrated the Sabbath, and avoided every 
transgression as far as he could. In the opinion of ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran, a person who 
desecrated the Sabbath by his own will, or committed idolatry was unfit for writing a 
divorce document. However, according to the testimony, this individual did not profane the 
Sabbath; and the fact that he observed dietary laws made it evident that he intended to 
follow the Jewish law (i.e. he was not to be treated as a willful idolater). This testimony 
was sufficient for ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran to accept the divorce document written by the 
converso, since these statements proved for him that the converso was indeed a forced 





                                                 
9 In this manner, explained Solomon b. Simeon Duran, even though they violate a precept of the Torah, they 
do not transgress a law punishable by karet (extirpation, divine punishment). Eating leaven on Passover is 
one of the sins punishable by karet enumerated in the Bible (cf. Ex 12:15). According to Solomon b. Simeon 
Duran the food mixed with a minimal amount of leaven is a “mixture of leaven” but not “pure leaven,” 
therefore the punishment of karet does not apply.   




(Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:201, 3:83) 
 
The consumption of cheese made by Gentiles is prohibited. The reason for the 
prohibition according to the Mishnah11 is the following: the milk might have been curdled 
with rennet from the stomach of an animal which is not permitted for consumption (either 
because it was non-kosher, or because it was sacrificed for idolatry).12 The two responsa 
dealing with the subject of cheese presuppose that conversos used to eat non-kosher cheese 
made by Gentiles, and, consequently, they were likely to give non-kosher cheese to Jews. 
Therefore it became questionable whether it was permitted to eat cheese proceeding from a 
converso. 
The responsum related to cheese is included twice in the collection of responsa 
written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, in vol. 2 no. 201 and in vol. 3 no. 83. The two texts 
correspond word by word. On the other hand, the original questions are lacking; both texts 
begin with a short description of the case under discussion, and the formulation of the 
descriptions differs slightly. There are two main points to be considered with regard to the 
responsum: 1) the answer does not really fit the supposed question; 2) the Sitz im Leben of 
the responsum is not realistic. 
 According to the introductory remarks added to the texts, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
received cheese from a forced convert as a gift and had the intention to eat it in accordance 
with the view that a person suspected of eating prohibited food is not to be held necessarily 
suspicious of feeding others with the same. However, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet asked the 
opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran regarding this matter, who overruled Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet’s view and “forbade” him to eat the cheese. According to the claim of Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran, his master accepted this ruling. Albeit Isidore Epstein regarded this 
responsum as a proof of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran’s outstanding authority that might have 
overrode that of the elder rabbi, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet,13 his supposition does not seem 
                                                 
11 mAZ 2:5 
12 The prohibition of consuming milk bought from a Gentile does not apply here, since according to the 
halakhah the milk of unclean animals does not curdle, cf. bAZ 35b; MT, Maakhalot Asurot 3:12, 15, 16. It 
has to be noted however, that Bedouins do make a kind of cheese from the milk of camel (which is an 
unclean animal) after it is curdled: “The Rwala do not churn the camel’s milk. If they have too much, they 
boil it and from the curds make small cheeses which they eat either dry or stewed with bread.” (Musil 
1928:89)     
13 Epstein 1968:27. Yoel Katan in his introduction to the responsa of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran mentions the 
dissent of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran and Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet on this case of cheese sent by a converso, and 
accepts without any reservation that Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet indeed subjected himself to the authority of 
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plausible. Given the somewhat strained relations between Isaac b. Sheshet and the much 
younger Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, it is highly improbable that the elder rabbi would turn to 
his younger colleague with a question in an issue affecting his own person as well, and 
especially because he had already formulated his opinion on the question, and decided that 
the consumption of the cheese was permitted. The claim of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, 
namely that he overruled the decision of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, forbidding him the 
consumption of the cheese, and that Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet acknowledged the younger 
rabbi’s decision, cannot be accepted without scruples.14  
 On the other hand, it has to be noted that the text of the answer does not seem to be 
a real answer to an actual question, and it is even less likely to be connected to the case 
described by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran in his introductory remarks. The responsum 
comments on the difference of views exposed in two halakhic compendia, Torat ha-Bayit 
by Solomon b. Adret15 and Bedek ha-Bayit by Aharon ha-Levi16 regarding the 
interpretation of a Talmudic passage.17 The responsum does not contain any reference to 
the case described in the introduction added later to the text, or to the food produced by 
actual conversos, or to conversos at all. For these reasons, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the “question” part of the responsum is fictitious, and the “answer” part does not deal with 
a problem connected to conversos at all.  
 The “questions” are formulated in the following versions:        
  
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:201: 
I wrote this to R. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, who asked me whether it was 
permitted for him to eat cheese received from a forced convert who was 
suspected of eating [non-kosher food], but according to the rabbi [Isaac b. 
Sheshet] he was not suspected of feeding others [with non-kosher food]. 
And he [Isaac b. Sheshet] wanted to eat [the cheese], accepting the [view 
of] Rah [R. Aharon ha-Levi] who explained that even if one is suspected 
of eating [non-kosher food], he is not suspected of feeding others [with the 
same], and it is permitted to rely on him [i.e., that the food offered by him 
is kosher]. But I have forbidden him [to eat the cheese], and he [Isaac b. 
Sheshet] accepted by decision in this issue. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran. What is more, he refers to this case as a proof that Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet withdrew 
his position of rabbinical authority in order to make way to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran. Cf. Katan 1998:30. 
14 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran was 35 years younger than Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, and served as a judge in the 
rabbinical court of law headed by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet.  
15 Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Torat ha-Bayit, 4:2 (29a)  
16 Aharon ha-Levi of Barcelona (1235-ca. 1290): Bedek ha-Bayit ad loc. 
17 bAZ 39b 
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Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ. 3:83: 
I wrote this to R. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet concerning the cheese sent to him 
by one of the forced converts who was suspected of eating cheese made by 
Gentiles, and the rabbi [Isaac b. Sheshet] relied on him [supposing that the 
cheese was kosher], because he [the convert] was not suspected of feeding 
others [with non-kosher] food. And he [Isaac b. Sheshet] followed [the 
opinion of] Rah [R. Aharon ha-Levi] who put this permission in writing in 
the Bedeq ha-Bayit. But I forbade him [to eat the cheese] and he [Isaac b. 
Sheshet] acknowledged my words. 
 
As it has been previously noted, the answer does not relate directly to the alleged 
question of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet. In the responsum, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran discusses 
the divergent opinions of Solomon b. Abraham Adret and Aharon ha-Levi concerning the 
interpretation of the Talmudic passage about the Jewish shopkeepers in Syria. In the view 
of Aharon ha-Levi, the underlying reason for the permission of eating from the food 
received as a present is the following: it has to be supposed that a person won’t eat 
prohibited food if permitted food is available. But, continues Aharon ha-Levi, if permitted 
food is not available, he might eat prohibited food. However, he would not send prohibited 
food as a present, even if he sometimes eats non-kosher food. On the other hand, according 
to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran’s interpretation, Solomon b. Adret holds that the Syrian 
shopkeepers in question would not eat prohibited food even if permitted food was not 
available, otherwise it would be prohibited to eat from their food as a guest. But since a 
guest is allowed to eat from their food, it is evidently permitted to eat the foodstuff sent by 
them as a present as well.  
This discussion does not contain any information about the conversos’ attitude to 
dietary laws, or about the Jews’ attitude to food offered by conversos. On the basis of 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran’s interpretation of the halakhic discussion in Torat ha-Bayit and 
Bedek ha-Bayit, it can be assumed however, that the consumption of cheese sent as a gift 
by a person suspected of eating non-kosher food was prohibited in his view.  
 
III. Conversos and Jews eating together  
(Remark in Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 4) 
 
 Although it is reasonable to suppose that conversos and Jews used to eat together, 
and the information supplied by the Inquisitorial processes corroborate this supposition, I 
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could find only one reference to this custom, and even this reference is far from being 
elaborated. 
The responsum treats the problem of wine made or handled by conversos.18 The 
inquirer asked ––among several questions relating to wine–– whether it was permitted to 
accept the invitation of conversos and eat with them meat prepared by them in their own 
dishes, while they supposedly used to cook forbidden food in their dishes. The inquirer 
presented this question as referring to a well known reality of Jews accepting the invitation 
of conversos to eat together. Unfortunately, the answer does not elaborate the issue of 
eating together, and concentrates solely on the questions connected with wine. 
Nevertheless, the information disclosed by the question is in itself interesting.     
 
IV. Conversos and Gentiles eating together, conversos eating non-kosher food 
(Remarks in Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 14, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 
2:60)   
 
This topic is again one of the less discussed ones in the responsa, although some 
references can be found concerning the conversos’ custom of eating non-kosher food, both 
with regard to individuals or to the conversos as a group.  
A responsum written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet (no. 14) discusses the betrothal of 
an underage girl in Majorca. He nullified the betrothal on account of several reasons, the 
unfitness of the witnesses being among them. In this context, it is stated that the converso 
witness of the betrothal did not qualify since “…he used to eat with the Gentiles forbidden 
meat that was not slaughtered according to Jewish law, and he used to share their company 
all the time, and they used to invite him and he used to eat their meat.”19 
There is a short remark in a responsum dealing with wine20 written by Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran, according to which a minority of the conversos alienated from the Jewish 
way of life, and they were accustomed to eat forbidden food even if permitted food was 
available. As a consequence, they were unreliable in cases concerning food and wine in 
general, although if a certain converso did adhere to dietary laws, his testimony about food 
or wine was acceptable.        
 
                                                 
18 For the detailed discussion of this responsum see the chapter about wine. 
19 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 14 
20 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran : TashbeÛ 2:60 
 
 124 
V. Wine  
 
The importance of the responsa dealing with wine produced and handled by 
conversos lays in the fact that this issue is directly related to idolatry and the observance of 
the Sabbath.21 The consumption of wine produced or even touched by a Gentile is 
prohibited to Jews, and it is also forbidden to draw benefit from such wine, for example, by 
selling it. The prohibition has two reasons: first, a Gentile might use the wine for idolatrous 
purposes, and thus convert it to yein nesekh (libation wine); secondly, consuming wine 
together with Gentiles might lead to intermarriage between Jews and Gentiles.22 The wine 
of a Jew that was touched by a Gentile is generally classified as setam yeinam (wine of 
Gentiles), the consumption of which is prohibited.23  
The converso obviously becomes similar to the Gentile to a certain extent. The 
rabbinic authorities had to define the position of the converso in comparison with the 
Gentile, depending on the conditions of the conversion (whether it was forced or 
voluntary) and the attitude of the converso to the Christian environment and the Jewish 
precepts. Since intermarriage with conversos and their descendants was not forbidden, only 
the first one of the two reasons for prohibition mentioned above seems to be relevant in 
this case. On the other hand, a convert who desecrated the Sabbath publicly may be 
regarded a complete Gentile,24 and thus if he touched the wine, it would become 
prohibited. Should the conversos be regarded as idolaters and desecrators of the Sabbath? 
In order to discuss the problem of wine, the authorities had to take a stand on the question 
of these fundamental matters. The tendency of the responsa presented here is evident: they 
tend from uncertainty to definite prohibition, and the gradual transition from 
permissiveness to prohibition can be clearly observed in the discussion below. 
The following instances shall be discussed: wine made in Valencia (Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4); wine made by Jews in Morvedre, transported by converts 
via Majorca (Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 12); wine sent from Majorca by a 
convert to Algiers (TashbeÛ 1:63); wine made by Jews and guarded by a convert in 
Majorca (TashbeÛ 1:66); wine made by Jews in Morvedre, and transported by a convert via 
                                                 
21 For a detailed discussion of the halakhic problems related to wine produced or touched by Gentiles in 
Ashkenaz in the High Middle Ages see Soloveitchik 1978.   
22 Cf. Deut 7:7; bSanh 106a; bAZ 36b 
23 But according to Maimonides, for example, if the Gentile is not suspected of idolatry, it is permitted to 
draw benefit from the wine. See MT Hilkhot Maakhalot Asurot 11:7: “And similarly, the idolater [that is, the 
Gentile], who does not worship idols, like these Ishmaelites – it is prohibited to drink their wine, but it is 
permitted to draw benefit from it.”  
24 Cf. MT Hilkhot Gerushin 3:15 
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Majorca to Tenes (TashbeÛ 2:60); wine made by converts and sent (possibly to North-
Africa) by ship (TashbeÛ 3:312); Wine made by Jews in Tortosa, and sent by a convert in 
Christian ship to Majorca and from there to Bejaia (Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, 
no. 553). 
The responsa concerning wine mention Valencia,25 Morvedre (Morbitere, 
Morviedo, Murviedro),26 Majorca,27 Tortosa,28 Algiers,29 Tenes,30 and Bejaia (Bougie).31 
The Jews in the Kingdom of Valencia owned rural estates and were engaged in agriculture. 
In the municipal boundaries of the city of Valencia and Morvedre, these lands were mainly 
occupied by vineyards and olive groves (Hinojosa Montalvo 1993:235-238). Although the 
commercial activity of Valencian Jews was of primordial importance, the exact nature of 
their activity remains unknown, as the documentation concerning commerce contained in 
the Archive of the Kingdom of Valencia is limited to the trade with prohibited products 
(Hinojosa Montalvo 1993:193-194). For the same reason, commerce with wine is not 
mentioned in the records of the archives studied and published by Hinojosa Montalvo in 
his work of great importance about the Jews of the Kingdom of Valencia in the fifteenth 
century. Information concerning wine production and trade in the fourteenth century was 
gathered by Meyerson (2004:38-45) concerning Morvedre. According to Meyerson, export 
trade in wine produced in Morvedre in the fourteenth century was directed towards 
Valencia, Elx, Játiva, and perhaps Majorca and Barcelona. In the fifteenth century wine 
was imported to Tortosa, Teruel, North Africa and Sardinia (Meyerson 2004:43). The 
responsa of the three halakhic authorities under discussion here contain abundant 
references to commerce of wine made in the Kingdom of Valencia: the wine was either 
made by Jews or by the converts themselves, and it was generally transported by converts.  
Algiers, Bejaia and Tenes were important port cities in North Africa and centers of 
maritime commerce. Contacts between the Jewish population of the North African port 
cities and the Jewish communities of the Iberian Peninsula had a long tradition (Hirschberg 
1974:372-375). Majorca was a flourishing commercial center and a stopping place on the 
North Africa-Valencia maritime route (Hinojosa Montalvo 1993:207).  
  
                                                 
25 Port city in Eastern Spain, the capital of the kingdom of Valencia. 
26 Now Sagunto, city in the kingdom of Valencia, near to the Mediterranean coast.  
27 The largest of the Balearic Isles, part of the Corona of Aragon. 
28 City in North-Eastern Spain, belonged to the Corona of Aragon.  
29 Port city in North Africa.  
30 Port city in North Africa, between Mostaganem and the city of Algiers. 
31 Port city in North Africa, East from the city of Algiers.  
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V.1. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa nos. 4, 12 
There are two responsa written by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet dealing with the problem 
of wine produced or handled by conversos. Although the questions of the two responsa 
differ considerably, the answers show great similarity. The question of the first responsum 
(no. 4) touches on various related subjects connected with dietary laws. The question of the 
second responsum (no. 12) concerns a particular case of wine sent from Majorca. The 
answers operate with the same arguments, and they are actually interchangeable, as they 
are very general and do not contain direct references to the specific cases. This might 
indicate that Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet made use of the same answer twice; or maybe the 
answers were considerably shortened by later copyists or editors. 
 
V.1.1 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 4: on conversos making and offering wine32 
The question, which is anonymous in its present form, concerns four related 
problems: 1) if a converso can tread grapes in the vat of a Jew;33 2) if a converso is reliable 
regarding the kashrut of the wine made by himself; 3) if a converso is reliable regarding 
the kashrut of the wine made by others; 4) if a converso is reliable regarding the 
observance of the dietary laws. The question itself is worth to be translated, as it is relevant 
to the connections between Jews and conversos in the years following the mass conversion 
of 1391 in the Kingdom of Valencia:34 
 
You asked also in your last letter, if a forced convert to idolatry from among 
the forced converts of our time can tread grapes in the vat of a Jew, and 
whether the wine will be kosher as if treaded by a Jew? Moreover, a lot of 
them make wine in their houses or in their own press-sheds, and they say that it 
was made according to the prescriptions of kashrut: whether we can trust them 
in order to drink the wine? And if they bring it from overseas [i.e. from a 
distant country], and they testify that it is kosher? Again, if one of them invites 
a Jew to eat with him, and offers him meat and wine, shall he believe him that 
it is kosher as he says, and shall he [the Jew] suppose that he [the convert] will 
not forsake that which is permitted and won’t feed him with that which is 
forbidden? And although he [the convert] has sinned, he is still a Jew, and he 
                                                 
32 For the discussion of this responsum see Netanyahu 1966:23-29 (without even mentioning the subject 
matter of the responsum); and some brief remarks by Orfali Levi 1982:25-26. 
33 Unfortunately Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet in his answer did not relate to this question specifically. As 
Soloveitchik has already explained, the leading rabbis of Ashkenaz in the fourteenth century agreed on the 
possibility of Gentiles treading grapes, on the basis that crushed grapes interspersed with the pulp of the 
grape was still grape juice and did not acquire the status of “wine” to which the prohibitions concerning yein 
nesekh apply. See Soloveitchik 1978.    
34 From the answer it becomes evident that the question came from Valencia. By Valencia not only the city 
bearing the same name was meant, but also the Kingdom of Valencia, which pertained at the time to the 
Corona of Aragon. 
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[the Jew] will not suspect his dishes, that he [the convert] might have cooked in 
them something forbidden. And if they can be deemed as Jews with respect to 
the handling of the wine and ritual slaughtering?35 
 
The term used in the question for the conversos – “the forced converts of our time” 
(anusei ha-zeman) – indicates that the question was written after 1391, since this formula 
was not used before that. On the other hand, in his responsa no. 1:63, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran36 states that a certain Moses Amar asked Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet if the wine sent to 
him by his Majorcan converso father-in-law could be consumed or not, and there Simeon 
b. ÚemaÎ Duran remarks that Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet refrained from deciding the problem 
since mass conversion was still a new phenomenon, and therefore he, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran, was permitted to answer the question. This indicates that the responsum no. 1:63 of 
the responsa of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran was written before the present responsum of the 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet.  
In the city of Valencia, some 200 Jews remained after the mass conversion of July 9-
11, 1391, and they continued to live together with the conversos in the former Jewish 
quarter until the end of August. At the end of August, the majority of these Jews were 
transferred to Morvedre, but some families continued to live in Valencia until 1424, when 
they probably left the city due to a burdensome tax imposed upon them (Hinojosa 
Montalvo 1993:67). The text of the responsum mentions Valencia as the place of the acts 
and events described in it, without specifying whether the toponym refers to the city or to 
the kingdom. Although the Jewish community of the city of Valencia eventually 
disappeared completely, and Morvedre became the new center of Valencian Jewry as a 
whole (Hinojosa Montalvo 1993:253), the denomination used in the responsum can equally 
refer to the city or to the kingdom, since Jews and conversos still lived together in the city 
of Valencia in the years subsequent to the riots of 1391.  
 
V.1.1.1. Legal judgement of committing transgressions under compulsion 
The answer begins with a summary of the legal judgment of carrying out an act 
under compulsion in general. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet enumerates the prescriptions and 
prohibitions regarding the issue in the Torah, and the considerations in the Talmud:37 If 
                                                 
35 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4 
36 See below. 
37 Deut 6:5: “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength.;” 
Lev 22:32: “Do not profane my holy name, for I must be acknowledged as holy by the Israelites;” bBK 28b: 
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one commits an offence against the law under compulsion, he cannot be punished by the 
rabbinical court of law. He cannot be disqualified from being a witness, and has to be 
considered a Jew in every respect. And this is so even if one committed idolatry, in the 
case of which Jewish law requires that one sacrifice his life rather than committing it. Isaac 
b. Sheshet Perfet quotes the ruling of Maimonides,38 which is in agreement with his 
exposition. He also makes reference to a responsum written by R. Solomon b. Abraham 
Adret (Barcelona, 1235-1310), which sums up the arguments mentioned above, and rules 
that “they are Jews and the meat of an animal slaughtered by them is permitted, and the 
wine touched by them is not forbidden.”39  
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet emphasizes that these statements refer only to those who 
refrain from transgressions as far as they can. However, if a person violates a percept by 
his own will (and not under compulsion), the punishment for which is flogging in theory, 
he becomes unfit for testifying, even if his transgression was not public. Moreover, he has 
to be suspected of violating that particular percept regularly. If he violates the Sabbath 
publicly or worships an idol of his own will (even if in private), he has to be considered as 
a person who absolutely abandons the laws of the Torah. According to Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet, the fact that a person commits an offense privately and not under compulsion, 
demonstrates that although at first he might have violated percepts under real compulsion, 
he finally got used to the negligence of Jewish laws and became a voluntary convert.  
 
V.1.1.2. Conversos remaining in Iberia got used to transgress Jewish law 
The conclusion drawn by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet is that converts who remained in a 
land in which they could not practice Jewish religion freely, are to be suspected of 
transgressing Jewish law as a rule. He mentions that a great number of Jews managed to 
escape from religious persecutions by leaving the country. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet states 
explicitly that it was possible even for the poorest members of the Jewish community to 
leave the country. For this reason, regarding the legal status of those who remained, it is 
presumed that they do not behave according to Jewish law. But if it can be ascertained that 
a given person never violates the percepts by his own will, and that he remains in the 
country because he really cannot afford the costs of travel, he should be regarded as a 
                                                                                                                                                    
“[he who acts under] compulsion is exempted by God” (my translation); Sifra, Kedoshim 10:13: [As it is 
written concerning the person who sacrifices his son to Molech:] “I will set my face against him” (Lev 20:5) 
– [...] against him [who did it willfully], but not against who did it under compulsion.”  
38 MT Hilkhot Sanhedrin 20:2. 
39 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4. Cf. Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Responsa, no. 7:41. 
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proper Jew, who is fit for testifying. The wine handled by him and the meat of an animal 
slaughtered by him is to be permitted for consumption. Unfortunately, Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet did not expand how the existence of these circumstances should be verified and 
demonstrated in practice.  
 
V.1.1.3. Testifying concerning wine 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet distinguishes between two categories of those who commit 
offenses against Jewish law willfully. If the offense is idolatry or the violation of the 
Sabbath in public, the person should be regarded as a Gentile, and wine handled by him is 
thus prohibited. If the offense is something else, he should be regarded as suspicious of 
committing that specific transgression, but the wine handled by him is not prohibited. 
However, he is unfit to testify concerning the kashrut of the wine in his possession (not 
necessarily made by him). The reason, as Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet formulates it, is the 
following:  
 
The forced converts who live in Valencia and in other countries do not refrain 
from the [consumption] of the wine of the Gentiles. Even if they refrain from 
it, they cannot prevent the Gentiles from handling their [kosher] wine. They are 
all suspicious, that if their wine was handled by a Gentile, they do not 
disqualify it [their kosher wine] from being consumed or sold. Since they are 
suspicious of this [specific] thing, they are unreliable concerning their own 
wine.40  
 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet explains that it is controversial whether the conversos are 
suitable for testifying concerning the wine which is not their property. The basis for the 
debate is a discussion in the Talmud between Rabbi Meir and Rabban Gamaliel.41 
According to Rabbi Meir, a person suspected of neglecting a percept is disqualified from 
testifying concerning it. However, according to Rabban Gamaliel he is reliable concerning 
that percept if the testimony involves another person but not himself. As Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet explains, most halakhic authorities and all later authorities ruled as Rabban 
Gamaliel, including Maimonides42 and Solomon b. Abraham Adret.43 
The response of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet does not follow systematically the four 
distinct questions asked by the inquirer. The answer concentrates on the testimony 
                                                 
40 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4 
41 Cf. bBekh 35a 
42 Cf. MT Hilkhot Edut 11:8 
43 Cf. Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Responsa, 1:64 
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concerning the kashrut of the wine, and touches upon the wine handled by conversos. It 
does not expound on other problems raised by the inquirer, like ritual slaughtering or the 
dishes used by converts.  
 
V.1.2. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 12: on conversos making and offering wine 
The second responsum of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet relating to wine contains a very 
similar argumentation to the first one. The original question did not survive, it is summed 
up very briefly in a couple of words: “And what you asked in another letter about the wine 
brought from Majorca; and the converts who brought it testified that it was kosher [wine] 
from Morvedre.”44  
The considerations mentioned in this responsum are identical with those of the 
previous one, and certain passages correspond word by word. For example, the passage 
dealing with wine possessed by conversos and their attitude towards the wine of Gentiles 
here is identical with the discussion of the topic in the previous answer, with the only 
significant difference in the toponym: in the former responsum Valencia, in this one 
Majorca is mentioned. There are two major differences between the two responsa. This 
latter responsum lacks the general introduction concerning the violation of percepts under 
compulsion. But it contains a short excursus with respect to the oath taken by converts, and 
states that they are unreliable regarding issues of kashrut even if they make an oath 
concerning the matter. 
 
V.2. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63: on wine sent by a converso relative from 
Majorca45 
 There are five extant responsa written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran that deal with 
wine and converts. The gradual change of his opinion can be observed clearly in these 
texts. From a relative permissiveness, he eventually moved to a more severe attitude 
towards conversos. This change can be explained by his personal experiences regarding 
converts. The motives of the alteration of his view were detailed by him explicitly in the 
reasoning of the decisions. 
The introduction of the responsum is the following:  
 
                                                 
44 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 12 




I have written this one about the wine that was sent by the father-in-law of 
Moshe Amar. He [the father-in-law] sent it to him being still under the 
compulsion of the persecution in Majorca. He [Moshe Amar] asked Isaac b. 
Sheshet – may the Almighty protect and bless him – and the other authorities 
that were here, but they did not determine [whether it was] prohibited or 
permitted, since it was at the beginning of the persecution. They gave him 
permission to ask me about this issue and to follow my instructions, and I 
wanted to commit the instructions to writing.46 
 
The abbreviation that appears next to the name of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet (
 “may the Merciful guard him and redeem him”) shows that he was 
still alive at the time when the responsum was written, which suggests that it was written 
before 1408. It is also possible that this responsum is the earliest from among the texts 
discussed in this chapter, and that those of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet were written after this 
one (as according to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet did not wish to 
answer the question at the time, though as seen above, he did answer similar questions 
later, and that is why Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran himself undertook the task). 
The two major subjects of the responsum are conversos handling the wine and 
conversos testifying concerning the kashrut of the wine. The basis for the discussion is the 
ruling of Maimonides: “But if he could flee and rid himself of the wicked ruler’s hand, and 
does not do that, he is like a dog that returns to his vomit, and he is called a willful idolater, 
and he will be banished from the world to come, and will descend to the lowest step of the 
Hell.”47  
 
V.2.1. Reasons for remaining in Christian territory  
The basic statement of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran is that it should not be automatically 
supposed that the conversos could have left the land of persecution. It should be assumed 
that they stayed in Christian territory under the pressure of the circumstances. Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran enumerates some possible reasons, like financial problems or fear: maybe 
they could not cover the expenses of the transfer; maybe they were afraid that they would 
be severely punished if it was discovered that they wanted to emigrate. Consequently, he 
claims that the statement of Maimonides does not apply to these converts. Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran draws attention to the wording used by Maimonides, and especially that he 
                                                 
46 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63 
47 Quoted in Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63; cf. MT Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 5:4. 
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mentioned divine punishment only, but did not specify worldly consequences. According 
to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, the reason for this is that only divine omniscience can 
determine whether a particular person was a voluntary convert who stayed in the land of 
the persecution by his own free will, or whether he stayed because of a reason which was 
unknown to human observers. 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran took a further step explaining, that even if it was certain that 
the conversos could have left the country without having endangered themselves, they 
should not be treated as willful idolaters. The example given by him is theoretical, and it is 
based on a biblical precedent:  
 
And I say furthermore, that even if it is clear to us that there is no fear in 
escaping, like [a situation in which] the wicked king made a proclamation 
throughout all his kingdom, “Any of his people among you may go up, and 
may the Lord their God be with them.” (II. Chron 36:23); even in a situation 
like this the wine handled by a person who was withheld from leaving, and 
who stayed there, should not be suspected of being prohibited.48 
 
The situation described here seems to be a hypothetical one. The Christian rulers in 
general did not permit converted Jews to leave the country, since it was evident that they 
would then return to the Jewish faith. According to the Catholic belief, baptism is a 
sacrament that has an irreversible effect in all cases, no matter if the conversion took place 
under compulsion or voluntarily. Thus, returning to the former faith was considered an 
utmost serious sin, and it had to be prevented by all means. The Christian authorities in 
Majorca issued subsequent decrees forbidding forced converts to leave the island. In spite 
of this, a great number of converts did leave Majorca and returned to Judaism in North-
Africa.49 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran may have alluded to this emigration.  
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran differentiates between the passive act of staying in a place 
where one would possibly commit transgressions, and the active act of going to a place of 
the same kind. As an analogy, he considers the halakhah regarding captured women. 
Women who were captured by criminals are permitted to their husbands, since they acted 
under compulsion. But if they followed the criminals on their own will, they are prohibited 
to their husbands, because in this case the state of compulsion does not apply.50 However, 
according to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, converts are not comparable to such women, 
                                                 
48 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63 
49 Cf. Beinart: “Majorca” EJ 11:795-804 
50 Cf. bKet 51b 
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because the act of following the criminals is an active deed, whereas staying in Iberia is a 
passive one. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran emphasized that this approach to conversos is not 
particularly permissive, but it is in accordance with the strict sense of law.  
In the opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, coercion is a most decisive factor 
regarding the status of converts. As conversos began to violate religious law under 
compulsion, they should be deemed as forced converts, and their legal status as such 
should not be changed until evidence indicating the willful alteration of their status was 
produced. The mere fact of staying in Iberia, according to him, is not such evidence. 
Consequently, they ought not to be treated as voluntary converts on the basis of bare 
presumptions, because their “legal status is unambiguous as the legal status of a married or 
a single woman, that cannot be questioned unless an evidence is produced.”51 In the 
continuation of the discussion, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran put forward that if the conversos 
themselves said that they had stayed in Iberia for financial reasons, they should not be 
treated as voluntary converts;52 and that a person who himself claimed that he had 
committed a transgression for financial reasons only, should not be trusted concerning his 
claim, but it has to be supposed that he had some other reasons for the transgression as 
well.53  
What follows from this discussion is that the wine handled by a converso is to be 
considered kosher unless it is known for sure that the person had violated Jewish law of his 
own will. Staying in Christian territory is not to be considered an evidence of willful 
transgression. 
 
V.2.2. Testifying concerning wine 
The second subject of the discussion in the responsum is testifying concerning wine 
made or possessed by conversos. Two arguments are cited by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran that 
could result in the prohibition of such wine, and both arguments are eventually refuted by 
him. The first one is the view of Rabbi Meir, according to whom a person suspicious of 
transgressing a percept is disqualified from testifying concerning it.54 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran claimed that this assertion did not apply in case of a general, not well-established 
suspicion. Then he moved on to the explication of another statement of Rabbi Meir, 
                                                 
51 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63 
52 Cf. bSanh 61b and bShab 72b 
53 Cf. bKet 18b 
54 Cf. bBek 30a 
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according to which a person suspected of neglecting one religious law is suspected of 
disregarding the whole Law. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran made a distinction between a general 
suspicion and a well-established presumption, and drew a comparison between the case of 
the converts and the kohanim (priests). He claimed that if a convert could be disqualified 
based on a general suspicion only, so also the kohanim could be disqualified from passing 
judgments. One of the obligations of the kohanim is to pass judgments,55 but they can do so 
only if they themselves are impeccable. Yet, the general assumption regarding kohanim is 
that they may blemish the sacrificial animal, because then they can eat it themselves 
instead of having to sacrifice it. Nonetheless, the kohanim as a group cannot be regarded 
suspicious of committing a certain transgression, and therefore, they cannot be disqualified 
because of somebody who did actually commit that transgression. Similarly, the converts 
as a group cannot be suspected of neglecting religious laws on account of some individuals 
who did in fact neglect it. One should be deemed suspicious only in case of some specific, 
well-established suspicion. 
The second argument cited and refuted Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran is that conversos did 
not care if Gentiles handled the wine, and they were similar in this respect to Cutheans 
(Samaritans). In rabbinic tradition, it is an important aspect that Cutheans themselves did 
not offer libations, but at the same time they did not care if Gentiles handled their wine.56 
However, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran explains that conversos differ from Cutheans in two 
respects. First, Cutheans are allowed to drink wine handled by Gentiles, so it is reasonable 
to suppose that it does not bother them if Gentiles have handled their wine. Conversos, on 
the other hand, know that wine handled by Gentiles becomes forbidden for them, and they 
would not drink such wine. Secondly, the precept of “do not put a stumbling block in front 
of the blind” (Lev 19:14) does not apply in case of Cutheans, but it is binding for converts, 
and consequently, converts would not give forbidden wine to a fellow Jew. As Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran explains, even if one rejects the first argument, and holds that conversos are 
suspected of drinking wine handled by Gentiles, it must be accepted that they would not 
give such a wine to a Jew: 
 
[Concerning] the wine that they are sending to a Jew, and they say that they 
have made it in [i.e. observing the rules of] kashrut, they are reliable, since it is 
                                                 
55 Deut 21:5: “The Levitical priests shall step forward, for the Lord your God has chosen them […] to decide 
all cases of dispute and assault.” 
56 Cf. bAZ 31b 
 
 135 
established for us according to Rabban Gamaliel that he is reliable concerning 
his fellow’s but he is not reliable concerning his own.57  
 
In contrast to the responsum of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet58 discussed above (no. 4), 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran does not mention here that some authorities do not accept the 
view of Rabban Gamaliel, and follow that of his opponent, Rabbi Meir. The reason of the 
statement of Rabban Gamaliel, according to the interpretation of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, 
is that testimony concerning the wine of another person does not imply profit and benefit 
for the witness. In consequence, a suspicious person is reliable even concerning his own 
property, if the testimony does not imply profit and benefit for him. And this is exactly the 
case here, regarding wine sent as a present: since the wine is a present, the sender does not 
obtain any profit. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran adds, that the kind of benefit that may result 
from a present, such as returning the kindness, etc., is not in the category of profit, because 
it is not an imminent and secure benefit (as the price of an article sold would be, for 
example).  
Summing up the discussion, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran establishes as follows: 
  
The presumption concerning the legal status of these converts is that they are 
reliable in general, unless it becomes clear that their legal status has changed, 
because they do not refrain from forbidden things. But their legal status should 
not be questioned without a very specific reason. Therefore, they are reliable 
concerning all prohibitions in the Torah, and all the more so concerning 
rabbinical prohibitions, such as [against] the wine of Gentiles, and they are like 
Jews in every respect.59  
 
V.2.3. Excursus 1: a person suspected of eating non-kosher food is not suspected of feeding 
others with it 
At the end of the responsum, there are two further arguments, which were added 
later. The first one cites the opinion of Aharon ha-Levi, according to which a person 
suspected of consuming forbidden food is not suspected of feeding others with forbidden 
food.60 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran points out that the view of Aharon ha-Levi is based on an 
interpretation of a Talmudic passage (bAZ 39b), which is contrary to the interpretation of 
Rashi61 and Solomon b. Abraham Adret.62 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran adds that in his opinion 
                                                 
57 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63; cf. bBek 35a 
58 Cf. above, Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4 
59 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63 
60 Cf. Aharon ha-Levi: Bedek ha-Bayit  4:2 
61 Rashi ad loc. 
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the interpretation of Rashi and Solomon b. Abraham Adret is better than that of Aharon ha-
Levi. Nevertheless, since the view of Aharon ha-Levi is also widely accepted, it supports 
his decision.  
 
V.2.4. Excursus 2: only God is entitled to judge the motives of conversos staying in 
Christian territory 
The second argument to be considered is a reaction to a passage of the Iggeret ha-
Shemad,63 according to which those who could escape from the land of persecution, yet 
they stay there because they fear for their children, are to be regarded as staying almost 
voluntarily. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran does not challenge this statement, but he comments 
on it. In his opinion, even if a person remains there for this reason, it should be supposed 
that he is prevented from leaving the country by another reason, too. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran refers back to his former discussion of the subject, according to which only divine 
omniscience could determine why exactly a person does not escape, and claims that for 
this same reason has mentioned Maimonides only divine punishment, leaving aside more 
imminent consequences.64 Besides, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran adds that Maimonides ruled 
that a person who committed idolatry because of love or fear was exempt from punishment 
until he accepted the idol as a deity.65 According to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran it is evident, 
that a person, who stays because he fears for his children, does not accept the idol as a 
deity, and therefore, he is exempt from the charge of idolatry. He adds that his wine might 
still be forbidden, because the idolatrous act committed by him is indeed an effective act. 
Accordingly, as the offering of a person who does not accept the idol as a deity becomes 
forbidden, so should the wine of converts. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran does not elaborate this 
proposition, he confines himself to mentioning it. Finally, he remarks that the statement of 
Maimonides in Iggeret ha-Shemad might indicate that Maimonides supposed that those 
who stayed fearing for their children did in fact accept the idol as a deity, since it is evident 
that the love of God is prior to the love of the family. Or maybe Maimonides wrote that 
passage for didactical reasons, in order to give an impulse to the converts to make such a 
difficult decision as leaving behind their family.  
                                                                                                                                                    
62 Cf. Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Torat ha-Bayit 4:2; Solomon b. Abraham Adret: Responsa, 1:64. 
63 Iggeret ha-Shemad (Letter about the forced conversion) is an alternative title of Maamar Kiddush ha-Shem 
(Tractate concerning martyrdom) written by Maimonides concerning forced conversion to Islam at the time 
of the Almohad persecution in al-Andalus in the 12th century. The referred passage is at the end of the letter, 
in the edition of Kafih 1994:119; in the edition of Shilat 1995:57.  
64 Cf. above, and MT Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 5:4 
65 MT Hilkhot Avoda Zara 3:6; cf. bSanh 62b, bShab 72b 
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The main point of the responsum is that the wine handled by conversos does not 
become prohibited, and they ought to be regarded as reliable concerning the kashrut of 
wine until proven otherwise. According to the arguments of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran the 
mere fact of staying in the land of forced conversion does not fall in the category of proof.  
 
V.3. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66: on wine guarded in a Christian’s storehouse 
by a Majorcan converso66 
The question of this responsum was sent by Mordecai Naggar67 from Majorca. It 
concerns wine kept in a store-house in the courtyard of a Gentile woman.  
The wine was guarded at first by a Jew who was staying in the store-house. Then, the 
majority of the wine was carried away, and the Jew left, too. The store-house was closed, 
and the keys were handed over to a second Jew, who was living in the village. The Gentile 
woman offered the rest of the wine for purchase to the father of the first Jew, and he 
bought it. At the same time, the second Jew, who was guarding the keys, returned the keys 
to the woman, saying that the wine was not kosher, and reported this to the buyer as well. 
The second Jew testified that although the doors of the store-house were closed, one of the 
doors that led to the courtyard of the woman was in such a poor condition that it was 
impossible to close the door in a proper way, so anyone could have entered. In his 
testimony he gave a detailed description of the doors and the locks. He also said that the 
woman kept her utensils in the store-house, and therefore she definitely entered it, and did 
so through the door that was in poor condition. He claimed that when he saw this, he cast 
the keys to the woman without anyone being present there.  
Despite these obvious statements in the testimony of the Jew, the wine was still not 
prohibited unambiguously, as there were other circumstances that left the situation unclear. 
The keys were at some point handed to a converso, who later testified that he was 
present when the Jew returned the keys, and that the keys were not returned to the woman 
– as the Jew stated –, but to him. This way, the wine was theoretically under continuous 
Jewish attention. The doors of the store-house were examined, and it turned out that the 
situation did not match the situation described by the Jew who had formerly guarded the 
keys: the locks were in a different position, and none of the doors was in bad condition.  
                                                 
66 For the discussion of this responsum see Netanyahu 1966:35-38, and a short reference by Zimmels 
1932:94. 
67 Mordecai Naggar lived in Majorca but paid several visits to North Africa. In 1435 he was baptized in 
Majorca, and subsequently he left for Algiers. (Epstein 1968:95-96)  
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Thereupon, some relied on the testimony of the Jew and declared the wine to be 
forbidden, and others trusted the converso. Those who trusted the converso claimed that 
the Jew was bribed by the person who bought the wine. They argued that the wine 
acetified, and the Jew did not want to pay for it. And if the wine was declared prohibited, 
the buyer could say that the purchase was invalid, since he purchased the wine on 
condition that it was kosher, and thus the Jew would not have to pay. In the meantime, he 
refused to pay the woman, who in turn denounced the buyer to the Gentile authorities. 
Those who trusted the convert backed their opinion with a hearsay, according to which the 
buyer tried to come to a compromise with the woman, and offered her to stop spreading 
rumors about the wine being prohibited, if the woman agreed to settle for a partial payment 
of his debt.  
Those who trusted the Jew argued that the wine was prohibited. They argued that the 
converso might have been bribed by the Gentile woman to change the position of the locks 
so that the reality would contradict the words of the Jew. Moreover, they claimed that the 
wine was not acetified yet when the Jew returned the keys, so the buyer had no reason for 
bribing the Jew at the moment of his testimony. The wine acetified precisely during the 
long discussion about it. They stated furthermore that conversos were unfit for guarding 
wine, despite being reliable concerning wine made or offered by them:  
 
As regards the reliability of the converts, they say that although they believe 
them when they say that “we bought this wine from a Jew called so-and-so,” or 
when converts make the wine in their houses; but the custom is not to rely 
upon converts in guarding the wine, as because of the pressure on them, 
converts cannot detain Gentiles from handling their wine, and they themselves 
do not care about Gentiles handling their wine. It is common that they are not 
held reliable for guarding the wine, although they tread [grapes] in the vat for 
wine pressing together with Jews. But the custom is to entrust the wine to Jews 
and not to converts.68 
  
In his answer, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran first discusses the problem regardless of the 
fact that the wine was guarded by a convert, and then examines also the subject of 
converts. In the general discussion of the case (regardless to the matter of conversos), he 
puts forward several reasons for the prohibition of the wine. The most important point of 
the exposure is that in order to ensure the kashrut of the wine, the use of a seal is required. 
If they did not use a seal on the wine or the barrel, the wine is forbidden in any case. 
                                                 
68 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66 
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In his discussion concerning conversos, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran repeats the 
principles exposed previously by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet69 and by himself:70 If a convert 
commits idolatry or profanes the Sabbath in public, without being forced to do so, the wine 
handled by him becomes forbidden. If he drinks the wine of Gentiles, he is reliable 
concerning the wine of another person, but unreliable concerning his own. But if he 
receives payment for guarding the wine, it becomes similar to his own, and therefore he 
becomes unreliable concerning its kashrut. If he does not drink the wine of Gentiles, but 
does not care about Gentiles handling kosher wine, his wine is forbidden. Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran quotes the passage written by Maimonides regarding those who could escape 
from compulsion and persecution but refrain from doing so, where these persons are 
compared to dogs returning to their vomit.71 He does not interpret the passage, but remarks 
that “there is something very difficult regarding the reliability of converts and the handling 
of wine by them, and I shall not put forward logical arguments concerning this, but I will 
quote Maimonides for you.”72 
 
V.3.1. Conversos dissimulating their identity and assimilating to Christians 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran discusses the subject of the relationship between conversos 
and Christians. He emphasizes that the conversos must prove to be attached to Christians 
and dissociated from their former religious and ethnical environment:  
 
If the wine was in the hand of a Jew, it would be permitted; but now that it is in 
the hand of a convert, it is prohibited, in accordance with what you see from 
their behavior and custom with Gentiles. As the convert is deemed as Gentile 
by the woman, he must listen to her, for if he defied her, she would say to him: 
“You are still a Jew, and your heart is closer to the Jews than to the Gentiles!” 
For this reason, the convert is not reliable regarding guarding the wine. […] 
Obviously, if the woman wanted to enter her storehouse after the convert […], 
he would not prevent her from doing so, because he would be afraid that she 
would say that he still behaves according to the custom of the Jews, and he 
would cover for the woman who touched the wine [he would act as an 
accomplice].73 
 
                                                 
69 See above, in Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 4, 12. 
70 See above, in Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63.  
71 See above, in Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63. Cf. MT Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 5:4. 
72 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66 
73 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66 
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Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran discusses at length the custom of the community, namely 
that they rely on conversos with respect to wine made by them, but they consider them 
unfit for guarding the wine, claiming that they would not be able to prevent Gentiles from 
touching the wine. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran criticizes this custom, stating that if the 
converts do not care about Gentiles handling their wine, then apparently wine made by 
them should also be prohibited.  
 
V.3.2. Conversos remaining in Majorca or even returning to there  
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran remarks that although not all converts behave the same way, 
their majority got used to the desecration of the Sabbath, and became resigned to their new 
condition of living gradually assimilating themselves to the Christians. He adds that some 
of the conversos who did leave Majorca for North Africa, not only disregarded Jewish law 
although they could have observed it, but voluntarily returned to Majorca:  
 
We see that some of those who come here are Gentiles completely, and who 
shall decide which is worthy and which is disqualified? Moreover, apparently 
you do not have reservations because of the profanation of the Sabbath in 
public, though according to the hearsays, their majority or even almost all of 
them [desecrate the Sabbath publicly], and even those who had refrained from 
this, changed for the worse, and they do not refrain from this at all. Apparently 
you do not have reservations if they stay there after they have received 
permission to leave [the country], or if they do not consider leaving [the 
country] at all, and have built houses for themselves, and have chosen women 
for their sons, and have given their daughters in marriage to men. Let alone 
those, who have been here and returned there of their own accord – should they 
be treated as forced converts or not?74 
 
V.3.3. Christians in Majorca turn a blind eye to the conversos’ adherence to Judaism  
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran explains that the community of Majorca obviously believes 
that a person who stays in the place of persecution does not become a voluntary convert. 
He also offers an interpretation of the passage of Maimonides mentioned earlier,75 which 
makes this position possible. The statements of Maimonides refer to a situation in which 
the ruler keeps the converts under continuous and strict control. Accordingly, Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran adds the following argument: 
 
                                                 
74 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66 
75 Cf. MT Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 5:4 
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But in case of these persecutions, and especially in that place [in Majorca], 
they let converts do whatever they want, and they are not forced to commit 
idolatry, and they are almost deemed to be Jews by them [by Christians], to 
such an extent that they give them permission to leave the country if they wish. 
But if a Gentile wanted to emigrate and to become a proselyte, they 
[Christians] would not let him do that. On the contrary, they would kill him, 
even if he gave them all the money in the world. It is obvious from this that 
they are indeed considered as Jews by Christians, even though according to the 
principle of the Christian religion, if one converted, even under duress, he 
cannot return to Judaism. And for this reason, the Christians pretend that they 
do not see [the behavior of the converts]. The only effect of the persecution is 
that they have to use Gentiles names […], and seeing this situation, the 
converts think that it is permitted to stay there.76 
 
These remarks contradict the observation quoted just above, that the converso 
guarding the wine would obviously not prevent the Christian owner from entering the 
storehouse or touching the wine, since he is afraid that in that case the Christian would 
blame him with following Jewish customs. In the light of the discussion as a whole it 
seems to be an exaggeration that the conversos could do whatever they wanted, and that 
their acts were overlooked by the Christians, who required them only the use of Christian 
names.  
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran clarifies, that according to the community of Majorca, a 
converso who desecrates the Sabbath publicly in order to pretend to be a Christian, but 
observes it in his house as much as he can, is apparently not considered a person who 
disregards the entire Law, and wine handled by him is therefore permitted. He adds that it 
is evident that converts drink the wine of Christians willfully, and claims that for this 
reason it is surprising that the community of Majorca relies on them concerning wine made 
by them. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran resolves this contradiction by suggesting that according 
to the community of Majorca, conversos are suspected to eat forbidden food, but they are 
not suspected to feed Jews with such forbidden food.  
Compared to the former responsum, the reader has the feeling that the opinion of 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran regarding conversos has undergone some changes. He became 
more skeptical about them. His reservedness is based on personal experience (conversos 
arriving to Algiers and neglecting Jewish Law, or even willfully returning to Christian 
territory), and on information about the circumstances of conversos on the Iberian 
Peninsula or Majorca (they gave up observing the Sabbath, they drank prohibited wine, 
they did not want to leave Christian territory, etc.). Although the prevalent customs seem 
                                                 
76 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66  
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V.4. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: Responsum no. 2:60: on wine sent by a Majorcan converso77 
This question also was sent by Mordecai Naggar, from Tenes. It concerns a wine 
made in Morvedre that was sent to a Jew by a convert from Majorca. The wine was stored 
in sealed barrels, and the convert promised that he would send a letter written by that Jew 
of Morvedre who had made the wine that would certify the provenance of the wine. The 
question was whether the seal and the statement of the convert were sufficient to regard the 
wine as kosher. 
The answer of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran contains some general considerations 
regarding conversos. First, that it is evident that they are unreliable concerning the kashrut 
of their own wine. Secondly, that converts as a rule do not consume forbidden food if 
permitted food can be obtained easily. Likewise, they do not trade in forbidden wine.78 
According to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran wine made by Jews does not become forbidden if 
touched by a converso. He maintains that the provenance of a wine can definitely be 
established on the basis of its smell and color: “It can be said concerning this wine that it is 
evident that it was not made by this convert, since it was not made in Majorca, as 
everybody can recognize by its appearance and smell that it is from the kingdom of 
Valencia.”79 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran explains that since the wine was certainly made by 
Jews, and held in sealed barrels, it could become forbidden only in case the converso 
opened the barrel, offered libation offering from it, and then sealed the barrel again. But as 
conversos are not likely to offer libations, he holds that this possibility can be rejected. 
Therefore, states Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, all wine transported by conversos from 
Morvedre to North Africa could, in theory, be permitted. But this is not the case, he 
continues, since a minority of conversos does eat forbidden food even if permitted food 
                                                 
77 A short reference to this responsum can be found in Zimmels 1932:97. 
78 This proposition of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran is interesting. From the statement that “they do not trade in 
forbidden wine” it follows that they do trade in permitted wine. Now, as Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran just 
declared that they are unreliable concerning their own wine, which implies every wine in which they have 
profit, it might be expected that he would ban wine-trade completely. Nevertheless, he does not add any 
further considerations to his statement cited above. It might be suggested as a solution to the apparent 
contradiction here, that the wine in which a person trades does not become the trader’s property in any sense, 
and his activity is restricted to the transport of the goods, but he does not obtain any share in the goods 
themselves (although he does gain profit from their transport).  
79 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:60 
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can be found easily. Consequently, one should not rely on general presumptions, but on the 
specific person who sends the wine: “I usually say to those who receive wine that if you 
trust the person who sent it, drink it in your house, but beware from selling it to a Jew who 
does not know the sender well.”80  
But in this specific case, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran says that the wine is permitted in 
any case, since its origin can be cleared and attested. In this sense, wine is similar to eggs 
claimed by the Gentile seller to be eggs of a ritually clean bird.81 As the origin of the eggs 
could be cleared, so the origin of the wine can be determined too, consequently the wine is 
permitted. All the more so, since the converso would not allow himself to sell forbidden 
wine to the Jews, if the truth can be found out easily: “And also, the convert will be 




V.5. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:227: excursus on Majorcan conversos drinking 
wine sold by an Arab woman83 
The text is not a proper responsum, but a letter of admonition written to the 
community of Majorca before their general conversion. The letter contains an addition at 
the end, which goes as follows: “After I had written this, they did not listen to me. Within a 
short time they were struck by Divine Justice, and all of them converted due to the 
dissensions. But I have saved my soul.”84 
The letter touches on various problems, such as quarrels in the community, 
negligence of the precept of wearing earlocks, etc., and it also discusses the issue of wine 
at length.  
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran severely criticizes the community on account of their 
custom of drinking wine sold by an Arab woman, who might have undergone ritual 
immersion, but, as Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran assumes, it was not in the presence of three 
Jews, and she never accepted the precepts of Jewish Law – all of which are requirements 
of conversion to Judaism. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran appears to be sure about the invalidity 
of the immersion, and he justifies his view by reminding the community that the activity of 
                                                 
80 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:60 
81 Cf. bÍul 63b 
82 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:60 
83 The responsum is treated by Zimmels 1932:95-96. 
84 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:227 
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proselytizing was absolutely forbidden to them by Christian authorities, and that they 
really do refrain from it because they fear the consequences.  
Moreover, the woman sells the wine to Jews and Gentiles alike, and she uses the 
same vessel for measuring it. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran explains that the wine would be 
prohibited for this reason alone, even if it was measured out by a Jew. His reasoning is that 
as the wine in the vessel of the Gentile and in that of the seller forms a continuum, and thus 
the wine that remains in the vessel of the seller becomes forbidden. If the seller immerses 
his vessel to the barrel of the kosher wine again, that also becomes forbidden. Therefore, 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran suggests the rinsing of the vessel after each usage.  
Another charge Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran brings up against the community is that 
according to the information he received, they let Gentiles put the cane of measurement 
into the barrel of their kosher wine. As Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran says, “there is nothing left, 
but that you go to the shops of the Gentiles in order to buy the wine there.”85  
This letter is most important from the point of view of the prevalent customs in the 
Jewish community of Majorca. It probably sheds even more light on the reality than the 
responsa discussed earlier. It might be suggested that those who disregard Jewish precepts 
to such an extent, would normally not send questions to an authority similar to Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran, or to any halakhic authority at all. Therefore, the chance that evidence of 
their customs and manners survives in responsa literature is relatively limited.  
 
V.6. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:312: on wine made and sent by Majorcan 
conversos 
The last responsum of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran to be discussed here concerns wine 
made and sent by conversos. The formulation of the question is interesting, since it 
contains the phrase “last converts who have not yet become notorious on account of 
desecrating the Sabbath publicly”86 which means that most conversos were evidently 
considered as profaners of the Sabbath by the time. The question is as follows:  
 
Another question regarding these last converts who have not yet became 
notorious on account of desecrating the Sabbath publicly: whether they can be 
trusted when they send wine by ship, and they say: “drink this wine, because I 
have made it in my house” – if it is permitted to drink it.87  
 
                                                 
85 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:227 
86 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:312 




The answer reveals the considerable change of opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
regarding conversos. In the first responsum discussed above88 he ascertained that just 
because of a general suspicion the conversos as a group should not be treated as suspicious 
of committing certain transgressions. In this responsum, however, he holds that even in 
case of a general suspicion they are suspected of disregarding the Law. For this reason, 
even wine handled by them has to be prohibited. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran adds that some 
might not accept the view of treating conversos as suspicious because of a general 
suspicion (as he himself did not hold this view earlier). In this case, although wine handled 
by conversos would be permitted, they could not be relied on concerning wine made and 
sent by them (but they could be trusted regarding the wine of another person). Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran explained his opinion by adding some ironic remarks: 
  
Since even the first converts, who were evidently forced converts, compelled to 
conversion by naked sword, did not refrain from redeeming themselves by the 
wine of their [the Gentiles’] banquets.89 And even the great rabbis, they did not 
have other questions then whether they had to say the blessing for things 
enjoyed [birkat ha-nehenin] over it [the Gentiles’ wine]; and if they could 
neutralize it in water, and what the required quantities were. All the more so 
these, who were not forced by real compulsion, and who undoubtedly drink the 
wine of the Gentiles. […] And therefore, I prohibited wine coming from them, 
even wine that was made before the massive forced conversion, and all the 
more so wine that was made after the massive forced conversion. […] And 
according to what we have seen from them, and what we have heard from 
them, and what they have written to us from there, they are to be hold as 
absolutely suspicious, and as they are suspicious, they should not be trusted.90  
 
V.7. Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsum no. 553: on wine made by Jews and guarded 
by a converso91 
This is the only responsum written by Solomon b. Simeon Duran that deals with 
wine sent by a convert. It discusses wine that was made by a Jew in Tortosa, sent by a 
converso on a Christian ship to Majorca, and from there to Bejaia. The barrels were sealed 
with two seals, and on the seals it was written that the wine was kosher. A converso was 
guarding the wine during the journey, who testified that the wine was and remained kosher. 
                                                 
88 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:63 
89 Redeeming themselves by the wine of their banquets: . Maybe it can be read as: 
: polluting themselves with the wine of their banquets.  
90 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:312 




The wine was declared permitted on the basis of the principle that conversos were 
unreliable concerning their own wine, but they were reliable concerning the wine of 
another person.  
The great novelty of the responsum is that according to Solomon b. Simeon Duran 
the conversos were unreliable even concerning the wine of someone else:  
 
Although it is written in the responsa of Rabbi Isaac b. Sheshet, and in that of 
my master, my father [Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran] that they are to be trusted 
concerning the possession of someone else, but this referred to the first 
converts, who did not desecrate the Sabbath in public. But today, that all of 
them desecrate the Sabbath publicly, they are not to be trusted at all.92 
 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran permitted the consumption of the wine because of the 
seals that guaranteed its kashrut. His reasoning was based on the principle of majority: 
since the majority of the barrels on which the phrase “yayin kasher” (kosher wine) is 
written in Hebrew script is indeed kosher and permitted, the wine in question is also 
permitted.93 He raised the possibility of the falsification of the seals by the converso, but 
rejected the suggestion. He argued that although the converso could write Hebrew letters, it 
was not worthwhile for him to falsify the seals. Since wine made in Tortosa could be 
distinguished from wine made in Majorca, it was certain that the wine was made in Tortosa 
(by a Jew), and not in Majorca (by a converso). Solomon b. Simeon Duran apparently 
supposed that wine made in Tortosa was obviously made by Jews, and not conversos, 
whereas wine proceeding from Majorca might have been made by conversos. This 
reasoning seems to be strange, since the wine could have been made by a converso even in 
Tortosa, and in this case the falsification of the seals remains possible. In any case, 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran did not raise this later possibility. 
 
This wine that arrived from Tortosa to Majorca, and it is evident that it is not 
from Majorca, he [the convert] won’t make pains to falsify the seals, therefore 
the wine is kosher because of the reasons I have exposed. And all the more so, 
since here we relied on the script that it is from Tortosa and we have drunk 
from this wine, because some of the barrels arrived here and some to your 
place, and the seal that you have and what we have is like what is in the script, 
and the thing become permitted, thanks God.94 
 
                                                 
92 Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 553 
93 The discussion is based on bBB 24a, where the barrel (without a seal of kashrut) is found in the river. 




The responsa presented in the foregoing show an evident tendency towards the 
prohibition of the consumption of wine made or handled by conversos. The opinion of the 
halakhic authorities concerning conversos underwent a gradual change; the initial 
hesitation and perplexity in view of the new phenomenon of mass conversion was followed 
by a slow consolidation of their position regarding the converts. The decisive factor in this 
respect was the fact that vast masses of conversos remained in Christian territory where 
they inevitably went through a gradual assimilation to the norms and customs of the 
surrounding Christian society. They could not avoid profaning the Sabbath and letting the 
Christians exert control and influence upon their private life. Therefore, as long as they 
remained in Christian kingdoms, they became disqualified concerning the halakhic issues 




Chapter 6 – Death 
 
The files of inquisitorial processes and the edicts of faith1 contain references to the 
customs of conversos connected with death, funeral and mourning. These include first and 
foremost washing the deceased persons’ body;2 shrouding it (Levine Melammed 1999:57, 
89); eating eggs together, sitting at low tables after the funeral at the traditional meal called 
cohuerzo (Levine Melammed 1999:34-35, 39, 46-49, 89); mourning the dead behind 
closed doors, sitting, singing, crying, and clapping the hands “in the Jewish way” (Levine 
Melammed 1999:43-44, 90); sitting shivah3 without engaging in any activity (Levine 
Melammed 1999:91).  
The responsa related to this topic is very limited. Only one text (Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran: TashbeÛ 2:139) deals explicitly with obligations concerning mourning for converts, 
and even this text does not contain much data about the case it discusses; it might be 
supposed also that it is a general treatment of a problem not related to a specific event. In 
any case, it sets forth rulings with regard to both voluntary and forced converts. Two more 
responsa mention briefly the death of converts. One of them treats the issue of ritual 
uncleanness.4 The other5 mentions a form of behavior the conversos were accused of by 
the Church, namely, that they tried to evade the administration of the last consecration.  
 
 
I. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:139: on the obligation of mourning for a convert  
 
Unfortunately, the responsum does not seem to relate to a specific case and it 
contains very general statements only. The question, if there was originally at all, did not 
survive. The answer is introduced merely by a brief inscription outlining the subject matter 
of the responsum; whether the Jewish brothers of a voluntary convert (meshummad) are 
obliged to mourn for him or not. The text does not contain sufficient data to determine the 
circumstances of the conversion, or the new religion adopted by the convert. The 
                                                 
1 Edict of faith (edicto de fe): list of heresies that was read out publicly in order to facilitate the identification 
of Judaizing (and other heretical) activities.   
2 Cf. Levine Melammed 1999:43-44, 46, 57, 88-89. These and the following examples are taken from 
confessions given before the Inquisition in a period between the end of the fifteenth century and the middle 
of the sixteenth century by Castilian conversos.  
3 Shivah: a week-long (hence the name, meaning “seven”) period of mourning for the first-degree relatives. 
4 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:323 
5 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:43 
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responsum mentions however the possibility of observing Jewish law in secret, which is of 
course quite relevant in the context of forced converts to Christianity, therefore a short 
discussion of the text seems to be appropriate.  
 
I.1. In case of a minor 
If the son was a minor, he had to be mourned by his brothers, since his father was 
the one that committed a sin by converting, not the son. According to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran a minor was not to be held responsible for his deeds, since “if a minor eats nebelah,6 
it is not the duty of the Beth din to take away from him.” (bYeb 114a)7 Furthermore, a 
minor raised as a Gentile by his convert parents was similar to a minor captured and raised 
by Gentiles.8 He had to be considered as a brother9 and therefore one should defile himself 
for him (by handling his corpse, attending his funeral etc.).10 
 
I.2. In case of an adult 
If the son was an adult, it had to be decided whether he persisted in neglecting 
Jewish law by his own will, in which case he was a voluntary convert; or due to coercion, 
in which case he was a forced convert. In the view of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran a voluntary 
convert was not considered as a brother because those who “may be cast in and need not 
brought up” (bAZ 26b) from a pit did not count as brothers, and obligations concerning 
brothers did not apply to them, therefore it was not obligatory to mourn for them either. 
What is more, “his relatives should put on white clothes [rejoicing] that they have lost one 
of those who hate God.”11 
 
I.3. In case of a person adhering to Judaism in secret 
    However, if he observed Jewish law in secret, he was a forced convert and every 
regulation relating to those considered as brothers applied also to him.   
                                                 
6 Meat of an animal which died without being slaughtered. 
7 This does not mean however, that a minor is encouraged to transgress Jewish law; on the contrary, he has to 
be accustomed to observe it by his family. Cf. MT Hilkhot Maakhalot Asurot 17:27-28   
8 Such a child is to be considered as one who transgresses the law because he is compelled to do so. Cf. MT 
Hilkhot Mamrim 3:3 
9 This word is not to be taken in a biological sense here. “Brother” is a well-defined halakhic category 
meaning a fellow Jew. Cf.: ETal 1:434-436  
10 Relations requiring mourning correspond to those for whom a priest should defile himself. Cf. Lev 21:1-3, 
bMQ 20b.  
11 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:139 
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B. Netanyahu referred to this responsum as an indication of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran’s negative opinion of the conversos:  
 
Since the phenomenon of Marranism touched practically every Jewish 
family in Spain and went deep into family relationships, RashbaÛ’ position 
on the attitude to be assumed by the Jewish relatives of a convert in the 
case of the latter’s death, is also indicative of the stand he took on the 
issues of Marranism and the rift within the Jewish camp. Thus, according 
to him, the death of a convert should not be mourned by his Jewish brother 
or other close relations, but should rather be regarded as a joyful event and 
celebrated in accordance with the prescribed custom (TashbeÛ, II, 139, p. 
31d).12  
 
Unfortunately, Netanyahu fails to mention that according to the same responsum if 
the deceased convert adhered to Judaism in secret, he had to be mourned by his relatives as 
any other Jew. This is a good example of Netanyahu’s tendentious use of the sources; he 
chooses from them the parts that support his thesis, while ignores others contradicting to it, 
even if these passages are found in the very same short text, separated by some lines only.  
 
 
II. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:43: remark on a converso refusing to die as a 
Christian13 
  
The responsum discusses the validity of a divorce document written by a converso 
scribe in Majorca. The Majorcan community testified that the scribe was a forced convert 
who made every effort to observe Jewish law. He was notorious of his adherence to 
Judaism to such an extent that after his death the Christians did not permit to bury him in 
the Christian cemetery. Finally, his wife managed to arrange him a Christian funeral by 
bribery. It seems highly probable that the converso refused to receive the sacraments 
before his death, as it can be deduced from the testimony concerning his behavior that was 
sent to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran by the representatives of the Majorcan Jewish community: 
“…even when he died, he did not follow the custom of the Gentiles so they did not want to 
bury him, as [it is their] custom [with] those who abjures their religion, until his wife spent 
a lot of money [in order to bribe them to bury him].”14    
                                                 
12 Netanyahu 1966:42, n. 113 
13 For the detailed discussion of this responsum see the chapter about divorce. 




III. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 3:323: remark on entering Christian cemeteries 
where converts were buried  
 
The responsum discusses the topic whether the corpse of a Gentile is ritually 
impure similarly to that of a Jew. At the end of the responsum, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
mentioned that kohanim used to enter Gentile cemeteries following the ruling of 
Maimonides, according to which the corpse of a Gentile did not defile with the impurity of 
the tent.15 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran however remarked that “R. PereÛ ha-Kohen16 who died 
in Barcelona bewared of [entering Gentile cemeteries because of] the meshummadim [that 
might have been buried there], since it is an accepted principle that “a Jew, even if he 
sinned, is still a Jew.”17 Due to the brevity of the remark, it cannot be decided whether the 
word meshummad means actually voluntary convert. If it does, the conclusion is that 
according to the view of R. PereÛ ha-Kohen, a meshummad is not regarded as a Gentile 
with respect to ritual impurity caused by his corpse, thus the regulations connected to death 
and mourning may apply to him as well. But as the use of the word meshummad is not 
entirely consequent in the responsa, another explanation may be that the rabbi refrained 
from entering Gentile cemeteries because of the forced converts buried there, which would 
suggest that he considered forced converts only as ‘brothers’ with regard to corpse-
uncleanness, and regarded voluntary converts to be similar to Gentiles in that respect.              
 
                                                 
15 Cf. MT Hilkhot Evel 3:3 
16 R. PereÛ ha-Kohen of Barcelona was the teacher of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran’s father-in-law, R. Jonah de 
Maistre of Teruel. The responsa of R. PereÛ ha-Kohen is frequently quoted by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, cf. 
Epstein 1968:5, n. 15.    
17 bSanh. 44a, my translation. 
 
 152 
Chapter 7 – Inheritance 
 
According to Biblical law the property of a deceased person is inherited by his 
relatives in the paternal line, either ascendants or descendants. The priority of the heirs is 
determined by the degree of kinship. The wife does not inherit her husband’s property, but 
has right to the sum fixed in her ketubah,1 her dowry, and her own property brought into 
the marriage. If a person wishes to bequeath his property to another who is not his legal 
heir, he can dispose of his property by will in favor of him. Even wills written before 
Gentile notaries were accepted as valid.2 The question that arose with regard to conversos 
was whether they were entitled to inherit their Jewish relatives, or they were disqualified as 
heirs.   
The number of responsa available in this subject is limited, in fact, they relate 
solely to two cases. The first case (Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 46-52 and 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:58-62) comprises the litigation between a convert wife 
and the alleged Jewish relatives of his husband. The husband disposed of his property 
before his death, but the will was drafted by a Christian notary. Both Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet and Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran were asked to give their opinion about the case, and 
their rulings were conflicting. For several reasons Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet held that the 
converso woman should inherit the husband in accordance with the will of the latter, and 
the custom of the Majorcan community to which they belonged before their conversion. In 
a later responsum, he suggested that the litigation should be brought before Christian 
jurisdiction (again in accordance with the custom of Majorcan Jews). Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran however argued that the property should be given to the Jewish heirs of the 
husband, although their degree of kinship was impossible to be determined (what is more, 
the kinship itself was under question). His main argument was that the property was 
transferred in the meantime to North Africa, where the Jewish heirs resided, so it would 
have been illogical to send it back to Majorca, so that a Christian judge may decide its fate. 
The convert woman should come to North Africa, return to Judaism and claim her part of 
the husband’s property. 
                                                 
1 The ketubah is the marriage contract containing the obligations of the husband toward his wife in case he 
divorces her, or in case he dies. The part of the husband’s property that the wife receives is also called 
ketubah (since it is fixed and specified in that document).  
2 Cf. MT Hilkhot Avadim 6:5 
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The other case, which was discussed by Solomon b. Simeon Duran in two responsa 
(nos. 287, and 418) concerns the disinheritance of converso heirs (again from Majorca). 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran explained that although the converts were entitled to be heirs of 
their relatives, the rabbinical court of law had the right to confiscate their inheritance as 
means of penalty for their conversion. He added that this was the practice of his father, 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran as well.      
A short responsum written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran concerns a litigation about 
inheritance where the parties involved were Jews, but one party happened to appoint a 
converso as an agent to represent their interests before the Muslim authorities. This last 
case is not related to the converts’ right to inheritance, nevertheless it will be presented 
briefly as it is relevant to the conversos’ involvement in the life of the Jewish community.        
 
 
I. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, nos. 46-52 and Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 
nos. 1:58-62: on the inheritance of a converso claimed by his converso wife and by his 
alleged Jewish relatives3 
 
These responsa discuss a case of inheritance where the opinions of Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet and Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran differed. A letter written by the Christian treasurer of 
Majorca is included in one of the responsa (Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 52) in 
Hebrew translation, containing the names of the parties involved and the date (1401).  
 
I.1. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 46 
The responsum was sent to Moses Gabbay of Honein.4 According to it, a person 
who was a Majorcan convert5 deposited his property at another Jew (referred to as 
Reuben), giving one part of it directly to him, and entrusting the other part to his wife in 
order to give it to Reuben. After that, the convert died, and a person (Simeon) by claiming 
                                                 
3 The litigation discussed in these responsa is shortly mentioned by Epstein (1968:25, n.24) who dated the 
responsa written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran concerning this case to the year 1404 due to the reverential 
reference  that appears next to the name of the TashbeÛ’ father, which implies that his 
father died in the same year. This expression is used only during the first year after death, see bKid 31b. 
About these responsa see also Zimmels 1932:92-94.  
4 Moses Gabbay was a rabbinical scholar who after 1391 settled in Honein, but mantained relations with the 
Aragonese ruler. In 1394 he went on a diplomatic mission on behalf of Juan I. See Hisrchberg 1974:387 and 
the references there. 
5 That becomes clear from the subsequent responsa, cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet nos. 51-52, TashbeÛ 1:60-61. 
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that he was a relative, requested the property (both parts) from Reuben as the legal heir. 
His claim was supported by two arguments: 1) his family name was identical with that of 
the convert’s; 2) he could testify that they were relatives.  
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet refused Simeon’s claim with the following: 1) identical 
family names do not prove kinship; 2) the testimonies were insufficient, since the 
witnesses could not specify the exact relationship between the convert and Simeon, neither 
was it clear whether there was another relative having priority over Simeon as to 
inheritance. 
 
I.2. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa nos. 47-52 
The following responsa elaborate the same problem. Apparently the inquirer, 
Moses Gabbay was not completely satisfied with the answer of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, and 
sent him another letter in which he formulated his objections. Nos. 47-52 reject these 
objections one by one, without quoting them in their entirety, however. Nos. 47-52 form in 
fact one responsum, which was divided to chapters under different numbers according to 
subject matter. No. 47 discusses further whether the mere testimony about the kinship 
between the convert and Simeon is sufficient or not; the conclusion is that although the 
witnesses heard that the convert had called Simeon ‘a relative’ it is not evident whether he 
meant it precisely as ‘relative with regard to inheritance’ or vaguely, in a general sense. 
Neither was it clear whether Simeon was a relative in the paternal line or not.6 No. 48 
treats the formula used by the convert when appointing the depositee. No. 49 discusses 
whether the signatures in the depositary document were written too far from one to the 
other, making a later addition of some lines to the text possible. No. 50 argues that the part 
of the property given to the depositee through the wife must be returned to her, since: 
“Pledges should not be taken […] form women […] if one has taken a pledge from a 
women, he should return it to her.” (bBB 51b) No. 51 states that although the deed was 
registered in the office of a Christian notary, it was still acceptable in accordance with the 
ruling of Maimonides.7     
The most relevant responsum concerning the way conversos conducted their legal 
cases of inheritance is no. 52, which contains a letter written by the Christian treasurer 
                                                 
6 The system of succession is based on the paternal line of descendancy, cf. mBB 8:2, bBB 115a-b.   
7 Cf. MT Hilkhot Avadim 6:5, according to which all deeds made in the offices of Gentile notaries are 
acceptable, except for divorce documents and bills of release given to servants. 
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(gazbar) of Majorca.8 The letter was written on the 30th of December, 1401. The 
responsum contains the Hebrew translation of the original text. The letter is addressed to 
“the [Christian] consuls (cónsules), the Muslim cadis (qāÃī-s), the Jewish rabbis 
(rabbanim)”9 in Christian or Muslim lands, in the name of the king of Aragon. It explains 
that a Majorcan convert called Juan Prum by his Christian name, and Abraham YaÎyun by 
his Jewish name disposed of his property by will before a Majorcan notary called Antonio 
Aslón. He appointed two depositees over his property: his wife, called Bonita by her 
Christian name, and Ester by her Jewish name, and a notary called Niklob Prum. In the 
letter the relation between Niklob Prum and Juan Prum is not clarified. Juan Prum 
appointed his two underage daughters, Clara and Nikolba as his heirs, with the stipulation 
that in case they died without having male children, the property should return to his wife, 
Bonita. Shortly after that the converso Juan Prum died, and also his daughters died within 
two years, without issue. Therefore, according to the Christian official, the inheritance was 
due to the wife.   
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet argued that since the parties involved were all conversos, 
their litigations had to be prosecuted under Christian law. He added that even the Jews of 
Majorca conducted their lawsuits under Christian law; that was the custom of the Majorcan 
Jewish community, which they followed by their own will, not because of any 
compulsion.10 Therefore it was only logical, according to Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, that the 
conversos should turn to the Christian jurisdiction.  
The conclusion is that in Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet’s opinion the heir was the wife for 
several reasons. First of all, there was no other heir who could prove satisfactorily either 
his priority or his kinship; secondly, that was the will of the husband, and the deed 
registered by him in the office of the Christian notary was valid; thirdly, Majorcan 
conversos should conduct their lawsuits under Christian jurisdiction in civil affairs relating 
to property, since that was the accepted custom of the Jewish community as well.     
 These decisions of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet were contradicted and refuted by 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran almost point by point. TashbeÛ nos. 1:58-62 comprise the critique 
of the decision made by Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet. Supposedly these responsa by Simeon b. 
                                                 
8 For the German translation of the text see Zimmels 1932:93.   
9 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 52 
10 In the 14th century the Majorcan Jewish communities were granted the right of trying even criminal law 
(although this right was restricted between1337-1383, when they were prohibited to administer corporal 
punishment). Cf. Beinart: “Majorca” EJ 11:795-803. In any case, the fact that the autonomy of the 
community was strong does not mean that its members did not turn to Christian jurisdiction if they wished.   
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ÚemaÎ Duran formed one text originally that was divided to shorter parts and included as 
such in his edition of responsa. 
 
I.3. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:58: on alleged kinship  
The responsum modifies slightly the information obtained from the letter of the 
Majorcan treasurer quoted in the responsum of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet no. 52. From 
TashbeÛ 1:58 it appears that the Majorcan converso, Juan Prum (or, by his Jewish name, 
Abraham YaÎyun) appointed two depositees (not identical with the depositees mentioned 
in the letter of the Christian official): Abraham Sasportas and Abraham Mandil, in order to 
take the property with them to North-Africa, for the converso had the intention to emigrate 
there with his wife. These depositees were merchants who in fact transferred the property 
to Honein (or to Tilimsan, as both places are mentioned as the final destination of the 
deposit11). Juan Prum/Abraham YaÎyun died in Majorca and his daughter died after him 
(in this responsum only one daughter is mentioned). The property of the converso was 
claimed by two parties: his wife, whose claim was supported by the testament of her 
husband written before the Christian notary in Majorca; and a person called Astruc YaÎyun 
who presented a letter of attorney written by his father and uncle, both conversos in 
Majorca, stating that they are the closest relatives of Juan Prum/Abraham YaÎyun. Simeon 
b. ÚemaÎ Duran related that Moses Gabbay from Honein turned to Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
with two questions in this issue, and Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet decided in favor of the wife. 
Astruc YaÎyun, on the other hand, saw Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran about the case, who took 
his side against Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet. 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran refused the objections of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet 
concerning the sufficiency of the testimonies about the kinship of Juan Prum/Abraham 
YaÎyun and Astruc YaÎyun. According to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran’s argumentation the 
testimonies of the witnesses were sufficient even if they could not specify the degree of 
kinship between Astruc and Abraham YaÎyun, notwithstanding the fact that their family 
relationship was not well known among the people of Majorca. He supported the view by 
referring to an analogous case in bKet 23a, where two witnesses testified that they had seen 
a certain woman betrothed, while two others said they had not seen the betrothal. Although 
all of them lived in a common courtyard, the woman was regarded as betrothed, since a 
woman might be betrothed without making the event public. As the statement of the 
                                                 
11 Cf. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:62 
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witnesses regarding the status of the woman was accepted, even though the betrothal was 
not well-known among the inhabitants of the courtyard, so the statement of the witnesses 
regarding the kinship of Abraham YaÎyun and Astruc YaÎyun should be accepted, even 
though their kinship was not well-known among the people of Majorca. Secondly, Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet suggested that the mere fact of designating someone as a relative did not 
prove that the designation was meant literally; it could be meant figuratively, or it could be 
an informal way of speaking. The fact that some witnesses hear a person calling another 
his son, is not sufficient to assume that the other was in fact his son. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran refuted this objection referring to bBB 126b:  
 
A certain [Person once] came before R. Hanina [and] said to him, ‘I am 
certain that this [man] is firstborn’. He said to him, ‘Whence do you know 
[this]?’ — [The other] replied to him,: ‘Because when [people] came to his 
father,38 he used to say to then,: Go to my son Shikhath, Who is firstborn 
and his spittle heals’. — Might he not have been the firstborn of his mother 
[only]? — There is a tradition that the spittle of the firstborn of a father is 
healing, but that of the firstborn of a mother is not healing. 
 
 
This passage supports the argument that a person can be assumed a firstborn on the 
basis of a vague dialogue overheard by the witness. That the kinship was accepted is 
deduced from the fact that there is no discussion in the Gemarah whether the son was a 
firstborn or not; the question is only whether he was the firstborn of the father or the 
mother (but his being a firstborn is not doubted).  
Furthermore, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran made reference to the ruling of Maimonides, 
according to which any person calling another his son, or brother, or any other possible 
heir, that person inherits him, even if he is not recognized as his relative.12   
In the view of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet this ruling of Maimonides is valid only if 
there is no other potential heir, because in that case calling a person someone’s son 
conveys the meaning that he is his heir as well. That would mean that a person by calling 
another his son would declare him his heir as well. But according to the explication of 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran the two matters should be differentiated: 1) calling someone a 
relative; 2) declaring someone a heir. In the opinion of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, the 
evidence of the witnesses according to which the converso called the other his relative is 
accepted (but without the intention of appointing him as his heir). But now, as there is no 
                                                 
12 Cf. MT Hilkhot NaÎalot 4:1 
 
 158 
other possible heir, he can be held as a legal heir, since “…he does not receive this 
property [i.e., the inheritance] because of the utterance of the testator, but because of [the 
decision] of God, and the utterance of the testator is need only to recognize him as a 
relative.”13 That is to say, it is not necessary for the converso to appoint him as a heir. By 
being called a relative he is accepted as such, and since no other potential heir remained, he 
is appointed by God as the converso’s heir. This argument is weakened by the fact (not 
mentioned by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran here) that the converso did appoint his heir, namely 
his wife, who is a potential heir in any case.14 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet held that it was necessary for the relatives demanding the 
inheritance to prove that they were the closest relatives of the converso, and no other 
relative could claim priority over them. According to Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, however, a 
heir is not obliged to prove that he is the closest relative,15 if there is no other relative 
making the same claim.  
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet mentioned that even if the alleged relatives were in fact kin, 
it was not clear whether they were relatives in the paternal line or not. According to 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, however, it was well-known that in Majorca there was only one 
YaÎyun family, moreover, a witness testified that Abraham YaÎyun’s father had no 
brothers; therefore it was evident that all members of the family were descendants of one 
forefather.16      
    
I.4. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:59: on deposit taken from a woman 
The text is the continuation of the previous discussion. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
refuted the argument of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet according to which a deposit taken from a 
woman should be returned to her, and not any other person.17 In the opinion of Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran, that may be true only in a case where it is obvious that the deposit was 
originally the property of the woman. Otherwise, a woman is not reliable concerning the 
property in her possession, but it has to be assumed that it belongs to her husband.18 
Therefore the deposit taken from Bonita, the converso’s wife, should not be returned to 
                                                 
13 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:58 
14 If she had not been a potential heir, there would not have been a discussion as long as 13 responsa about 
her. 
15 Cf. bBB 33a 
16 If the kinship is accepted, their being related on the father’s side is even more plausible as family name 
passed from father to son, and not from mother to son. 
17 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 50, which based its argumentation on bBB 51b. 
18 Cf. MT Hilkhot Malve 2:8 
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her, but to Astruc YaÎyun, all the more so, since it was evident to all, that the deposit was 
given to Bonita so that she may hand it over to the depositee.  
 
I.5. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:60: on oath administered to a convert 
The responsum argues that a woman is obliged to support her claim to her share of 
the husband’s property by presenting her ketubah in which the obligations of her husband 
towards her are specified.19 Moreover, she ought to take an oath at the rabbinical court of 
law when after the husband’s death she claims her ketubah that she had not received part of 
the ketubah before.20 However, argued Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, as the woman was a 
convert, it was impossible for her to administer an oath, since she was suspected of 
transgressing the laws of the Torah.21        
 
I.6. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:61: on the custom of the Majorcan community of 
conducting litigations under Christian law 
According to the statement of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet both the conversos and the 
Jews of Majorca conducted their litigations under Christian law by their own choice, and 
that was the custom of the Jewish community there. Therefore also in the case of the 
inheritance claimed by the wife and by the alleged relatives of the husband, they should 
turn to the Christian authorities.  
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran refuted this ruling with the following arguments: 1) The 
property under discussion was not in Majorca any longer, but in North-Africa, and it was 
illogical to send it back to a Christian land, so that a Christian court of law may decide 
about it. Moreover, Juan Prum/Abraham YaÎyun deposited his property to be taken to 
North-Africa, therefore it cannot be returned to Majorca.22 2) It is possible that the 
Majorcan custom of turning to the Christian jurisdiction was originated on the demand of 
the Christian government, and not on the free choice of the Jewish community. 3) The 
custom of turning to Christian jurisdiction was reproachable (except when it was done 
under coercion), therefore it should not be followed. 4) Conversos were to be considered as 
                                                 
19 Cf. MT Hilkhot Ishut 18:23 
20 Cf. bGit 34b; bKet 105a; MT Hilkhot Ishut 18:19 
21 Cf. MT Hilkhot Toen we-Nitan 2:1-2 
22 mBK 10:6: ”If a person […] received a deposit in a settlement, he should not return it [to the depositor] in 
the desert. [If he received the deposit] on condition of going to the desert – he should return it in the desert.” 
Similarly, if they had agreed to take the deposit to North-Africa, it must be returned to the depositor or to his 
heir there, and not in Majorca, where the stipulation was made.  
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Jews with regard to inheritance,23 consequently their litigations should be under Jewish 
law, not under Christian law. 5) The Christian notary who wrote the testament used to take 
bribes (as it was attested in the rabbinical court of law in Algiers), therefore his legal 
actions were unreliable and the documents written by him were invalid.  
The decision of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran was that Astruc YaÎyun was the heir of 
Abraham YaÎyun, and as long as the widow continued to live as a Christian in Majorca, 
she should not be regarded as a potential heir. However, if she returned to Judaism and left 
Majorca, the parties could resume their litigation under Jewish law, before a rabbinical 
court.    
 
I.7. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:62: on the depositee seizing part of the 
inheritance by bribing the Muslim authorities 
This responsum, which was sent to Astruc YaÎyun to Tilimsan, evidences that the 
above presented decision of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran was not entirely carried out;24 
although Astruc YaÎyun received the part of the inheritance which was entrusted to 
Abraham Mandil (apparently in Mostaganem). However, the other depositee, Abraham 
Sasportas managed to take the property by bribing the Muslim authorities in Tilimsan. The 
alleged heir, Astruc YaÎyun also turned to the Muslims, who – according Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran – almost confiscated the property thus putting an end to the discussion,25 but 
finally, the two parties (Abraham Sasportas and Astruc YaÎyun) made a compromise and 
divided the inheritance among themselves (offering a part to the Muslim authorities as 
well), and Astruc YaÎyun waived his rights to the rest of the inheritance. It does not mean 
he completely renounced his claims for the property of Abraham YaÎyun, for he stated that 
his waiving the inheritance was due to compulsion, because he could not litigate fairly with 
Abraham Sasportas who was an influential person enjoying the support of the officials of 
the Muslim ruler. Moreover, Astruc YaÎyun was unable to produce a shetar modaah 
                                                 
23 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran proved this statement with the same arguments he made discussing the marital 
status of the conversos: namely, that a Jew, even if he sinned, is still a Jew (cf. bSanh 44a); the betrothal of a 
meshummad is valid (cf. bYeb 47b, bBek 30b). He also referred to bKid 18a, where it is stated that a convert 
Jew inherits his father by Biblical law, and this view was codified by Maimonides (cf. MT Hilkhot NaÎalot 
6:12).      
24 As opposed to the opinion of Epstein 1968:25: “The party against whom Barfat’s decision went thereupon 
urged some of the judges to refer to Duran, who, though knowing that Barfat had already laid down the law, 
nevertheless did not refrain from giving his decision, which happened to run counter to that of Barfat, and 
which was acted upon.” 
25 Cf. the practice in mediaeval Egypt, where the inheritance of non-Muslims who had no heirs was 
expropriated by the treasury (bayt al-māl). About the chancellery of inheritances (dīwān al-mawāriṯ ) 
confiscating Jewish property in mediaeval Egypt see Gil 1976:6-7, 10. 
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(declaration of protest against forced action, written before the forced transaction in the 
presence of witnesses, annulling the subsequent action), saying that he could not find 
witnesses ready to sign such a document, since they were afraid of Abraham Sasportas. 
From the question it seems probable that Astruc YaÎyun made such declaration in the 
presence of Muslims, before a Muslim notary. However, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran held that 
such a declaration made before a Gentile notary was null and void,26 and since the lack of a 
written declaration of protest, Astruc YaÎyun’s waiving his claims was valid and in force. 
There is no further information about the outcome of the litigation. 
 
I.8. Conclusion 
 Notwithstanding the considerable amount of data contained in the responsa of Isaac 
b. Sheshet Perfet and Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, some details of the litigation remain 
unclear. In any case it is evident that the widow of Abraham YaÎyun did not receive any 
part of the inheritance in spite of the will of her husband drafted by a Christian notary in 
Majorca. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet argued that the property should be returned to Majorca 
and should be given to the widow; or that the litigants should conduct their case under 
Christian jurisdiction, as this was the practice of the Majorcan Jews. In the opinion of 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran the property should remain in North-Africa and given to the 
alleged heir, Astruc YaÎyun, who was possibly a relative of Abraham YaÎyun. If the 
widow returned to Judaism and went to North-Africa, she could claim her part of the 
inheritance before a rabbinical court of law. However, neither of these decisions was 
completely executed, since the depositee, an influential merchant called Abraham 
Sasportas seized a part of the property. The alleged heir, Astruc YaÎyun turned to Muslim 
jurisdiction, and the parties negotiated a compromise which implied bribing the Muslim 
authorities who wished to confiscate the property under discussion. The long 
correspondence involving various rabbis is remarkable considering the limitations of the 
rabbinical decisions’ applicability to everyday reality. Neither the instructions of Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet, nor those of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran were fully carried out; reality 
overruled their decisions.     
 
                                                 
26 Cf. MT Hilkhot Malveh u-Loveh 27:1 
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II. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:214: on a converso appointed as an agent by 
Jewish heirs 
 
The question concerns a converso who was appointed as an agent by the heirs, in 
order to act on their behalf. The heirs were the widow and the son of a person who had left 
Christian land and emigrated to North-Africa, and appointed his brother as a guardian for 
his children after his death. The widow claimed that the guardian owed money to her 
deceased husband, and authorized a converso to take steps on their behalf. The converso 
forced the guardian to appear before the Muslim bet ha-Îeshbon, that is, the office of the 
muÎtasib.27 Neither the place from where the question was sent, nor the person of the 
inquirer is specified in the responsum. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran argued that although 
Gentiles cannot be appointed as agents,28 conversos were not counted as Gentiles, since a 
Jew, even if he sinned, is still a Jew.29 However, the person who appoints a convert as an 
agent to proceed against a Jew ought to be excommunicated until he retracts and annuls the 
agency. What is noteworthy, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran proved this statement by making 
reference to passages or rulings where a Jew transferred property in the hands of a Gentile 
(not a convert Jew), thus producing a situation which was unfavourable for his fellow Jews 
(as the Gentile supposedly has power over them).30 That means that according to Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran a convert was on one hand similar to a Jew with respect of agency per se 
(intrinsically he was a potential agent); but, on the other hand, he was similar to a Gentile 
with respect of his extrinsic circumstances that made him capable of overruling Jews 
(being a convert he was supposed to have more influence before Gentile authorities than 
being a Jew). But, since in the case under discussion the convert agent was in all 
probability a convert to Christianity (since he is identified as “one of the anusim”31) he had 
no more influence in a Muslim environment than a Jew.32 Nevertheless, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran opposed his appointment as an agent.   
Similarly to the above mentioned responsa, the decision concerning property was 
left to the Muslim court to make.       
                                                 
27 The muÎtasib (controller of the market) was a Muslim official whose task was similar to that of the qāÃī 
(judge) and the ṣ āÎib al-šurÔa (head of the police) in maintaining ordered social life in the towns. The 
muÎtasib had limited right to impose penalties and corporal punishments to infringers of the law. Cf. Cahen 
and Talbi: “Íisba” EI 3:485-489 
28 Cf. bBM 71b 
29 Cf. bSanh. 44a 
30 Cf. bBK 117a, bBM 108b; MT Hilkhot Shekhenim 12:7, Hilkhot Íovel u-Mazzik 8:5 
31 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:214 
32 Jews and Christians pertain to the same category of “protected people” (ahl al-Æimma) who are entitled to 






III. Solomon b. Simeon Duran (Solomon b. Simeon Duran): nos. 287, 418 on 
disinheriting converts 
  
Responsum no. 418 is a short answer to the objection made by a student of 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran from Bejaia. The inquirer, David b. Samuel ha-Kohen Bakri, 
disputed a former decision written by Solomon b. Simeon Duran, in which he stated that 
the Majorcan convert (meshummad) relatives of a person had to be denied their 
inheritance. The inquirer held that since the converts were Jews, even if they sinned (cf. 
bSanh 44a), they could inherit their relatives. 
The formerly written responsum to which reference is made is possibly no. 287,33 
which discusses the case of the inheritance of a person called Moses Sevili (that is, from 
Sevilla), whose property was transferred to the hekdesh34 since he had no heirs. Solomon b. 
Simeon Duran objected that every Jew must have an heir,35 and the only reason justifying 
the transfer of the inheritance to the hekdesh was if the heirs were meshummadim, since in 
that case the rabbinical court of law was entitled to appropriate their inheritance as a means 
of penalty, in accordance with the ruling of Maimonides: 
 
A Jew who converted is still entitled to inherit his Jewish relatives. But if 
the rabbinical court of law wishes to expropriate his property and to 
penalize him, so that he may not inherit, so that not to strengthen their 
[the converts’] hands, they have the authority to do so. And if the convert 
has Jewish children, the inheritance of their father should be given to 
them. This is the custom followed in the West [that is, the Maghreb].36 
 
Responsum no. 418 offers a short explanation on the converts’ right to inheritance. 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran made reference to the passage of the Talmud (bKid 18a) which 
enumerated different proof-texts for the Gentiles’ right to inherit their fathers by Torah 
                                                 
33 This suggestion was made by Moshe Sobel, the editor of Solomon b. Simeon Duran’ responsa, see Sobel 
1998:418, n.1. 
34 Hekdesh or kodesh was the designation of Jewish pious foundations corresponding to Muslim waqf, by 
which property could be donated to the synagogue. About Jewish pious foundations in mediaeval Egypt see: 
Gil:1976. For the use of the term hekdesh in mediaeval Europe see Baron 1945:328-329  
35 Cf. bBB 115b where it is stated that if a person seems to have no heirs, the investigation should be carried 
on until a relative is found whether in the descending or in the ascending line, whatever distant the 
relationship may be.  
36 MT Hilkhot NaÎalot 6:12 
 
 164 
law, among them the following: “I have given Esau the hill country of Seir as his own.” 
(Deut 2:5) An objection is raised in the Talmud against the applicability of this passage for 
proving the Gentiles’ right to inheritance, namely, that Esau was a non-observant (mumar) 
Jew, and not a Gentile. It thus means that a non-observant Jew (as Esau) is entitled to 
inheritance by Torah law. Solomon b. Simeon Duran quoted briefly a responsum of Asher 
b. Jehiel37 in which he refused the ruling of R. Meshullam b. Kalonymos quoted by R. 
Judah ha-Kohen38 according to which a non-observant Jew was not entitled to inherit. 
Finally Solomon b. Simeon Duran cited the ruling of Maimonides quoted above, and added 
that this ruling was followed by his father, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, and also by the rest of 




On the evidence of the few responsa regarding inheritance presented above, it 
seems to be reasonable to state that the outcomes of litigations concerning bequeathed 
property were heavily influenced by the Gentile authorities the involved parties turned to 
(beside consulting the rabbinic authorities). The opinions of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet and 
Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran with respect to the involvement of Gentile authorities to the 
litigations conflicted; Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet was willing to accept the practice of Majorcan 
Jews and conversos to conduct civil laws under Christian jurisdiction, while Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran opposed this custom. Apparently, the three authorities (Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran and Solomon b. Simeon Duran) shared the view that in 
theory a convert is entitled to inherit his relatives, in practice, however, Simeon b. ÚemaÎ 
Duran and his son, Solomon b. Simeon preferred to deprive the conversos of their 
inheritance and to transfer the property to the possession of other Jewish heirs, or to the 
Jewish community, until the converso returned to Judaism.       
 
                                                 
37 Cf. Asher b. Jehiel: Responsa, 17:10. R. Meshullam b. Kalonymos quoted Biblical passages (Gen. 17:7-8, 
15:18) where the words covenant, inheritance and descendents occur as interrelated (suggesting that only 
those descendants are entitled to their inheritances who keep the covenant of God). Asher b. Jehiel held that 
these passages were “asmakhta be-alma,” that is, Scriptural texts supporting a specific view, but not proofs 
bearing with demonstrative force, and definitely not convincing enough to contradict an established ruling.  
38 A student of R. Gershom Meor ha-Golah. Cf. Sobel 1998:354, n. 5 
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Chapter 8 – Returning to Judaism 
 
 
I. Leaving the land of forced conversion  
                          
Emigrating from Christian territory where Jews were subject to religious 
persecution, and forcibly baptized conversos were not allowed to observe Jewish laws any 
more is a recurring theme that appears in a great number of responsa. Although most of the 
decisions focus on one main subject like divorce, marriage, inheritance, etc. almost all of 
them mentions other, related matters as well. One of the topics frequently addressed by the 
rabbis is the converts’ tardiness in leaving the places where they were subjected to 
religious persecution. It was evident to all rabbinical authorities that forced converts were 
obliged to leave those territories for a place where they could practice Judaism openly. 
This matter was never subject of debate; although the judgment of conversos remaining in 
Christian territory did vary to a certain extent. The remarks of the rabbis concerning the 
probability and possibility of the emigration are really noteworthy.  
The conversos who decided to emigrate faced various difficulties. On the one hand, 
they had to liquidate their estates and goods, and rearrange their family and other social 
relationships. Although some conversos did return to Iberia after a longer or shorter stay in 
North Africa, or elsewhere,1 most of those who left Iberia had the intention of leaving it for 
good. The emigration of the converts was generally prohibited by the Christian authorities 
as they supposed that the emigrants would return to their former religion.2 The re-
conversion presented a serious theological problem since ––though forced baptism was 
undesirable–– the effect of the sacrament according to the Christian belief was irrevocable. 
Therefore a person once baptized in any way remained Christian for the rest of his life, and 
the supervision of his moral conduct was the responsibility of the Christian Church. For 
this theological reason, and for other more practical, financial, and economic reasons the 
emigration of the conversos was impeded. From the point of view of the rabbinic 
                                                 
1 Cf. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66, ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75, and from a later 
period Josef ibn Lev: Responsa, 1:22, David ibn Avi Zimra (Radbaz): Responsa, 4:91, David b. Hayim ha-
Kohen (Radakh): Responsa, no. 11, Moses b. Josef Trani (Mabit): Responsa, 1:142, Samuel de Medina 
(Rashdam): Responsa, Even ha-Ezer 10. 
2 See for example the edict of faith referred to in Zeldes 2004:78, in which the Inquisition of Sicily 
(pertaining at that time to the Crown of Aragon) prohibited the converts to leave the island without obtaining 
permission from the authorities. Concerning the migration of the conversos before the expulsion see for 
example Beinart 1983:72-74. 
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authorities, staying in the land of persecution or leaving it was a crucial issue. In fact, that 
became the criterion which differentiated between those considered voluntary converts and 
those held to be forced ones. These two categories of converts frequently overlapped as the 
actual degree of the compulsion was difficult to determine.  
The categorization of the converts had also practical consequences since the status 
of a forced and a voluntary convert was different, and the regulations concerning them 
varied or even contrasted with one another. In the case of some essential matters like 
marital status, the reasons and circumstances of the conversion were practically irrelevant. 
The descendants of a convert mother, whether forced or voluntary, were evidently regarded 
as Jews, at least as it concerned their marital capacity. But in most halakhic matters the 
circumstances of the conversion were relevant to the status of the convert, as forced 
converts were suitable for performing most of the religious precepts while voluntary 
converts were disqualified and excluded in many instances. It must be noted, that from a 
practical point of view the disqualification did not only have negative effects on the lives 
of the converts. For example, if a marriage contracted by a converso couple was declared 
invalid for any reason, the woman could more easily contract a new marriage with another 
person, if she decided to return to Judaism leaving her husband behind.3    
The issue of the return was the criterion that determined the rabbis’ attitude towards 
the conversos. The mere fact of the conversion, if it happened under coercion, was not 
regarded as a major transgression, but the convert was expected to emigrate to a place 
where he could return to Judaism and live as a Jew openly. If, for any reason, he refused to 
leave, he became suspected of voluntarily neglecting the religious regulations. The 
assessment of the possibility and probability of the converts’ emigration varied widely over 
time and place; depending on historical circumstances, the personality and experiences of 
the specific halakhic authority, the nature of the question and the particular case at hand. 
But when the question of returning to Judaism was discussed in a responsum, it was 
usually supposed that leaving Christian territory was possible and feasible, and thus it was 
generally assumed, that those who stayed nevertheless, remained voluntarily.4 Still, there is 
only a certain amount of hesitation about their judgment, and only in the responsa written 
in the period when massive forced conversion was a new phenomenon, that is, in the 
decades subsequent to the year 1391. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet in his responsum no. 11 
                                                 
3 This was not infrequent; see the chapter about marriage.  
4 Cf. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 4; Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66, 3:47; Simeon b. 
Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31. 
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offered a number of reasons that, to a certain extent, could excuse those lingering in 
Christian territory.5 He expounded that although the conversos were baptized by force, if 
they stayed in Christian land afterwards, they would gradually get used to transgress 
Jewish law, and therefore, it could not be assumed about them that they made every effort 
to observe the law. Some of them, however, remained there because of financial reasons, 
since they were incapable to cover the expenses of the emigration for the whole family. 
Such persons were afraid that their relatives might assimilate to the Christians (by mixed 
marriages, or by adopting their customs), and therefore choose to remain in Iberia so that 
they could take care of their families. According to the explication of Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet, that was not a legitimate reason for staying in Iberia, since one is obliged to leave 
the land of forced conversion at any cost. He emphasized however, that those who 
remained for the aforementioned reason, were not aware that they transgressed the law, 
and consequently, they were not responsible for their mistake. A similar, or even more 
lenient argumentation can be found in a responsum written by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
(TashbeÛ 1:63). In this responsum dealing with wine sent by a Majorcan converso before 
1408,6 he took a fairly positive stance towards the converts, and elaborated the issue of 
leaving Christian territory or staying in it, and offered several reasons to explain, and even 
justify the reluctance of the conversos. In his opinion, it was an error to suppose that the 
conversos could have emigrated freely; on the contrary, presumably, they remained 
because of the pressure of the circumstances, of financial reasons, or because they were 
terrified.  
In his view, even if it was evident that the conversos could have left without 
endangering themselves, they should not be treated as voluntary converts. He held that 
even a person who himself admitted that he had stayed in Christian territory only for 
financial reasons should be regarded as a forced convert. In his opinion, as he formulated it 
in this responsum, judging one’s motives for staying was beyond the capacity of any 
fellow creature. Only divine omniscience could determine whether a particular person was 
voluntary convert who stayed there on his own free will; or whether he stayed for a reason 
unknown to human observers.  
                                                 
5 For this responsum, see the chapter about divorce. 
6 The text mentions Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet, and the abbreviation that appears next to his name shows that he 
was still alive at the time of writing the responsum. This suggests that the responsum was written before 
1408. For the detailed discussion of this responsum see the chapter about wine. 
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Later however, in another responsum sent to Mallorca again concerning wine 
(TashbeÛ 1:66), he mentioned the same problem in a very different tone, and stated 
sarcastically that it was impossible to decide if a converso was forced or voluntary convert:  
 
We see that some of those who come here [to Algiers] are complete 
Gentiles, and who can decide which is worthy and which is disqualified? 
[...] Apparently, you do not have reservations if they stay there after they 
have received permission to leave; or if they do not consider leaving at all 
[…] Let alone those, who have been here and returned there of their own 
accord – should they be treated as forced converts or not? […] [in 
Majorca] they let converts do whatever they want, and they are not forced 
to commit idolatry, and they are almost considered as Jews by them [by 
Christians] to such an extent that they are given permission to leave the 
country if they wish. [...] They are indeed considered as Jews by 
Christians, even though according to the principle of Christian religion, if 
one converted, even under duress, he cannot return to Judaism. And for 
this reason, the Christians pretend that they do not see [the behavior of the 
converts]. The only effect of the persecution is that they have to use 
Gentiles names […], and seeing this situation, the converts think that it is 
permitted to stay there.7 
 
 It must be observed again that even though a great number of conversos did leave 
Mallorca and returned to Judaism in North-Africa, the emigration of the converts was not 
authorized by the Christians rulers. On the contrary, in Majorca, the Christian authorities 
issued subsequent decrees forbidding the conversos to leave the island.8 The necessity to 
renew the decrees indicates the fact that many converts disregarded it. Moreover, the 
remarks about Christians ignoring the conversos’ attempts of observing Jewish laws 
contradict the argumentation of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran expounded in the same 
responsum, according to which a converso guarding wine would not prevent a Christian 
from touching it, since he is obviously afraid that the latter would charge him with 
adhering to Judaism in secret. In the light of this, the remarks of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
(quoted above) about Christians letting the conversos do whatever they wanted seem to be 




                                                 
7 Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 1:66. For the extensive discussion of this responsum see the chapter 
about wine. 
8 The governor of Majorca prohibited the emigration of the converts after the persecutions of the year 1391. 
In 1413 Ferdinand I issued a decree that forbade the emigration of the converts to North Africa. Cf. Beinart: 
“Majorca” EJ 11:801-802 
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II. Formalities of reintegration into the Jewish community 
 
If the convert was born a Jew, his reintegration to the Jewish community had no 
formal requirements. In the period under discussion, I could not find any opinion requiring 
some kind of self-mortification, or exhibition of repentance.9 
If the convert was born a Christian and his parents were of Jewish origin,  baptized 
before having children, then various questions arose: whether the parents of the child could 
really be considered as Jews; whether he could prove it; if not, how the presumed legal 
status of the parents should be determined; how the parents got married (according to 
Jewish rite, according to Christian rite or both); whether the witnesses of the marriage were 
valid (whether the witnesses were Jews or conversos; in the latter case, whether they were 
considered voluntary or forced converts); and if the child was born from the second 
marriage of his parents, whether the first marriage and the divorce were valid (because in 
case the first marriage was valid but the divorce was not, then the second marriage was 
considered adultery, and the child born of it was considered illegitimate). 
Once the conversos’ descent was clarified, he could be integrated into the Jewish 
community. The formalities of that included the arrangement of the convert’s personal 
relations (for example, if he returned together with his wife, they were supplied with a 
Jewish marriage document, etc.), and the remedy of several unfulfilled acts, such as 
circumcision. Questions arose concerning some details of the formalities: it was not 
evident whether the converso had to undergo circumcision only, or ritual immersion as 
well; whether he had to declare in the presence of three that he had the intention to observe 





                                                 
9 There is only a very short remark of Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet mentioning the forced baptism his community 
underwent: “After the things happened to us, we are not supposed to behave with such superiority, but it is 
more fitting to us ‘to give our backs to the smiters’ [cf. Isa 50:6] maybe we will attain atonement.” (Isaac b. 
Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 61) Rabbis in the 16th century seldom mention the need of self-mortification in 
connection with returning conversos, and even when they did, they refuse its use as it is obvious from the 
remarks of David ibn Avi Zimra (Responsa, 3:434) and Binjamin Zeev, both of whom opposed this practice: 
“I think one does not need to chastise himself, since there is no greater mortification of the flesh than that he 
suffers each and every day anyway: namely, that he has to abstain from all those pleasures which are 
permitted to the Gentiles, and were permitted to him also formerly [before his return to Judaism].” (Binjamin 
Zeev: Responsa, no. 72.) 
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II.1. Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsum no. 89 “Maamar ha-anusim” (Treatise about 
the forced converts)10 
The responsum is not an answer given to an actual question but a kind of essay; for 
the same reason it is called “Maamar ha-anusim” (Treatise about the forced converts) in 
the texts that mention it.11 The wording of the introductory phrase of the responsum is 
highly interesting: “The sons of these meshummadim [voluntary converts], called anusim 
[forced converts], who are uncircumcised, and when they come to return to Judaism, it is 
necessary to clarify the laws regarding their reintegration, circumcision and ritual 
immersion.”12  
 This sentence is of course too brief to draw far-reaching conclusions on its basis, 
but it can be suggested nevertheless that in the opinion of Solomon b. Simeon Duran those 
conversos who did not leave Iberia in order to immigrate to a land where they could 
practice Judaism freely were indeed meshummadim (voluntary converts), even if they had 
been baptized forcibly. On the other hand, their descendants were to be regarded as anusim 
(forced converts), all the more so if they fled from Iberia and wished to return to Judaism. 
 But there is another possible interpretation of the sentence, namely, that the phrase 
“called anusim” does not relate to the sons of the meshummadim, but to the meshummadim 
themselves. Hebrew grammar makes this interpretation of the sentence as possible as the 
first one. In this case, the wording of the sentence gives evidence of the confused use of the 
terms meshummadim and anusim, that, for some speakers, seemed to be interchangeable.13     
 The first issue Solomon b. Simeon Duran clarified in the responsum is that 
returning conversos are not to be confused with proselytes, since if their mother was 
Jewish, they were Jews, even if their father was a Gentile.14 After discussing the marital 
                                                 
10 For the discussion of this responsum see Netanyahu 1966:45-48. 
11 Cf. Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 393, dealing with marriage contracted by a voluntary 
convert. The context of the responsum suggests that the convert in question adopted Islam, not Christianity. 
In any case, in the answer, Solomon b. Simeon Duran referred his readers to his responsum no. 89, which he 
called “Maamar ha-anusim.” Cf. also  ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75, 1:107 
12 Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 89 
13 Cf. ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75: “After having that clarified it must be discussed if 
these meshummadim called anusim are to be considered as Jews or proselytes.”  
14 About the same issue, see the end part of his responsum no. 223. The question of that responsum did not 
survive; the text elucidates different and apparently unconnected problems. Among them, it relates to the 
subject of parenthood in the case of converts, and ascertains that voluntary or forced converts do not differ 
from Jews with regard to their parental relationship (that is, even if one of the parents or the children 
converted, the kinship was not suspended among them). Solomon b. Simeon Duran mentioned furthermore, 
that a forced or voluntary convert returning to Judaism is not to be called proselyte (ger), but a repentant Jew 
(yisrael baal teshuvah).    
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status of the conversos,15 Solomon b. Simeon Duran elaborated the practical aspects and 
the formal requirement about the reintegration of conversos into the Jewish community. 
 
II.1.1. Conversos returning to Judaism are not required to accept the precepts 
Proselytes wishing to embrace Jewish religion are to be taught some precepts and 
they have to declare their intention of observing these and the rest of the Jewish law. 
However, as Solomon b. Simeon Duran explained, this did not apply to returning 
conversos, since they did not have the possibility of choosing whether they wanted to 
observe Jewish law or not, since, as members of the Jewish people, they were obliged to 
observe it from the outset. 
 
II.1.2. Conversos returning to Judaism do not need ritual immersion 
As a ritual immersion is prescribed for proselytes only, returning conversos were 
not obliged to undergo it. 
 
II.1.3. Blessings of the circumcision 
According to Solomon b. Simeon Duran, conversos were obliged to say the 
blessing over circumcision just as the father of a baby is obliged to pronounce the blessing 
before his son’s circumcision. It was controversial, however, which blessing formula 
should be used; the one with the “al” preposition and a noun, or else the other with the “l” 
preposition and an infinitive.16 Solomon b. Simeon Duran explained that a commandment 
executed by means of an agent has to be blessed upon with the formula of “al” preposition 
and the noun. Circumcision is apparently a commandment performed by means of an agent 
(the person who actually circumcises the other). On the other hand, since the converso is 
an adult, he himself chooses to be circumcised and takes actions in order to comply with 
this precept, which means that in essence he himself executes it, therefore the formula of 
“l” and infinitive should be used. Solomon b. Simeon Duran concluded that this question 
was not decided unanimously, therefore the prevalent practice should be followed, that is, 
using the blessing formula with the “al” preposition and the noun.     
                                                 
15 See the chapter about marriage. 
16 These are two basic types of blessings. The difference lies in the prepositional phrase or infinitive used in 
the second part of the sentence, indicating the specific precept to be carried out: “Blessed are You, O Lord, 
our God, ruler of the universe, who sanctified us with his precepts and commanded us about the circumcision 




II.1.4. Healing the wound 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran, who ––like his father and other members of the family–
– had vast medical knowledge, gave several practical advices for curing the wound caused 
by the circumcision, explaining along the line the details of the healing mechanism. The 
ointments and poultices proposed contained mixtures of yolk, olive oil, cumin, white of 
egg, etc.  
 
II.1.5. Supplication for the conversos 
The responsum quotes a short supplication that was probably recited at the event of 
the formal acceptation of the conversos into the Jewish community. The text is as follows: 
 
Our God, the God of our fathers, benefit the servant called so-and-so and 
bestow upon him your favor, since you aroused his heart to repent with 
pure repentance, now plant your love and your fear into his heart, and 
open his heart to your Law, and lead him in the path of your 
commandments, so that he may find grace before you, let it be your will, 
amen!17   
 
II.2. Uncircumcised conversos 
(Remarks in Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3, 2:19, 2:31) 
In the case of the third (and further) generations of conversos, whose parents were 
born Christians, it is not clear whether one having an uncircumcised father could be 
considered a Jew. Although no halakhic authority gave a negative answer to the last 
question, there were people who held an opposite opinion, as evidenced by questions and 
passages cited in the responsa reflecting the views of the inquirers. These passages advance 
arguments as the following: 
 
…you have also written – I quote it – but their father was uncircumcised 
and was a voluntary idolater, and their mother had neither legal marriage 
ceremony, nor marriage document and they [the parents] did not observe 
the precepts concerning the purity of marital life – they were born from 
niddah18 women and uncircumcised men!19 
                                                 
17 Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa, no. 89 
18 Niddah: period unfit for marital life; woman who is in a period which is unfit for marital life (like the 
menstruation and the following days).  




 This inquirer thought that the lack of circumcision affected basically the marital 
status of the conversos thus disqualifying them from marriage. As a consequence, in the 
inquirer’s view, the descendants of the uncircumcised conversos who decided to return to 
Judaism were not to be accepted as kohanim, as the fact that their fathers were 
uncircumcised was a blemish that affected the status of their sons. Simeon b. Solomon 
Duran mentioned the same erroneous opinion in his responsum concerning levirate 
marriage: “The descendant [of a convert] should not be disqualified as a potential Jew only 
because his father was uncircumcised.”20 In the opinion of others, although the conversos 
might be considered potential Jews, and thus fit for marriage; nonetheless, if they were 
uncircumcised, their marriages were invalid even if they were of Jewish descent: “…in the 
view of some learned men, the woman may get married again since the marriages of the 
forced converts are not valid, because they are not circumcised.”21 No legal decision was 
found according to which the circumstances mentioned above did affect the status of the 
conversos.  
 
II.3. Proselytes or returning Jews? Ritual immersion 
(Remarks in Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsa nos. 223, 368; ÚemaÎ b. Solomon 
Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75; Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3, 2:31) 
The difference between a ger (proselyte) and a baal-teshuva (a person of Jewish 
descent who returns to Judaism) was unclear for a relatively great number of the inquirers. 
For this reason, the authors of the responsa generally tried to clarify these concepts, and 
emphasized the difference between the two notions by pointing out the various differences 
between them.  
Since the returning converso is not a proselyte, ritual immersion is not prescribed 
for him. The proselyte has to meet three formal requirements in order to be accepted as a 
Jew: 1) circumcision; 2) ritual immersion; 3) acceptance of the precepts in the presence of 
three persons. The conversos, however, had to accomplish the first condition only. They 
did not have to be admitted to the Jewish people (as they remained members of it due to 
their descent), only to remedy the lack of circumcision. As ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran put 
                                                 
20 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31. For the detailed discussion of this responsum see the 
chapters about marriage and levirate marriage.  
21 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:19. For the detailed discussion of this responsum see the 
chapter about marriage.   
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it: “Ritual immersion was not prescribed for these meshummadim called anusim, and they 
are not called gerim22 but baalei-teshuva.”23 
The question of the necessity of ritual immersion arose in the cases when the 
converso could not prove his mother’s Jewish descent. According to the view formulated 
by Simeon b. Solomon Duran, since the general presumption was that conversos did not 
marry Gentiles, it should be assumed that the mother of a returning converso was of Jewish 
descent as well: “This presumption is proven by the common practice of reputed 
authorities everywhere who obliged returning forced converts to undergo circumcision 
only and not ritual immersion, since they are not suspected of having Gentile mothers. It is 
a common presumption that converts do not marry Gentiles.”24 (The same considerations 
can be found also in Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3) 
 
II.4. Examining personal motives of conversos returning to Judaism 
(Remark in Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsum no. 368) 
The responsum deals with proselytes, but passim mentions conversos returning to 
Judaism. A Gentile who wishes to adopt Jewish faith so that he or she could marry a 
Jewish man or woman is refused by the rabbinical court of law.25 Conversos willing to 
return to Judaism, however, should not be held back on account of their attraction to a 
Jewish woman or man. Both the question and the answer use the term anusim (“anusei ha-
zeman, anusim ellu”: forced converts of our days, these forced converts). The answer 
mentions that also descendants of conversos should be accepted even if the motives of their 
return were not void of personal interest related to marriage. Solomon b. Simeon Duran 
made reference to an aggadah related in the Talmud according to which R. Johanan 
persuaded Resh Lakish to repent his misdeeds by offering him his daughter to marry her.26 
Solomon b. Simeon Duran did not elaborate the issue of returning conversos, but the short 
reference to the question shows that the intention of conversos wishing to rejoin the Jewish 
community might have been examined to a certain extent by the rabbinical authorities. 
However, as opposed to prospective gerim, they were encouraged to join the Jewish people 
                                                 
22 Ger (singular), gerim (plural): proselyte.  
23 ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 1:75. Cf. also Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31, 
and  Solomon b. Simeon Duran: Responsum no. 223.  
24 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:31 
25 Cf. bYeb 24b, bBM 72a; MT Hilkhot Issurei Biah 13:14 
26 Rash Lakish was a robber but after repenting his sins, he became a student of R. Johanan. Cf. bBM 84a  
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regardless of their intention.27 Unfortunately, the responsum does not deal with the issue of 
conversos descending from mixed marriages, although it would be interesting to know 
whether the descendant of a Gentile mother and a converso father was treated absolutely in 
the same way as a Gentile (of pure Gentile origin) in this respect, or if he – being ‘from the 




III. Kohanim  
Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3 
 
The kohanim (priests, sing.: kohen), that is, the descendants of the family of Aaron 
were in charge originally of the Temple service. By the Middle Ages, their functions 
became more limited, and their descent obscure. They could not prove with certainty their 
descent from ancient priestly families, still, they were held as presumed priests by the 
members of the Jewish communities.28 There are special regulations applied to the 
kohanim; e.g. avoiding the impurity caused by the dead, or prohibitions relating marriage 
with certain women, like divorcees or “prostitutes” (the term “prostitute” (zonah) is not 
used in the general sense, but refers to a special group of women defined by Jewish law).29 
A privilege of the kohen is that he is called first to read the Torah during the synagogue 
service.      
 From among the returning conversos, some claimed to be descendants of priestly 
families and as such, they wished to enjoy their privilege of reading the first portion. This 
is an honor that distinguishes the kohen from the ordinary members of the community. 
Unfortunately, there is only one responsum that treats this problem, and the original 
question of the responsum survived only in brief quotations inserted in the text of the 
answer. Therefore, it cannot be clearly decided whether the inquirer (or his community) 
thought that the conversos ––due to the act of conversion–– became unworthy of such 
                                                 
27 Of course in case of conversos that means rejoining the Jewish people, as they never became wholly 
separated from it from a halakhic point of view (at least, if their mother was Jewish or of Jewish descent), 
therefore conversos are not similar to Gentile proselytes.   
28 Cf. MT Hilkhot Issurei Biah 20:1-2 
29 About the relations forbidden to the kohanim, and the so-called “prostitutes” see: MT Hilkhot Issurei Biah, 
17:1, 18:1  
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honor or not (despite their return to Judaism), but the wording of the passages quoted from 
the question indicates some kind of refusal towards them.30 
The responsum discusses whether the returning conversos who claimed that they 
were kohanim could be relied upon or not. The passages cited from the question make 
obvious that in the opinion of the inquirer, the converts in general were not to be accepted 
as kohanim. The main reasons of their disqualification were: 1) their fathers were 
uncircumcised and willful idolaters; 2) their parents were not married according to the 
Jewish law; 3) their mothers were ritually impure since conversos did not observe the laws 
concerning the purity of marital life. Simeon b. Solomon Duran refused these arguments 
by demonstrating that they were irrelevant either to the requirements of being a kohen, or 
to the marital status of the converts. He established furthermore that it has to be presumed 
that conversos do not marry Gentile women.31  
The question cited by Simeon b. Solomon Duran shows that the inquirer did not 
distinguish between proselytes and repentant convert Jews, as it is evidenced by his 
formulation of the question: “…these proselytes (gerim) that come from the kingdoms of 
Catalonia, Castile and Portugal in order to accept the Jewish faith (lehitgayyer) […] and 
each one of them says: ‘I am a kohen’…”32   
Simeon b Solomon Duran clarified the difference between a converso returning to 
Judaism and a Gentile accepting Jewish religion, remarking the obvious error of the 
inquirer, whose question would be senseless if it concerned real proselytes (since 
proselytes cannot be of priestly origin).  
According to the explanation of Simeon b. Solomon Duran, no sin could disqualify 
a kohen from acting as such, in case he repents his sin(s). A kohen is disqualified only if 
his descent does not fit the requirements; e.g. if his mother was either a divorced woman, 
or a “prostitute.” But, as Simeon b. Solomon Duran explained, convert couples, although 
they could not marry according to Jewish law, did not establish licentious relationships, but 
lived together with the intent of marriage. What is more, convert families knew each other 
very well, and they were aware of the descent of their fellows: “…all the forced converts 
know each other well, and they know the family and the descent of each one of them, so 
                                                 
30 See e.g. the following: “…you have also written – I quote it – but their fathers were uncircumcised and 
were voluntary idolaters […], they were born from niddah women and uncircumcised men!” (Simeon b. 
Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3) 
31 For the detailed discussion of these questions see the chapter about marriage. 
32 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3 
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they say: ‘he is from this family, and the other is from that family’, and they know also 
those who are held to be kohanim.”33 
Consequently, according to Simeon b Solomon Duran, conversos did not differ 
from Jews in this respect. As a Jew could be held a kohen if one witness testified that he 
was accepted as such in a certain community, the converso had to be regarded as a kohen if 
there was a witness to prove that he was held as such among the families of the converts. 
 
 
IV. Christian authorities confiscating the property of conversos who emigrate 
IV.1. Remark in Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 2 
The responsum discusses whether it is permitted to evade certain oppressive laws or 
duties as tax-paying. The circumstances of the case under discussion are not given in 
detail, but the scene is Valencia. The responsum passim mentions that the king confiscated 
the property of the conversos and Jews who left his kingdom. In Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet’s 
opinion in such cases it was permitted to evade the oppressive laws decreed by the king 
even by means of trickery, as they did not pertain to the category of “dina de-malkhuta 
dina” (Aramaic: “the law of the government is binding”). 
 
It is permitted to evade the [Gentile] law by means of [a false] vow or 
oath, if it is done because of the oppressors[’ deeds], namely, that the 
oppressor or the king acts insidiously and illicitly in order to confiscate 
property, as he is doing now with the property of the forced converts who 
have escaped in order to return to Judaism, or with the property of the 
Jews who left his land […][the procedure of the king] is not lawful, but he 
enacts bad laws against them in order to confiscate their property.34    
 
IV.2. Remark in Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran: TashbeÛ 2:176  
The responsum deals with the obligation of the husband to pay his wife’s ketubah 
(sum fixed in the marriage contract in case of divorce). The text refers to the Christian law 
operating in Majorca according to which the property of the conversos who emigrate from 
there is confiscated by the Christian authorities. Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran ––as opposed to 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet––claims with regard to this that “dina de-malkhuta dina,” that is, 
                                                 
33 Simeon b. Solomon Duran: Yakhin u-Voaz 2:3 
34 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 2. 
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the law of the government is binding. For the detailed presentation of this responsum see 
the chapter about divorce. 
  
 
V. The Jewish community in Algiers tries to impede the immigration of conversos  
(Remark in Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsum no. 61) 
 
The responsum discusses the possibility of limiting the scholars’ right to 
excommunicate members of the Jewish community. With reference to this question, the 
responsum mentions and describes in detail a case occurred in Algiers, when members of 
the Jewish community led by a newcomer from Majorca tried to impede the entrance of a 
group of conversos who fled from Iberia and wished to join the Jewish community of 
Algiers.   
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet did not mention the person leading the protest against the 
entrance of the conversos by name; neither did he specify his position in the Jewish 
community. According to the scarce information contained in the responsum, this person 
came from Majorca, where he already had a long history of opposing and defying local 
rabbinic authorities. After his arrival to Algiers, he endeavoured to become “head and 
leader of the community,” and he strove to remove Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet from the city. 
The leaders of the community wished to excommunicate this person due to his constant 
intrigues, but Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet prevented them from doing so saying that “after the 
things happened to us, we are not supposed to behave with such superiority, but it is more 
fitting to us to offer our backs to those who beat us and our cheeks to those who pull out 
our beard35 - maybe we will attain atonement.”36 Notwithstanding this humble attitude, 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet admitted that upon hearing that some members of the community 
tried to impede the immigration of the conversos and wished to return them to Majorca he 
lost his temper and pronounced words of excommunication against those hindering the 
immigration of the conversos. This led to the enactment of a communal agreement, 
according to which no person should excommunicate another without the consent of the 
trustees of the community (ne’emanim).  
                                                 
35 This is a reference to Isa 50:6: “I offered my back to those who beat me, my cheeks to those who pulled 
out my beard; I did not hide my face from mocking and spitting.” 
36 This seems to be a reference to baptism that many Iberian Jews underwent in 1391, including possibly 
Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet. About the question if Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet was among those forcibly baptized see 
Riera i Sans 1983. 
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 The responsum mentions that each immigrant had to pay an entry tax of one 
doubloon, although previously they could enter and settle in Algiers for free.  
 
It happened that one day a boat has arrived from Majorca with 45 forced 
converts from Mallorca, Valencia, and Barcelona. The ruler of the city 
wanted to let them enter the city for the sake of financial gain, as he made 
pay them one doublon each [as an entry tax]. This decree was enacted 
because of this individual, although originally they could enter free of 
charge. […] And this individual made every effort in order for the 
community to persuade the ruler against their disembarking, so that they 
would return to Majorca.37  
 
Finally, the request of the newcomers was granted, and they could settle in Algiers. This 
responsum sheds light on the difficult situations the immigrants had to face even from the 
part of their own brethren. I cannot maintain the view according to which this conflict was 
the result of the tension among the native Jewish population of Algiers and the Iberian 
newcomers,38 since the leader of the opposition here was himself a Majorcan Jew, and the 
members of the community which supported him were from the community whose 
rabbinic authority was Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet himself.39 
 
 
 VI. Conclusion 
 
 The responsa presented above indicate that the reintegration of the conversos and 
their descendants into the Jewish communities did not lack certain tensions. Problems 
emerged mostly in the cases of second and further generations of converts, who ––due to 
their circumstances–– inevitably became alienated from Judaism, and were not raised in 
families observant of the regulations of the Torah. As the questions and the remarks of the 
respondents allude, for many inquirers the difference between proselytes and returning 
conversos was far from being obvious; and it is also probable that for some the lack of 
circumcision meant more than a mere deficiency to be repaired – it was regarded as a 
factor that basically questioned the Jewish identity of the conversos. Rabbinic authorities 
                                                 
37 Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet: Responsa, no. 61. Cf. Hirschberg 1974:386. 
38 This position is held by Epstein 1968:14-16. 
39 Iberian Jews formed their own congregations and did not join the existing congregations of native North-
African Jews, see Epstein 1968:14, cf. also Hirschberg 1974:386. Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet and his opponent 
were members of the same congregation as it is evidenced by the responsum. There is absolutely no 
indication that the conflict would have included Jews native to Algier.   
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however strongly emphasized the fact that the Jewish identity of the conversos was 
unrelated to such conditions, and depended solely on the Jewish descent of their mother. 
They repeatedly ascertained that the conversos pertained to the Jewish people in the sense 
that in theory, they were equally obliged to observe the commandments of the Torah, even 





 Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
The thesis presented the responsa concerning conversos written by five of the most 
important halakhic authorities from the period between 1391 and 1492. Although the 
number of legal decisions dealing with Jewish converts to Christianity is limited, it is 
possible to draw some reasoned conclusions on their evidence nevertheless. I analyzed 
forty-nine responsa systematically, seventeen of which were written by Isaac b. Sheshet 
Perfet; nineteen by Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran; seven by Solomon b. Simeon Duran, three by 
ÚemaÎ b. Solomon Duran, and three by Simeon b. Solomon Duran. These numbers 
indicate a clear tendency of decrease, as in the course of the fifteenth century, the legal 
status of the conversos became apparently less and less controversial. In the years and 
decades after the massive forced conversion that befell on the Jewish communities of 
Iberia, the newly emerging social group of forced converts implied a challenge for both 
their former and new religious communities. As a matter of fact, they did not wholly 
detach from Judaism; neither did they embrace Christianity entirely. They remained 
attached to the Jewish community by ties of mutual dependence; by bonds of kinship, 
custom, and necessity. The halakhic authorities had to define their opinion about the legal 
status of the populous group of conversos who lived in the neighborhood, and in several 
cases, in an actual coexistence with the Jews. 
The two rabbinic authorities who laid the foundations for the halakhic debate 
concerning the position of the conversos were Isaac b. Sheshet Perfet and Simeon b. 
ÚemaÎ Duran. Most of their decisions dealt with problems related to marriage, divorce, 
and dietary laws. Their responsa give evidence of the conversos’ quite deep involvement in 
the daily life of the Jews. Jews and conversos used to eat together, prepare food and wine 
together, they participated together in family events. Apparently the reality of shared 
everyday life gradually faded away. The responsa written by the later authorities, that is, 
the descendants of Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran, answer questions that arouse mostly in 
connection with the return of the conversos to Judaism. They treat fundamental issues as 
the marital status of the converts, while discussions concerning other issues, like dietary 
laws, wine prepared or handled by conversos, virtually disappeared.  
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 In fact, the matter discussed most extensively by the five authorities was the marital 
status of the conversos. In this respect, none of them regarded the conversos as being in an 
inherently inferior position to non-convert Jews; but the formulation of the questions, and 
the necessity of expounding the problem lengthily again and again signifies that for the 
inquirers it was not clear whether conversos were similar to Jews, or to Christians in this 
regard. The fact that the terms and denominations applied to the conversos by the inquirers 
were far from being consequent and precise implies that the legal state of the conversos 
were often confounded with that of the Gentiles. Conversos emigrating from Iberia, 
settling in North Africa, and rejoining the Jewish communities there, were frequently 
called proselytes, as if they were of non-Jewish origin (notwithstanding the widely 
accepted view often repeated in the responsa that conversos tended to marry within the 
converso community). That still does not mean that Jews regarded the conversos as 
Gentiles, but can simply be an imprecise and vague parlance from the part of the inquirers, 
who were not necessarily experts in the terminology and nuances of the Jewish law. This 
suggestion is further supported by the fact that sometimes even the rabbinic authorities 
themselves were not void of certain inconsistencies when referring to conversos 
alternatively as voluntary converts (meshummadim) or forced converts (anusim), 
apparently irrespective of the circumstances of the conversion. Examples of the 
inconsequent use of these terms have been pointed out several times in the course of the 
analysis of the texts.     
 In any case, the principle that the marital status of the conversos is equal to that of 
the Jews was never challenged by the authorities. Their marriages were not always 
accepted as valid, but the invalidation had reasons unrelated to the converts’ marital status. 
Marriages were declared null and void because of basic formal deficiencies, like unfit 
witnesses and the involvement of the Christian Church. Likewise, it was not a matter of 
real dispute whether the conversos were bound by the obligation of levirate marriage 
(which meant, in practice performing the ÎaliÛah – unless they returned to Judaism, of 
course). It was discussed to a limited extent whether the conversion put an end to the 
fraternal relationship between the brothers, but in practice none of the authorities 
disqualified conversos from fulfilling the obligation of levirate.  
Conversos, just as they were fit for marriage and levirate marriage, were fit for 
giving a divorce document as well. However, they were not unconditionally fit for writing 
or attesting the divorce document. In the cases mentioned in the responsa discussed, an 
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investigation concerning the individual conversos was suggested in order to decide 
whether they were fit for writing and attesting a divorce document, or not.  
As for the question whether conversos qualified as witnesses of either a marriage, a 
divorce document, or the kashrut of wine, it can be stated that as a group, they lost their 
status of being valid witnesses in a relatively short time. Only Simeon b. ÚemaÎ Duran 
showed a greater degree of confidence in the conversos’ strict adherence to Judaism, and 
even he abandoned his view later. Therefore it was generally supposed that the conversos, 
since they remained in Christian lands, under the vigilance of the Christian authorities, 
adopted Christian manners and way of life. Consequently, the conversos were assumed to 
disregard Jewish law even in the cases they could observe it without endangering 
themselves. It has to be noted, however, that these statements were frequently made in 
close connection with difficulties that conversos returning to Judaism had to face. In their 
case, the disqualification of conversos remaining in Iberia from performing various acts 
had in practice many positive consequences1 for the reintegration of the returning 
conversos into the Jewish communities. For example, a woman whose marriage contracted 
with a converso was annulled, or who was declared to be unrelated to her convert levir, 
could easily marry again. On the other hand, if a divorce document attested by conversos 
was pronounced null and void, the same woman could become an agunah. However, this 
problem affected only the first generation of conversos, who got married under Jewish law, 
before their conversion. In the case of the later generations, owing to the involvement of 
the Christian Church, or the disqualification of the witnesses, the marriage could be 
annulled from the outset, therefore no divorce was necessary. The latest authority 
discussed in the thesis, Simeon b. Solomon Duran, was the first in formulating the view 
that it has to be presumed that the mothers of the returning conversos were of Jewish 
descent; that is, that the returning conversos as a rule were of pure Jewish origin. This 
statement was frequently repeated by a number of halakhic authorities of the sixteenth 
century.      
In theory, a converso was entitled to inherit his relatives, in practice, however, 
some authorities preferred to deprive them of their inheritance and to transfer the property 
to the possession of other, possibly Jewish heirs, or to the Jewish community, until the 
converso returned to Judaism.  
                                                 
1 It does not mean that it had no negative consequences at all; see below.  
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The number of the responsa treating questions related to the conversos’ return to 
Judaism increased in the second half of the fifteenth century. They discussed problems that 
arose with regard to the second and further generations of converts who left Iberia and 
settled in North Africa. As it was already stated, the responsa give evidence of a certain 
perplexity on the part of the inquirers regarding the halakhic status of the converts. The 
rabbinic authorities discussed extensively the practical aspects of the conversos’ 
reintegration into the Jewish community and declared unanimously that they never became 
inherently detached from the Jewish people, for in theory, they were as obliged to observe 
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